Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology
Philosophia theologiae ancillans (Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII + Secunda Art. I-XV)
Only God is necessary being: real being divides into creator and creature§1
1First Exercise. On being and essence.
Article I. The first division of real being is set out, and it is shown that God alone is necessary being.
Real being is first divided into finite and infinite — that is, into creator and creature. This division is commonly handed down and proposed in many other ways. Some put it thus: one being is from itself, another from another. Others thus: of beings, some are or exist by essence, others by participation. Others thus: one being is necessary, another contingent. The glorious God is infinite being, having existence from no other; he is likewise being by essence, and supremely necessary. Creatures, however, are finite beings, having existence from another; and therefore they are not necessary, but contingent.
2. The first two ways of proposing this division need no explanation; the last two are not so clear, and therefore they call for a longer account. I will begin from the last division, which is into necessary being and contingent being. The glorious God is called necessary being because it is necessary that he always exist in act. For God cannot deprive himself of his own being — that is, of the act of existence — nor can anything else do so, since he does not depend on another. Creatures, however, are contingent beings; that is, they exist contingently. For they hang upon the conserving power of a freely acting cause — that is, of God — who, before he gave them being, could have refused to give it, and after he has given it can take it away.
3. Many objections are usually raised here about the necessity of separated substances, of the heavenly bodies, of prime matter, of universal natures, and of necessary propositions, to which philosophers ascribe eternal truth. But because those thorny questions deter many by their difficulty and call them away from philosophical studies, I omit them and go on to other matters that are more necessary and more pleasant.
Latin · §1
EXERCITATIO PRIMA De Ente & Essentia. ART. I. Affertur prima divisio Entis realis, & ostenditur solum DEUM esse Ens necessarium. Ens reale, primo dividitur, in finitum & infinitum; hoc est, in creatorem & creaturam: quae quidem divisio, multis aliis modis tradi & proponi solet: quidam enim hanc divisionem sic proponunt; Ens aliud est a se, aliud ab alio: alii sic; Entium alia sunt seu existunt per essentiam, alia per participationem: alii sic; Ens aliud est necessarium, aliud contingens. DEUS gloriosus est ens infinitum, ab alio non habens existentiam: item est Ens per essentiam, & summe necessarium: Creaturae vero sunt entia finita, ab alio existentiam habentia; ideoque non necessaria, sed contingentia. 2. Duo primi modi proponendi hanc divisionem, explicatione non egent: duo vero postremi, non ita perspicui sunt: idcirco longiorem explicationem postulant: ego exordiar a postrema divisione, quae est in Ens necessarium, & Ens contingens. Dicitur DEUS gloriosus Ens necessarium; quia necesse est eum semper actu existere; neque enim potest DEUS privare seipsum suo esse, id est, existentiae actu; neque aliud quidpiam id potest, cum ab alio non pendeat. Creaturae vero sunt entia contingentia; id est, contingenter existunt: pendent enim a conservativa virtute causae libere agentis; id est, DEI, qui antequam dedit iis esse, potuit illud non dare; & postquam dedit, potest auferre. 3. Multa hic objici solent de necessitate substantiarum separatarum, corporum caelestium, materiae primae, naturarum universalium, & propositionum necessariarum, quibus aeterna veritas Philosophis tribuitur: verum quia spinosae istae quaestiones, multos sua difficultate deterrent, & avocant a studiis Philosophicis: ego, iis omissis, ad alia pergam, quae magis necessaria & jucunda sunt.
Only God is being by essence: existence is of the divine essence, not of the creature§2
2Article II. The second division of real being is proposed, and it is proved that God alone is being by essence.
This division is into being by essence and being by participation. Being by essence is the glorious God, who exists by the force of his own essence. Beings by participation are created beings, which have no actual and real existence in the world except as communicated and participated from another by whom they were produced — that is, from God. But that it may be understood how God is said to exist by the force of his essence, let these foundations be held.
First: the existence of God is of his essence. That is, it is not something superadded to the divine essence, nor ought it to be conceived by us as something superadded to it, but it is something included in the very essence of God, no less than animality or rationality is enclosed in human essence. This is shown thus: every substantial perfection is of the essence of God (for the essence of God would not be of infinite perfection if some perfection were granted which his essence does not enclose in itself); but existence is a substantial perfection, as is plain to anyone; therefore it is of the essence of God. Just as, therefore, it is of the essence of a human being to be an animal, or a body, or a substance, so it is of the essence of God to be something actually existing.
2. On the contrary, it is neither necessary nor possible that the existence of a creature be of its essence. It is not necessary, because the essence of a creature is not of infinite perfection. It is not possible, because whatever is of the essence of a thing necessarily belongs to that thing, and its affirmation of that thing is necessary and of eternal truth. But existence does not stand thus in creatures: for I do not truly say, it is necessary that a rose exist, or it is necessary that thunder exist — for they can fail to exist. Yet I do truly say, it is necessary that a rose be a flower, or that thunder be a sound, even when rose and thunder do not exist. Hence it is plain that these latter are essential predications, but not those former. This reason proves not only that existence is not of the essence of a creature, but also that existence does not necessarily follow the essence of a creature or flow from it. For whatever is essential by flowing forth is necessarily affirmed of the thing to which it is essential; but actual existence (as has been said) belongs to creatures contingently. Meanwhile we admit that the capacity or potency for existence belongs not contingently but necessarily and essentially to every real being, whether created or uncreated; but the same is not to be said of actual existence.
3. Let the second foundation be this. If anyone asks whence it is that God exists and cannot fail to exist, no reason can be given except this one: namely, because his essence is of infinite perfection — that is, it encloses every perfection in itself, and therefore existence also. Hence it is plain that God is rightly said to exist by the force of his essence. But if the question is moved concerning creatures — whence it is that they now actually exist — one must not answer that this happens because such is their essence, or because that is the condition of their essence; for their essence is indifferent to existing and not existing — that is, it can exist or not exist at the will of God. Rather one must answer that the true reason of that fact is that their essence, which earlier was only possible and apt for existing, has now been given the very act of existence by God and by secondary causes. Creatures therefore cannot be said to exist by the force of their essence, but by the force of the causes from which they were produced, and chiefly of the first cause. Hence it follows that they are not beings by their own essence, but by participation and reception of existence from the first cause. Besides, the reason of this matter can be given from this very clear foundation: it is the condition of the divine essence that it cannot fail to exist, and that it cannot participate its existence from another; but it is the condition of a created essence that it can, at the will of the first cause, have existence or not have it, and that it cannot exist except by participating the act of existence from the first cause. Hence it is plain that the first cause exists by the force of its essence; but secondary causes, or created beings, do not exist by the force of their essence, but through the action of the first cause from which they receive actual existence.
4. Third foundation. The essence of a creature is rightly and truly called potency; but the existence of a creature may well be called an act superadded to the essence. This is declared thus: just as physical matter is called potency and physical form act, because matter in itself and from itself has no form, but is capable of form, or can receive form, so the essence of a creature can be called potency, because it neither encloses existence in itself nor has it from itself, but is capable of it, or can receive it and participate it from the first cause. But on the contrary the essence of God stands far otherwise: for in itself it encloses the act of existing; and therefore it does not stand toward existence as potency toward act — for no potency encloses act in itself, but is referred to act as to something external. And so much concerning the division of being into finite and infinite.
Latin · §2
ART. II. Proponitur secunda divisio Entis realis, & probatur solum DEUM esse Ens per essentiam. Haec divisio est in Ens per essentiam, & Ens per participationem: Ens per essentiam, est DEUS gloriosus, qui vi suae essentiae existit. Entia vero per participationem, sunt entia creata, quae non habent actualem & realem existentiam in mundo, nisi communicatam & participatam ab alio, a quo producta sunt; hoc est, a DEO. Ut autem intelligatur, quo modo DEUS dicatur vi suae essentiae existere, teneantur haec fundamenta: Primo, Existentia DEI est de ejus essentia; hoc est, non est quid superadditum divinae essentiae, neque a nobis concipi debet, tanquam quid ei superadditum, sed est aliquid in ipsa DEI essentia inclusum, non minus, quam animalitas aut rationalitas in essentia humana clauditur: hoc autem sic ostenditur: omnis perfectio substantialis est de essentia DEI (non enim esset essentia DEI infinitae perfectionis si daretur aliqua perfectio, quam ejus essentia non claudit in se) sed existentia est substantialis perfectio, ut cuivis manifestum est: ergo est de essentia DEI. Sicut igitur est de essentia hominis esse animal, aut corpus, aut substantiam, ita est de essentia DEI esse aliquid actu existens. 2. Contra vero, neque necesse, neque possibile est, existentiam creaturae esse de ejus essentia. Non est necesse, quia essentia creaturae non est infinitae perfectionis. Non est possibile, quia quicquid est de essentia rei, illud necessario rei competit, ejusque affirmatio de ea re est necessaria, & aeternae veritatis. At existentia ita se non habet in creaturis: non enim vere dico, necesse est rosam existere, aut necesse est tonitru existere: possunt enim non existere. At vere dico, necesse est rosam esse florem: aut tonitru esse sonum, etiam rosa & tonitru non existentibus. Unde patet has esse praedicationes essentiales: non vero illas. Haec ratio non solum probat existentiam non esse de essentia creaturae: sed etiam existentiam non necessario essentiam creaturae consequi, aut ab ea dimanare. Quicquid enim est essentiale promanando, illud necessario de re, cui est essentiale, affirmatur: at existentia actualis (ut dictum est) contingenter creaturis competit. Interim admittimus existentiae capacitatem seu potentiam, non contingenter, sed necessario & essentialiter competere omni reali enti, sive creato, sive increato: sed non idem de actuali existentia dicendum est. 3. Secundum fundamentum sit hoc: Si quis quaerat undenam fit, quod DEUS existat, & non possit non existere: nulla potest afferri ratio, praeter hanc unam, videlicet quia ejus essentia est infinitae perfectionis; id est, omnem perfectionem in se claudit, atque adeo etiam existentiam. Unde patet DEUM recte dici vi suae essentiae existere. At si de creaturis moveatur quaestio, undenam videlicet fit, quod illae jam actu existant: non respondendum est illud ideo fieri, quia talis est earum essentia, aut quia ea est essentiae ipsarum conditio; earum enim essentia est indifferens ad existere & non existere; id est, potest existere vel non existere pro DEI arbitrio. Sed respondendum est, veram illius rei rationem esse, quia earum essentia, quae prius erat possibilis & apta ad existendum solummodo, jam ipso existentiae actu a DEO & causis secundis donata est. Non ergo possunt creaturae dici existere vi suae essentiae, sed vi causarum a quibus productae sunt, praecipue autem primae causae. Unde sequitur eas non esse entia per essentiam suam, sed per participationem & receptionem existentiae a prima causa. Praeterea hujus rei ratio reddi potest ex hoc fundamento, admodum perspicuo: ea est essentiae divinae conditio, ut non possit non existere, neque existentiam suam ab alio participare: ea vero est essentiae creatae conditio, ut possit pro arbitrio primae causae, existentiam habere aut non habere, & ut non possit existere, nisi participando existentiae actum a prima causa. Unde patet, primam causam, vi suae essentiae, existere: causas vero secundas, seu entia creata, vi suae essentiae non existere, sed per actionem primae causae, a qua actualem existentiam accipiunt. 4. Tertium fundamentum. Essentia creaturae recte & vere appellatur potentia; existentia vero creaturae bene dici potest actus superadditus essentiae: hoc autem sic declaratur: sicut materia Physica appellatur potentia, & forma Physica actus, quia materia in se, & ex se, nullam habet formam, sed formae capax est, seu potest recipere formam: sic essentia creaturae potest dici potentia, quia neque in se claudit existentiam, neque eam a se habet, sed ejus capax est seu potest eam recipere, & participare a prima causa: at contra, DEI essentia longe aliter se habet, in se enim claudit existendi actum: ideoque non se habet ad existentiam, ut potentia ad actum, nulla enim potentia in se claudit actum, sed ad actum tanquam ad quid externum refertur. Atque haec de divisione Entis in finitum & infinitum.
God alone is pure act: real being divides into actual, potential, and mixed§3
3Article III. The third division of real being is set out, and it is explained how God is pure act.
1. Third, real being is divided into that which is merely actual, that which is merely potential, and that which is partly actual, partly potential — or mixed from potency and act. Merely potential being is that which does not exist in act, but can exist: such a being is a rose in winter. It is to be noted here that philosophers commonly say that those beings which do not exist in act, but can really exist, are in objective potency. For the object of the productive potency which is in causes is that which is producible by the causes — or that which has not yet received existence from the causes, but can receive it. Therefore some possible being, so long as it does not exist in act, is the object of the productive potency of causes, and for that reason is said to be in objective potency, because namely it has that potency which belongs to things so long as they are objects of some causative potency. But when that being has been produced in act and has received existence from causes, it is no longer the object of the productive potency of causes, and on that account is said not to be in objective potency.
2. Merely actual being, or pure act, is the glorious God, to whom this supreme and perfect actuality is ascribed: first, to mark his simplicity. For every composition from potency and act is repugnant to him — that is, from some potential or imperfect principle, and an actual principle; that is, one that actuates and perfects that other principle, as we shall later declare in the doctrine concerning God. Second, to remove and exclude every potency that argues some imperfection. Now there are three kinds of potencies which, on account of their imperfection, cannot be ascribed to God: namely objective potency, which is nothing other than the producibility of a thing by its causes; second, passive potency, which belongs to things insofar as they can suffer and be changed by some agent; third, potency toward non-being. The first potency belongs to things that do not exist, and therefore cannot be ascribed to God, who exists necessarily and never could fail to exist; the two latter belong to things that do exist, yet are mutable and passible: but God is immutable and impassible. But of active potency the account is far otherwise. For active potency, as the metaphysicians have well observed, rather deserves the name of virtue or faculty than of potency: for each thing acts insofar as it is in act, whence the very power of acting is a certain actuality. But someone will ask: every potency is more imperfect than its act; and whatever is imperfect, whether absolutely or comparatively, is to be removed from God. It is answered that even active potency in creatures is often more imperfect than its act, and that because the perfection of a creature is placed in the operation and exercise of the potency, and it is more perfect when it acts than when it does not act: but God does not stand thus. For his supreme and infinite perfection, or beatitude, is placed in this — that he is God — and therefore he does not stand better or more perfectly when he acts than when he does not act.
3. Being that consists of potency and act is finite being actually existing in the world. And a being of this sort is said to consist of act and potency, or to be partly actual, partly potential, for two reasons. First, because in finite beings various compositions are found: namely from genus and difference, from matter and form, from integral parts, from essence and existence; from existing essence and subsistence superadded to it, from subject and accident. Now in all these compositions (that alone excepted which is from integrating parts) there is one potential and receptive principle, which on that account is called potency, and another actual and perfective principle, which on that account is called act: the principle of the former kind underlies in every composition, and the principle of the latter kind is superadded to it. Hence it is plain that finite beings are rightly said to be composed of potency and act. The second reason is this: finite beings, although they exist in act and thus have some act and perfection, are nevertheless not merely actual and perfect, but have those three kinds of potencies that argue imperfection. For first, before they exist, they have that objective potency toward existing. Second, when they exist, they have passive potency, and a receptive potency for new accidents. Third, they have potency toward non-being: for they can be abolished by the first cause and reduced to nothing.
Latin · §3
ART. III. Affertur Tertia divisio Entis realis, & explicatur quomodo DEUS sit actus purus. 1. Tertio dividitur ens reale, in illud quod mere est actuale, illud quod mere est potentiale, & illud quod est partim actuale, partim potentiale, seu ex potentia & actu mixtum. Ens mere potentiale, est illud quod actu non existit, sed existere potest: tale ens est rosa in hyeme. Notandum hic est, Philosophos passim dicere, ea entia quae actu non existunt, sed realiter existere possunt, esse in potentia objectiva: objectum enim potentiae productivae quae causis inest, est id quod a causis est producibile, seu id quod a causis existentiam nondum accepit, sed accipere potest. Ens igitur aliquod possibile, quamdiu non actu existit, est objectum potentiae productivae causarum, ideoque dicitur esse in potentia objectiva, quia videlicet habet eam potentiam, quae competit rebus quamdiu sunt objecta potentiae alicujus causativae. Ubi vero illud ens actu productum est, & existentiam accepit a causis, non amplius est objectum potentiae productivae causarum, & ob id dicitur non esse in potentia objectiva. 2. Ens mere actuale, seu actus purus, est DEUS gloriosus, cui haec summa & perfecta actualitas tribuitur: primo, ad indicandam ejus simplicitatem: ei enim repugnat omnis compositio ex potentia & actu; id est, ex principio aliquo potentiali vel imperfecto, & principio actuali; hoc est, actuante & perficiente illud alterum principium, ut postea declarabimus in doctrina de DEO. Secundo, ad removendam & excludendam omnem potentiam, quae imperfectionem aliquam arguit. Tria autem sunt potentiarum genera, quae ob imperfectionem suam DEO tribui nequeunt: nimirum potentia objectiva, quae nihil est aliud, quam rei producibilitas a causis suis: secundo, potentia passiva, quae rebus competit quatenus possunt ab agente aliquo pati & transmutari: tertio, potentia ad non esse. Prima potentia est rerum non existentium, ideoque DEO qui necessario existit, nec unquam potuit non existere, attribui nequit; duae posteriores sunt rerum existentium quidem, sed mutabilium & passibilium: DEUS autem est immutabilis, & impassibilis. At potentiae activae longe alia est ratio, nam potentia activa, ut bene observarunt Metaphysici, potius virtutis vel facultatis nomen meretur, quam potentiae: nam unumquodque agit in quantum est in actu, unde ipsa vis agendi actualitas quaedam est. Sed inquiet aliquis: omnis potentia est suo actu imperfectior: quicquid autem est imperfectum, vel absolute, vel comparative, a DEO removendum est. Respondetur, potentiam etiam activam in creaturis saepenumero esse imperfectiorem suo actu, idque quia creaturae perfectio in operatione & exercitio potentiae est posita, estque perfectior cum agit, quam cum non agit: at DEUS non ita se habet, ejus enim summa & infinita perfectio, seu beatitudo, in eo est posita, quod sit DEUS, ideoque non melius aut perfectius se habet, cum agit, quam cum non agit. 3. Ens constans ex potentia & actu, est Ens finitum actu existens in mundo: dicitur autem ejusmodi ens, constare ex actu & potentia, seu esse partim actuale, partim potentiale, ob duas rationes: Primo, quia in entibus finitis variae reperiuntur compositiones, nimirum ex genere & differentia, ex materia & forma, ex partibus integralibus, ex essentia & existentia; ex essentia existente & subsistentia illi superaddita, ex subjecto & accidente. In omnibus autem his compositionibus, (ea sola excepta quae est ex partibus integrantibus) est unum principium potentiale & receptivum, quod ob id appellatur potentia, alterum actuale & perfectivum, quod ob id dicitur actus: prioris generis principium in omni compositione substernitur, & posterioris generis principium ei superadditur. Hinc patet entia finita recte dici composita ex potentia & actu. Secunda ratio est haec: Entia finita, quamvis actu existant, & sic aliquem actum & perfectionem habeant, non tamen sunt mere actualia & perfecta, sed habent tria illa potentiarum genera imperfectionem arguentium. Primo enim priusquam existunt, habent objectivam illam potentiam ad existendum. Secundo cum existunt, habent potentiam passivam, & receptivam novorum accidentium. Tertio, habent potentiam ad non esse: possunt enim a prima causa aboleri, & in nihilum redigi.
Fourth division of real being: modes of existing — per se versus in another§4
4Article IV. The fourth division of real being is set out, which is drawn from the modes of existing.
1. A fourth division of real being can be drawn from the modes of existing — that is, from modes superadded to the act of existence. For in every being that exists in act these three things can be considered: first, that it has such an essence and nature by which it is constituted in a definite genus of being and is distinguished from all other beings; second, that it exists in act in the world, and so has an act of existing superadded to its essence; third, that it has such a mode of existing as suits its nature. For singular and complete substances are and exist in such a way that they are not in another, but exist through themselves. Singular accidents, by contrast — this whiteness, this blackness — are and exist in such a way that they do not exist through themselves, but in another. Hence it is clear that there are two general modes of existing, superadded to existence itself: the former is the perseity of existing, or the mode of existing through itself and not in another; the latter is the mode of existing in another and not through itself.
2. These things being laid down, the fourth division of real being can be conceived thus: every real being either exists in such a way that it can in no way inhere in another or be communicated to another; or it exists in such a way that it is in act in another, or at least can be in another. For example, this man, this horse, this stone in no way inhere in another by way of a part, or of an essential form, or of an accidental form, or of a quasi-form. By contrast their members inhere in them by way of parts, and their accidents inhere in them by way of accidental forms. I said "or at least can be in another" on account of human souls separated from the body, which, although they are not in act in another, can nevertheless be in another after the manner of parts. But that these things may be better understood, the kinds of those things which can in some way be said to be in another by way of a part or of a form must be enumerated.
3. First, accidents exist in their subject; second, parts both essential and integral exist in their whole; third, the total and singular nature of a thing is in that whose nature it is, after the manner of a form. For the nature or essence of a thing stands as a form; that of which it is the essence stands as matter. Therefore not only does a universal nature inhere in singulars, but a singular nature also inheres in that suppositum whose nature it is. Thus the singular nature of Peter is in Peter himself — that is, it is included in Peter. For Peter is not the humanity of Peter, but something consisting of his singular humanity and of the subsistence superadded to it; and therefore his singular humanity is said to inhere in him.
4. Whatever can be referred to these three classes must be said not to subsist, or to exist through itself, but to inexist in another (if one may so speak). Those things, however, which are referred to none of those classes are said to subsist, or to exist through themselves. For subsistence is nothing other than a certain mode of existing by which some being exists in such a way that it in no way inheres in another thing, but is underlaid and supposed to the other things that inexist in it. Hence a being of this kind is called in Latin a suppositum, in Greek a hypostasis.
5. It is to be noted here that these words hypostasis and subsistence are highly ambiguous and have six significations, of which the first three are less proper and not customary among philosophers, while the last three are more philosophical. First, hypostasis or subsistence is taken for the subsisting thing itself — that is, for a suppositum or person. Second, for true being, not for an empty appearance of it, and likewise for fixed and permanent being. Third, for that which underlies in any way: after which fashion in a building the foundation, in a column the base, in wine the dregs, in urine the sediment, are called hypostasis and subsistence.
6. But among philosophers, to subsist is taken first for being through itself — that is, not in a subject of inherence. In this way every substance, and substance alone — whether universal or particular, whether complete and total or incomplete and partial — is truly called a subsisting being, or a being through itself, not existing in another; accidents, by contrast, do not in this way subsist, but exist in another. Second, that is said to subsist which does not exist in another in such a way that it depends on it as to the act of existing — that is, so that because of its imperfect mode of existing it cannot exist outside that other and through itself. In this signification we deny that not only accidents but also universal substances subsist, and that because they depend on the first things as to actual existence; for they exist in them and by their benefit. Second, we deny that matter, and all substantial forms educible from the potency of matter, subsist in this way: for they so depend on the suppositum in which they inhere that they cannot exist through themselves and outside every suppositum. I said "forms educible from the potency of matter" to exclude the human soul, whose case is otherwise, as will presently appear. I said "outside every suppositum" because matter can indeed exist outside this or that particular suppositum — as outside Socrates or outside Plato — for when they are dead it can enter the constitution of another suppositum and be sustained by it; yet it cannot exist outside every suppositum. Third, we deny that singular substances themselves, when signified by abstract names — that is, the singular essences of created substances — subsist in this way. For the singular humanity of Peter so exists in Peter himself that it cannot exist through itself and outside every suppositum; likewise the singular humanity of CHRIST so exists in CHRIST that in an ineffable manner it depends in its being on his most glorious person. Although therefore singular men exist through themselves and in no way in another, singular human natures nevertheless do not exist through themselves, but in their singular supposita — that is, in men. Someone will say: a singular man and a singular human nature are the same. It is answered that that is most false; for a singular man is not a singular humanity, but something consisting of a singular human nature and of the subsistence superadded to it, as will appear in what follows. Hence the second person of the Trinity is said by the theologians to have assumed a singular human nature, not a singular man.
7. But on the contrary, in this signification we attribute subsistence, first, to all singular complete and predicamental substances — that is, those signified by a concrete name — such as this man, this horse; and likewise to the persons of the adorable Trinity, and that because all these exist in no thing as parts, or as essential or accidental forms. Second, in this sense we also assert that the Divine essence or Deity, although it exists in the three persons of the adorable Trinity, truly subsists; and we say the same of the human soul, although it is in the body as form in matter, and in the composite as a part in the whole — and that because neither does the essence of GOD depend in its being on the divine persons (for that would argue imperfection), nor does the rational soul depend on matter and the composite; for it can exist without them, and it really does exist when it is separated from the body.
8. Third, that is said to subsist which exists in another neither in act nor in potency — that is, which cannot be included in any suppositum. In this signification subsistence is denied to all those things which exist in some suppositum, whether or not they depend on it as to the act of existing. In this way we deny that the human soul and the most glorious essence of GOD subsist: for the former is in man as a part in the whole; the latter, in an ineffable manner, exists in the three persons of the Trinity. And therefore in this sense we say that only, and all,..supposita subsist and have subsistence: for every suppositum so exists that it can in no way exist in another suppositum, as an accident in a subject, a part in a whole, or a nature in that which has the nature. Hence it is that the philosophers say a suppositum is something incommunicable to many, and altogether unfit for existing in another. From these things it is clear that in this fourth division of being, subsistence is to be taken in this last way: for in it, by a subsisting being I understand that which in no way inheres in another, as an accident in a subject, a part in a whole, or a nature — whether universal or singular — in its suppositum. But by a being inexisting in another I understand that which is in some way communicable to another — that is, apt to inhere in another.
Latin · §4
ART. IV. Affertur quarta divisio Entis realis, quae est petita a modis existendi. 1. Quarta divisio Entis realis, peti potest a modis existendi; hoc est, modis actu existentiae superadditis: in omni enim Ente, actu existente, haec tria considerari possunt: primo, quod habeat talem essentiam & naturam, per quam constituitur in certo genere Entis, & ab omnibus aliis entibus distinguitur. Secundo quod actu existat in mundo, & sic habeat existendi actum, suae essentiae superadditum. Tertio, quod habeat talem existendi modum, suae naturae convenientem: substantiae enim singulares & completae, ita sunt & existunt, ut non in alio sint, sed per se existant: contra vero accidentia singularia, ut haec albedo, haec nigredo, ita sunt & existunt, ut non per se, sed in alio existant: unde patet duos esse generales modos existendi, ipsi existentiae superadditos; prior est perseitas existendi, seu modus existendi per se, & non in alio: posterior est, modus existendi in alio, & non per se. 2. His positis, quarta divisio Entis realis, sic concipi potest: omne Ens reale, vel ita existit, ut nullo modo alteri inesse aut communicari possit; vel ita existit, ut actu in alio sit, aut saltem in alio esse possit: exempli gratia, hic homo, hic equus, hic lapis, nullo modo alteri insunt, per modum partis, aut formae essentialis, aut accidentalis, vel quasi formae: contra vero horum membra iis insunt, per modum partium; &.accidentia ipsorum iis insunt, per modum formarum accidentalium: dixi, aut saltem in alio esse possit, propter animas humanas a corpore separatas, quae quamvis actu non sunt in alio, in alio tamen esse possunt, ad modum partium. Ut autem haec melius intelligantur, enumeranda sunt earum rerum genera, quae aliquo modo dici possunt esse in alio, per modum partis, aut formae. 3. Primo accidentia existunt in subjecto suo: secundo, partes tum essentiales, tum integrales, in toto suo: tertio, ipsa natura rei totalis &.singularis, est in eo cujus est natura, per modum formae: natura enim rei, seu essentia, se habet ad modum formae: id vero cujus est essentia, se habet ad modum materiae, ideoque non solum universalis natura inest in singularibus, sed etiam singularis natura inest in eo supposito cujus est natura: sic singularis natura Petri, est in ipso Petro: hoc est, in Petro includitur: Petrus enim non est humanitas Petri, sed est quid constans ex sua humanitate singulari, &.subsistentia ei superaddita, ideoque singularis ejus humanitas ei inesse dicitur. 4. Quaecunque ad has tres classes referri possunt, ea non subsistere, seu per se existere, sed alteri inexistere (si ita loqui liceat) dicenda sunt; ea vero quae ad nullam istarum classium referuntur, subsistere, seu per se existere dicuntur: subsistentia enim nihil est aliud, quam modus quidam existendi, quo Ens aliquod ita existit, ut nullo modo alteri rei insit, sed aliis rebus ei inexistentibus substernatur &.supponatur: unde ejusmodi Ens Latine suppositum, Graece hypostasis vocatur. 5. Notandum hic est, haec vocabula hypostasis &.subsistentia, esse valde ambigua, &.sex significata habere, quorum tria prima minus propria sunt, &.apud Philosophos non usitata: tria vero postrema magis Philosophica sunt. Primo, accipitur hypostasis seu subsistentia, pro ipsa re subsistente; hoc est, pro supposito, aut persona. Secundo, pro vero esse, non pro inani ejus specie, item pro esse fixo &.permanente. Tertio, pro eo, quod quovis modo subest: quo pacto in aedificio fundamentum, in columna basis, in vino faex, in urina sedimentum, hypostasis &.subsistentia dicitur. 6. Apud Philosophos autem subsistere, primo, sumitur pro esse per se; hoc est, non in subjecto inhaesionis: quo pacto omnis &.sola substantia, sive ea sit universalis, sive particularis, sive item sit completa &.totalis, sive incompleta &.partialis, vere dicitur Ens subsistens, seu Ens per se, non in alio existens; contra vero accidentia, hoc modo non subsistunt, sed in alio existunt. Secundo, illud subsistere dicitur, quod non existit in alio ita ut ab eo pendeat quoad existendi actum; id est, ita ut propter imperfectum suum existendi modum extra illud, &.per se existere nequeat. Hoc significatu non solum negamus accidentia, sed etiam substantias universales subsistere, idque quia a primis pendent quoad existentiam actualem, nam in iis &.earum beneficio existunt. Secundo, negamus materiam, omnesque formas substantiales e materiae potentia educibiles hoc modo subsistere: ita enim pendent a supposito in quo insunt, ut per se &.extra omne suppositum existere nequeant. Dixi, formas e materiae potentia educibiles, ad excludendam animam humanam, cujus alia est ratio, ut statim patebit. Dixi, extra omne suppositum, quia materia potest quidem existere extra hoc vel illud suppositum, ut extra Socratem, aut extra Platonem; potest enim his mortuis alterius suppositi constitutionem ingredi, &.ab eo sustentari, non tamen potest existere extra omne suppositum. Tertio, negamus ipsas substantias singulares, abstractis nominibus significatas; hoc est, singulares essentias substantiarum creatarum hoc modo subsistere: singularis enim humanitas Petri, ita in ipso Petro existit, ut per se &.extra omne suppositum existere nequeat; singularis item humanitas CHRISTI, ita in CHRISTO existit, ut modo ineffabili ab ejus gloriosissima persona pendeat in suo esse. Quamvis igitur singulares homines per se &.nullo modo in alio existant, singulares tamen naturae humanae, non per se, sed in singularibus suis suppositis, hoc est, hominibus existunt. Dicet aliquis: singularis homo &.singularis natura humana, idem sunt. Respondetur, illud esse falsissimum, singularis enim homo, non est singularis humanitas, sed est quid constans ex singulari natura humana, &.subsistentia ei superaddita, ut in progressu patebit. Unde secunda persona Trinitatis, a Theologis dicitur assumpsisse singularem naturam humanam, non vero singularem hominem. 7. At contra, hac significatione subsistentiam tribuimus, primo, omnibus singularibus substantiis completis &.praedicamentalibus, hoc est, concreto nomine significatis; quales sunt, hic homo, hic equus: item personis adorandae Trinitatis, idque quia haec omnia in nulla re existunt tanquam partes, aut formae essentiales aut accidentales. Secundo, hoc sensu etiam asserimus essentiam Divinam seu Deitatem, quamvis in tribus personis adorandae Trinitatis existat, revera subsistere: idem etiam dicimus de anima humana, quamvis ea sit in corpore, ut forma in materia, &.in composito, ut pars in toto: idque quia neque essentia DEI a personis divinis in suo esse pendet, hoc enim imperfectionem arguit; neque anima rationalis a materia &.composito, potest enim existere sine illis, &.revera existit, cum a corpore separatur. 8. Tertio, id subsistere dicitur, quod neque actu neque potestate existit in alio; hoc est, quod non potest includi in aliquo supposito: hoc significatu iis omnibus negatur subsistentia, quae in aliquo supposito existunt, sive ab eo pendeant quoad existendi actum, sive non; quo pacto animam humanam, &.gloriosissimam DEI essentiam subsistere negamus: illa enim est in homine ut pars in toto; haec vero, ineffabili modo, in tribus personis Trinitatis existit: ideoque hoc sensu sola &.omnia supposita, subsistere &.subsistentiam habere dicimus: suppositum enim omne ita existit, ut nullo modo possit in alio supposito existere, tanquam accidens in subjecto, pars in toto, aut natura in eo quod naturam habet. Hinc est quod dicant Philosophi, suppositum esse quid incommunicabile pluribus, &.omnino ineptum ad existendum in alio. Ex his patet, in quarta hac divisione Entis, subsistentiam ultimo hoc modo accipiendam esse: nam in ea per Ens subsistens, intelligo illud, quod nullo modo alteri inest, tanquam accidens in subjecto, pars in toto, aut natura, sive universalis, sive singularis, in suo supposito. Per Ens vero alteri inexistens, intelligo id, quod aliquo modo est alteri communicabile, h. e. aptum alteri inesse.
Explanation of being, essence, existence, subsistence, suppositum, and person§5
5Article V. An explanation of these words: Being, Essence, Existence, Subsistence, Suppositum, and Person.
1. Essence is accustomed to be described by the philosophers in various ways. First, thus: the essence of a thing is that which is explained by the definition. Second, thus: essence is that through which a thing is constituted in a definite genus of being and is distinguished from all others. Third, thus: essence is the first, radical, and intimate principle of all the actions and properties of a thing. For example, the principles of many human operations are habits existing in the souls of men; the principles of the habits are natural potencies flowing from the essence; the principle of the potencies is human nature or essence; but human essence itself, consisting of soul and body, has no productive and effective principle of itself existing in the man — that is, nothing can be found in the man himself from which his essence flows or is caused. I said that it has no effective principle existing in the man, because it is certain that it has constitutive principles, both physical and metaphysical. Since therefore the natural potencies of things, and the operations of the potencies, draw their origin from the essence, while the essence has no efficient cause prior to itself in that thing whose essence it is, it is rightly called the first, radical, and intimate principle of all the properties and actions of the thing.
2. Finally, essence can not inconveniently be described thus: essence is that which belongs to a thing most necessarily and first of all. I say "most necessarily" to exclude common accidents, which are contingently present to that thing whose accidents they are. I say "first of all" to exclude proper accidents, which, although they belong necessarily to their subject, do not yet inhere in it first; rather the essence inheres first, from which they flow. This, then, is the general rule: whatever inheres in a thing most necessarily, first of all, and intimately, that is the essence of the thing; but whatever inheres either contingently, or on account of another from which it flows — and likewise whatever is adventitious and not intimate — that is something superadded to the essence, not the essence itself.
3. Existence differs from essence chiefly in office and function. For the office of essence is to constitute a thing in a definite genus of being and to distinguish it from all others. Thus a man through his essence, inasmuch as he is a rational animal, is distinguished from all other beings. But the office of existence is to bring it about that a thing having such an essence is outside its causes (as the metaphysicians speak), or rather, that it is outside the virtue and productive potency of causes. For when a thing does not exist, it is said to be in the potency of its causes, because it is producible by its causes and can exist through their effective potency; but when it has been produced in act and has received the act of existing, it is no longer in the effective potency of the causes, but has been led out from the state of potentiality into the state of actuality. While that state lasts, it is not producible through the potency of the causes; for it must perish, and lose the act of existing which it already has, before it can again be produced by its causes and receive existence.
4. This office of existence differs from the office of essence in that the office of essence in all things is stable and perpetual; whereas the office of existence in some things is subject to various changes, because existence itself is now present, now absent. For example, the existence of a rose, or of thunder, at certain times exercises its office, but at other times does not — as in winter, when the rose or thunder are in the potency of their causes, as they say. By contrast, the essence of these and similar things perpetually exercises its office: for whether a rose exists or not, a rose is a flower, by nature and essentially distinct from all other flowers; and the physicists have science of the rose even when it does not exist, because they know the rose to be a flower distinct from other flowers not only by nature or essence but also by properties, virtue, and efficacy. For it is not to be thought that when a rose does not exist it loses its essential distinction from other flowers, or is confused with them as to essence. From these things this definition of existence can be gathered: Existence is a mode superadded to essence, bringing it about that a thing having that essence is outside its causes in the world.
5. These words — essence and existence — having been explained, it is easy to know what Being is. For Being differs from essence and existence as a concrete from two abstracts; and likewise as that which has, from those things which are had from it. For Being is nothing other than that which has essence, or existence. It is to be noted here that Being is taken in two ways, participially and nominally, as they speak. Being, as it is the participle of the verb "to be," signifies that which is existing in act; but Being, inasmuch as it is a verbal noun, signifies that which has an essence capable of existence, whether it exists in act or not; and as Suarez speaks, it signifies being itself, not as exercised in act, but in potency or aptitude. Thus "living," as it is a participle, signifies the actual use of life; but as it is a noun, it signifies only that which has that essence which can be a principle of vital operation.
6. Subsistence properly, and taken in the third signification, agrees with existence in this, that neither this nor that is Being itself, or the essence of Being, but a mode of Being. Yet it differs from it, first, in that existence extends more widely than subsistence: for the former belongs to all things, both substances and accidents; the latter belongs only to singular complete substances, inasmuch as they are signified by concrete names — to this man, this horse, this lion. For as I warned in the previous article, this singular humanity or this singular horseness do not subsist, but exist in their supposita and by their benefit.
7. From these things that have already been said we can gather that, in any singular substance signified by a concrete name, these three acts can be discerned: first, the act of the singular essence, through which that substance is such an individual, distinct from all others; second, the act of existence, through which the substance that has such a singular essence is outside its causes in the world; third, the act of subsistence, through which it is so outside its causes that it does not inexist, or lean upon another, but underlies those that inexist in it, and is supposed under them — whence, as was said above, it is called a suppositum.
8. The suppositum is easily known once the nature of subsistence is known; for a suppositum is nothing other than that which has subsistence, thus superadded to essence and existence — or that which, in the act of existing, leans upon no other, but is laid under and supposed by other things that lean upon it. It can also be explained thus: a suppositum is that which is in no way communicable to many, and likewise in no way can inhere in another, after the manner of a part or of a form. Therefore Peter's singular humanity is not a suppositum, because it is truly said to be in Peter; likewise the human nature of Christ is not a suppositum, for the same reason; but Peter himself is a suppositum, because he does not inhere in another as a part in a whole, an accident in a subject, or a nature in that which has a nature. In the same way Christ, and any other person of the Trinity, is a suppositum for the same reason. Accidents are not supposita, whether they are universal or singular, because they inhere in and lean upon their subjects. Universal substances also are not supposita, because they are communicated to singulars and inhere in them. Finally the glorious God, insofar as he is common, in an ineffable way, to the three persons of the Trinity, is not a suppositum — and that because it belongs to the account of a suppositum that it cannot be communicated, or inhere in another suppositum; but God, or the Godhead, is communicated and inheres in the three persons of the Trinity.
9. Person differs from suppositum in this, that every person is a suppositum, but not every suppositum is a person: for a person is nothing other than a suppositum endowed with reason — whence it is described by Boethius thus: It is an individual substance of a rational nature. Therefore suppositum in general is divided into rational and irrational. A rational suppositum is called a person; an irrational suppositum, as this horse, this stone, does not have a peculiar name imposed upon it. Person is divided into created and uncreated. The uncreated persons are three: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. A created person is either angelic, as Gabriel, Michael; or human, as Peter, John.
Latin · §5
ART. V. Explicatio istarum vocum, Ens, Essentia, Existentia, Subsistentia, Suppositum, & Persona. 1. ESSENTIA variis modis a Philosophis describi solet. 1. sic; Essentia rei est id quod definitione explicatur. 2. sic; Essentia est id, per quod res constituitur in certo genere Entis, &.ab omnibus aliis distinguitur. 3. sic; Essentia est primum ac radicale &.intimum principium omnium rei actionum, &.proprietatum: e g. multarum operationum humanarum principia sunt habitus in animis hominum existentes: habituum principia sunt potentiae naturales ab essentia fluentes: potentiarum principium est natura seu essentia humana: ipsa vero essentia humana, ex anima &.corpore constans, nullum habet principium sui productivum &.effectivum, in homine existens: h. e. nihil in ipso homine inveniri potest, a quo profluat, aut causetur ejus essentia. Dixi eam nullum habere principium effectivum, in homine existens, quia certum est, eam habere principia constitutiva, tum Physica, tum Metaphysica. Cum igitur rerum potentiae naturales, potentiarumque operationes, ab essentia originem suam trahant; essentia vero nullam habeat causam efficientem se priorem, in ea re, cujus est essentia, merito ea dicitur primum, ac radicale, &.intimum principium omnium rei proprietatum, &.actionum. 2. Denique essentia sic non incommode describi potest; Essentia est id, quod summe necessario, omnium primo, rei convenit. Dico summe necessario, ad excludenda accidentia communia, quae contingenter adsunt illi rei cujus accidentia sunt. Dico omnium primo, ad excludenda propria accidentia, quae licet necessario conveniant suo subjecto, non tamen primo ei insunt, sed prius inest essentia, a qua dimanant. Haec igitur est generalis regula: Quicquid summe necessario, omnium primo, &.intime rei inest, illud est rei essentia: quicquid vero aut contingenter inest, aut propter aliud a quo profluit; quicquid item est adventitium, &.non intimum, illud est aliquid essentiae superadditum, non vero ipsa essentia. 3. Existentia praecipue ab essentia differt munere, &.officio: essentiae enim munus est, rem in certo genere entis constituere, eamque ab aliis omnibus distinguere. Sic homo per essentiam suam, quatenus nimirum est animal rationale, ab omnibus aliis entibus distinguitur. At existentiae munus est, efficere ut res, talem essentiam habens, sit extra causas suas, (ut loquuntur Metaphysici) aut potius, ut sit extra causarum virtutem, &.potentiam productivam: res enim cum non existit, dicitur esse in potentia causarum suarum, quia est producibilis a causis suis, &.per earum potentiam effectivam existere potest: at ubi actu producta est, &.existendi actum accepit, non amplius est in causarum potentia effectiva, sed educta est ex statu potentialitatis in statum actualitatis; durante eo statu, non est per causarum potentiam producibilis; oportet enim eam perire, &.existendi actum, quem jam habet, amittere, priusquam a causis suis, denuo produci, &.existentiam accipere queat. 4. Differt hoc officium existentiae ab officio essentiae, quod essentiae munus in omnibus rebus sit stabile &.perpetuum: contra vero, existentiae munus in quibusdam sit variis mutationibus obnoxium, quia ipsa nunc adest, nunc abest: e. gr. existentia rosae, aut tonitrus, quibusdam temporibus exercet suum munus, aliis vero temporibus non exercet; ut hyeme, cum rosa, aut tonitrus sunt in causarum suarum potentia, ut loquuntur. Contra vero, harum &.similium rerum essentia suum munus perpetuo exercet: sive enim rosa existat, sive non, rosa est flos, natura &.essentialiter ab omnibus aliis floribus distinctus: &.Physici habent scientiam de rosa, etiam cum non existit: quia norunt rosam esse florem ab aliis floribus distinctum, non solum natura seu essentia, sed etiam proprietatibus, virtute, &.efficacia: non enim putandum est, rosam cum non existit, amittere essentiale suum discrimen ab aliis floribus, aut cum iis quoad essentiam confundi. Ex his colligi potest haec definitio existentiae: Existentia est modus essentiae superadditus, efficiens ut res eam essentiam habens, sit extra suas causas in mundo. 5. Explicatis his vocibus, Essentia, &.existentia, facile est scire quid sit Ens: differt enim Ens ab essentia, &.existentia, ut concretum a duobus abstractis: item ut id quod habet, ab iis quae ab eo habentur: nihil enim aliud est Ens, quam id quod habet essentiam, aut existentiam. Notandum hic est, Ens duobus modis accipi, participialiter &.nominaliter, ut loquuntur. Ens, ut est participium verbi sum, significat id, quod est actu existens: Ens vero, quatenus est nomen verbale, significat id, quod habet essentiam, existentiae capacem, sive actu existat, sive non: &.ut loquitur Suarez, significat ipsum esse, non ut exercitum actu, sed in potentia, vel aptitudine. Sic vivens, ut est participium, significat actualem usum vitae: ut vero est nomen, significat id solum, quod habet eam essentiam, quae potest esse vitalis operationis principium. 6. Subsistentia proprie, &.in tertio significatu accepta, in hoc convenit cum existentia, quod neque haec, neque illa, sit ipsum Ens, aut essentia Entis, sed modus Entis: differt tamen ab ea, primo, quod existentia latius pateat, quam subsistentia: illa enim competit omnibus, tum substantiis, tum accidentibus; haec vero convenit solis substantiis singularibus completis, quatenus concretis nominibus significantur — huic homini, huic equo, huic leoni: nam ut superiori articulo monui, haec humanitas singularis aut haec equinitas singularis, non subsistunt, sed in suis suppositis &.earum beneficio existunt. Secundo, differunt existentia et subsistentia ratione muneris, seu officii sui; munus enim existentiae est efficere, ut res aliqua actu sit in mundo, extra causarum virtutem, aut potentiam: munus vero subsistentiae est, efficere, ut res nullo modo possit esse in alio, vel ut pars in toto, vel tanquam accidens in subjecto, vel tanquam natura seu essentia, in eo quod habet essentiam. Tertio, differunt ut determinans et determinatum; sicut enim essentia est ex se indifferens ad existere et non existere, ita existentia est ex se indifferens ad esse in alio, et esse per se, seu subsistere: h.e. existentia est indifferens ad modum existendi innitendo alteri ut sustentanti, et ad modum existendi per se, sine dependentia ab alio recipiente et sustentante. Subsistentia igitur sic describi potest: Subsistentia est modus existentiae superadditus, a quo res habet, quod non in alio, sed per se existere possit. Unde a quibusdam dicitur omnimoda perseitas existendi. 7. Ex his, quae jam dicta sunt, colligere possumus, in qualibet singulari substantia, concreto nomine significata, tres hos actus cerni posse: primo, actum essentiae singularis, per quem substantia ea est tale individuum, ab omnibus aliis distinctum; secundo, actum existentiae, per quem substantia talem singularem essentiam habens, est extra causas suas in mundo; tertio, actum subsistentiae, per quem ea ita est extra causas suas, ut non inexistat, aut innitatur alteri, sed aliis ei inexistentibus substet, et supponatur; unde, ut supra dictum est, suppositum appellatur. 8. Suppositum facile jam cognita natura subsistentiae; nihil enim aliud est suppositum, quam id quod subsistentiam habet, sic essentiae et existentiae superadditam: seu id, quod in existendi actu nulli alteri innititur, sed aliis rebus ei innitentibus substernitur, et supponitur. Potest etiam sic explicari: suppositum est id, quod nullo modo est communicabile pluribus, nullo item modo alteri inesse potest, ad modum partis, aut formae. Singularis igitur humanitas Petri non est suppositum, quia vere dicitur esse in Petro: item natura humana CHRISTI non est suppositum, ob eandem rationem: at ipse Petrus est suppositum, quia non inest alteri, tanquam pars in toto, accidens in subjecto, aut natura in eo quod naturam habet. Similiter CHRISTUS, et quaelibet alia persona Trinitatis, est suppositum ob eandem rationem. Accidentia non sunt supposita, sive sint universalia, sive singularia, quia subjectis suis insunt et innituntur. Substantiae etiam universales non sunt supposita, quia singularibus communicantur, et iis insunt. Denique DEUS gloriosus, quatenus est communis, ineffabili modo, tribus personis Trinitatis, non est suppositum; idque quia est de ratione suppositi, quod non possit communicari, aut inesse alteri supposito: at DEUS, aut Deitas, communicatur, et inest tribus personis Trinitatis. 9. Persona in hoc differt a supposito, quod omnis persona sit suppositum, sed non omne suppositum sit persona: persona enim nihil est aliud, quam suppositum ratione praeditum: unde a Boetio sic describitur; Est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Quare suppositum in genere dividitur in rationale et irrationale. Suppositum rationale appellatur persona: suppositum irrationale, ut hic equus, hic lapis, non habet peculiare nomen sibi impositum. Persona dividitur in creatam et increatam. Personae increatae sunt tres, Pater, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus. Persona creata, vel est Angelica, ut Gabriel, Michael; vel humana, ut Petrus, Johannes.
Whether in creatures the suppositum and its singular nature really differ§6
6Article VI. Whether, in creatures, the suppositum and its singular nature really differ.
1. I have not resolved here to air that celebrated controversy concerning the distinction and diversity of essence from existence — whether namely it is real, or of reason alone. For that question has no usefulness in theology, and is more thorny and more difficult than can be grasped by those who are raw and beginners in metaphysics. Yet concerning the distinction of subsistence and of nature or essence I will say a few things: for the determination of that question has a notable use in theology.
2. This question is accustomed to be proposed in two ways. First, thus: whether, in created supposita, subsistence is something positive and really distinct from the singular essence to which it is superadded — or whether it is not. Second, thus: whether the suppositum and its singular nature really differ — for example, whether Peter and his singular human nature are in truth the same, or whether Peter, as Peter, includes something real and really diverse from his singular nature. Whether the question is proposed in this way or in that, it is the same controversy; and therefore I briefly answer that Peter and his singular nature really differ, as the including and the included, or as the composite and its constitutive principle. For every created suppositum, as Peter, includes the singular nature and something superadded to it — namely subsistence; or (to speak more plainly) every created suppositum is really composed of the singular essence and the subsistence superadded to it, which some call suppositality, others personality. If therefore we compare the suppositum to the singular nature, they are distinguished as whole and part; but if we institute the comparison between the singular nature itself and subsistence — as between Peter's singular human nature and Peter's subsistence or personality — then they are contradistinguished from each other as two extremes composing that created suppositum, namely Peter. But that this sentence may be established, first it must be proved that subsistence, or suppositality, is not a mere negation, as Scotus opines, but is something positive constituting Peter together with the singular nature, insofar as he is a suppositum. Second, that that positive thing differs not by reason alone but really from the singular nature with which it constitutes Peter. From this I will then manifestly infer that Peter really differs from his singular human nature, and that his human nature is truly and properly said to be in him. For if Peter, insofar as he is Peter, or insofar as he is a certain particular human person, includes these two — namely his singular humanity and his personality — as two constitutive principles really distinct, it is necessary that his singular humanity really differ from him, and be in him as truly as either his matter or his form is said to be in him.
3. Scotus, in book 3 of the Sentences, distinction 1, question 1, says that every suppositum, besides the singular nature, also includes subsistence, but he asserts that subsistence is a mere negation of the aptitude or potency of being in another suppositum. For singular natures have a potency of existing in a suppositum; but the suppositum itself, as Peter, cannot be in any other suppositum; and therefore on his view the suppositum, as such, is constituted by the negation of this potency of existing in a suppositum. This sentence is rightly rejected by Francisco Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations 34, section 2. First, because the subsistence which the suppositum adds to the singular nature is a certain substantial perfection; but a mere negation cannot be a substantial perfection; therefore a mere negation is not subsistence. Second, if subsistence, or personality, were a mere negation, the three persons of the Trinity would be constituted in their personal being, and would be distinguished from one another, by negation alone — for they are distinguished by their subsistences or personalities; but this is absurd, and plainly destroys the mystery of the Trinity. Therefore subsistence is not a mere negation, but something positive superadded to the singular essence for constituting the suppositum.
4. It must now be proved against Durandus, in book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 34, that subsistence is something really diverse from the essence or singular nature of created substances (for concerning God one must think far otherwise). And that is clearly shown by this reason: the Word assumed a singular human nature, but did not assume a human suppositum or human person — for thus he would not be one simple person, but twin. Therefore the human suppositum and its singular nature are really diverse; and therefore something is in truth included in the human suppositum besides its singular nature; and this can be nothing other than subsistence, or personality.
5. This reason is also accustomed to be proposed thus: those things which can be really separated are not really the same; but subsistence can be separated from the singular nature; therefore they are not really the same. The assumption is proved: the Word assumed a singular human nature; but he did not assume human personality or human subsistence, as all theologians confess; therefore they can be separated. This reason not only proves that subsistence really differs from the specific nature, which is common to all individuals, but also from the individual or singular nature; and therefore that their sentence is openly false who say that Peter's subsistence or personality is his individual difference. For Christ did not assume human nature in common, but a singular humanity; and he did not assume a singular person. In truth, therefore, the singular person differs from the singular nature, and includes something that is not included in the singular nature — namely subsistence and personality.
6. By these two reasons it is clearly proved that every suppositum, besides its singular nature, includes something positive really distinct from that nature — namely subsistence; and on that account that every created suppositum is really composed of its singular nature and subsistence, which others call suppositality. Someone will say: if subsistence is something real, really distinct from essence, it is either matter, or form, or the composite itself, or some accident of it. I answer: that which in the constitution of the suppositum is superadded to the singular nature is not some being properly so called, but a mode of being; and therefore it is neither matter, nor form, nor the composite, nor an accident of it.
Latin · §6
ART. VI. An in creaturis, suppositum & singularis ejus natura, re differant. 1. Non statui hic ventilare celebrem illam controversiam, de discrimine & diversitate essentiae ab existentia: utrum videlicet sit realis, an vero solius rationis: ea enim quaestio nullam habet utilitatem in Theologia, & spinosior est, & difficilior, quam ut ab iis capi possit, qui in Metaphysica rudes, ac tyrones sunt. De discrimine tamen subsistentiae, & naturae seu essentiae, pauca dicam: istius enim quaestionis determinatio insignem usum habet in Theologia. 2. Duobus modis proponi solet haec quaestio: primo, sic; Utrum, in suppositis creatis, subsistentia sit aliquid positivum, & realiter distinctum ab essentia singulari, cui superaddita est; an vero, non sit. Secundo sic; Utrum suppositum, & singularis ejus natura, re differant: e.g. utrum Petrus, & singularis ejus natura humana, revera idem sint; an vero Petrus, qua Petrus, includat aliquid reale, & realiter diversum a singulari ejus natura. Sive hoc, sive illo modo proponatur quaestio, eadem controversia est; ideoque breviter respondeo, Petrum, & singularem ejus naturam, realiter differre, tanquam includens & inclusum, seu tanquam compositum & principium ejus constitutivum: suppositum enim omne creatum, ut Petrus, includit naturam singularem, & aliquid ei superadditum, subsistentiam nimirum: vel (ut planius dicam) omne suppositum creatum est realiter compositum ex essentia singulari & subsistentia ei superaddita, quam nonnulli suppositalitatem, alii personalitatem vocant. Si igitur comparemus suppositum ad naturam singularem, distinguuntur ut totum & pars; at si comparationem instituamus inter naturam ipsam singularem, & subsistentiam, ut inter singularem naturam humanam Petri, & Petri subsistentiam, seu personalitatem, tum inter se contradistinguuntur, tanquam duo extrema componentia suppositum illud creatum, Petrum videlicet. Ut autem haec sententia stabiliatur, primo probandum est, subsistentiam, seu suppositalitatem, non esse meram negationem, ut opinatur Scotus, sed esse positivum quid simul cum natura singulari constituens Petrum, quatenus est suppositum. Secundo, positivum illud, non ratione sola, sed realiter differre a natura singulari, cum qua constituit Petrum: inde autem manifeste inferam, Petrum realiter differre a singulari sua natura humana, ejusque naturam humanam, vere, et proprie dici in eo esse. Si enim Petrus, quatenus est Petrus, seu quatenus est particularis quaedam persona humana, haec duo, i.e. humanitatem singularem, & personalitatem suam, tanquam duo principia constitutiva, re distincta, includat; necesse est ejus humanitatem singularem, re ab ipso differre, & tam vere esse in eo, quam aut materia, aut forma ipsius in eo esse dicitur. 3. Scotus, in 3. Sent. dist. 1. quaest. 1. dicit omne suppositum, praeter naturam singularem, includere etiam subsistentiam, sed asserit subsistentiam, esse meram negationem aptitudinis, seu potentiae essendi in alio supposito: naturae enim singulares, habent potentiam existendi in supposito: at ipsum suppositum, ut Petrus in nullo alio supposito esse potest, ideoque ex ejus sententia, suppositum, qua tale est, constituitur per negationem hujus potentiae existendi in supposito. Haec sententia merito rejicitur a Francisco Suarez, disp. Met. 34. sect. 2. Primo, quia subsistentia quam suppositum addit naturae singulari, est perfectio quaedam substantialis: sed mera negatio non potest esse perfectio substantialis; ergo mera negatio non est subsistentia. Secundo, si subsistentia, aut personalitas, sit mera negatio, tres personae Trinitatis in suo esse personali constituentur, & a se invicem distinguentur per solam negationem: distinguuntur enim per suas subsistentias, aut personalitates: sed hoc est absurdum, & mysterium Trinitatis plane destruit: ergo subsistentia non est mera negatio, sed positivum aliquid essentiae singulari superadditum, ad constituendum suppositum. 4. Jam probandum est contra Durandum, in 1. Sent. dist. 34. subsistentiam esse quid realiter diversum ab essentia, seu natura singulari creatarum substantiarum (nam de DEO longe aliter sentiendum est;) illud autem perspicue ostenditur hac ratione: Logos assumpsit naturam humanam singularem, non autem assumpsit suppositum humanum, seu personam humanam; sic enim non esset una simplex persona, sed gemina: Ergo suppositum humanum, & singularis ejus natura sunt re diversa: ideoque revera aliquid includitur in supposito humano, praeter ejus naturam singularem: hoc autem non potest esse aliud, quam subsistentia, seu personalitas. 5. Haec ratio etiam sic proponi solet: quae possunt separari realiter, ea non sunt realiter idem; at subsistentia separari potest a singulari natura: Ergo non sunt realiter idem. Quod probatur assumptio: Logos assumpsit singularem naturam humanam; at non assumpsit personalitatem, aut subsistentiam humanam, ut fatentur omnes Theologi: Ergo separari possunt. Haec ratio non solum probat subsistentiam re differre a natura specifica, quae communis est omnibus individuis; sed etiam a natura individuali, seu singulari; ideoque aperte falsam esse eorum sententiam, qui dicunt subsistentiam aut personalitatem Petri esse ejus differentiam individualem: CHRISTUS enim non assumpsit naturam humanam in communi, sed humanitatem singularem; & non assumpsit singularem personam: revera igitur, singularis persona differt a singulari natura; & aliquid includit, quod non includitur in natura singulari; subsistentiam nimirum, & personalitatem. 6. Duabus his rationibus perspicue probatur, suppositum omne, praeter singularem suam naturam, includere positivum aliquid, realiter ab ea natura distinctum, nimirum subsistentiam: & ob id suppositum omne creatum, esse realiter compositum ex singulari sua natura & subsistentia, quam alii suppositalitatem vocant. Dicet aliquis: si subsistentia sit aliquid reale, re distinctum ab essentia, vel est materia, vel forma, vel ipsum compositum, vel aliquod ejus accidens. Respondeo: illud, quod in constitutione suppositi superadditur naturae singulari, non esse Ens aliquod proprie, sed modum Entis: ideoque neque esse materiam, neque formam, neque compositum, neque ejus accidens.
Why philosophers attribute composition from essence and existence, and from essence and subsistence, to created substances but not to God§7
7Article VII. What is the cause why philosophers attribute composition from essence and existence, and likewise from essence and subsistence, to created substances, but not to God.
1. Created singular substances can be considered in three ways, as was said above. First, insofar as they have such an essence. Second, insofar as they are beings actually existing in the world. Third, insofar as they have such a mode of existing, or insofar as they are supposita. If they are considered in the first way, they have composition from the physical parts of their essence, and from the metaphysical parts of the same: for example, if Socrates is considered insofar as he is a man, he is physically constituted from his matter and form; likewise metaphysically, or logically, from genus and difference — that is, from animal and rational. If singular substances are considered in the second way, they include two things, namely essence and existence, which according to our way of conceiving stand as potency and act, as I explained above: and therefore, since from potency and act there is always made some composite that is one through itself, we rightly say that singular substances so considered are composed from essence and existence — that is, from nature and the act of existing. Thus Peter, insofar as he is a man actually existing in the world, includes these two: human nature, and the act of existing; he includes them (I say) as two principles from which he is constituted.
2. If created singular substances are considered in the third way — that is, if they are considered insofar as they are supposita, not only having an essence actually existing in the world, but also such a mode of existing, namely through itself and not in another — if (I say) they are so considered, they include two things, namely an essence actually existing, and subsistence, or the mode of existing through itself, superadded to that existing essence: but the essence or singular nature of a created substance is potency with respect to subsistence, and subsistence is its act superadded to it and perfecting it; and therefore from an essence or nature actually existing, and from subsistence superadded to it, we rightly say that something one through itself comes to be — namely the suppositum itself. Thus Peter, insofar as he is such a person, includes a singular essence, through which he is a singular being, and a singular subsistence, through which he is a singular person.
3. Someone will ask what the cause is why these three compositions are not attributed to God: since essence, existence, and subsistence or personality are found in all the persons of the Trinity, no less than in human and angelic persons — for each person of the Trinity has its essence and existence, common to it with the remaining persons of the Trinity; it also has its own proper subsistence, or personality, through which it differs from the remaining persons. The answer is that none of their composition can be attributed to God, his simplicity being preserved, and likewise the infinite perfection and dignity of that most glorious nature. But this will become plain if we consider and weigh those compositions one by one and apart.
4. First, then, essential composition, both physical and metaphysical, is to be removed from God: the former indeed, because it overturns a spiritual nature; the latter, because God is contained under no univocal genus, as will afterwards be proved (God favoring) in the questions concerning God. Second, composition from essence and existence is removed from God for two reasons: first, because for every composition, whether it be real or of reason, it is required that one thing be superadded to another for the constitution of some third; but existence is neither in truth, nor according to our way of conceiving, something superadded to the essence of God, but rather is something included in God's essence itself, as I declared in Article II. Therefore the existence of God cannot concur with his essence to constitute some third thing. Second, composition from essence and existence is attributed to created substances because their being so stands as potency, and existence as an act superadded to it; but the essence of God cannot be called potency with respect to the divine existence, because it includes existence in itself, as was said in the place already cited: and no potency includes its act in itself, but is directed to its act as to something further and external.
5. Concerning the third composition, which is that of supposita from singular nature and subsistence, there is greater hesitation: for it seems that it ought to be attributed to God, because each person of the Trinity includes these two: the divine essence, which is common to all three persons; and its particular personality, through which it is distinguished from the remaining two persons; therefore it is composed from these two. If you reply that some person is not composed from nature and subsistence because subsistence is something included in God's essence itself, just as was already said of existence, you will easily be refuted: for if the subsistence or personality of the Father were of his essence, it would be common to the whole Trinity, just as his essence itself also is. But this is absurd: therefore that too. Concerning this controversy I will set out my mind in several assertions.
6. Assertion 1. The subsistence, or personality, of the Father (let the same be said of the hypostasis of the Son and of the Holy Spirit) does not differ from his essence by any kind of real diversity, neither as a thing from a thing, nor as a mode of a thing from a thing, but differs from it by a distinction of reason alone. This assertion is proved thus: first, whatever is in God is God. Therefore nothing is in God that in truth, and on the side of the thing (as they say), differs from his Godhead. Second, if the person of the Father is really composed from his essence and subsistence or personality, two absurdities will follow: First, that God the Father is not, absolutely speaking and in the highest degree, simple; for the highest simplicity takes away every composition, and above all a real one: second, that the Godhead is a part of some thing; but every part is something incomplete, and less perfect than that whole of which it is a part.
7. Assertion 2. God is not composed from nature and subsistence by such a composition as is seen in created substances. This assertion plainly follows and is inferred from the preceding: for if God is not really composed from nature and subsistence, he does not have such a composition from nature and subsistence as created substances have; for these are composed from nature and subsistence as from two principles distinct in the thing itself, and therefore their composition is real.
8. Assertion 3. Although the subsistence of the Father is not of his essence, but according to our way of conceiving is something superadded to his essence, it is nevertheless not lawful to say that the Father's person is composed from those two by a composition of reason; indeed we ought not to conceive those two in the Father as two parts composing him: for when we conceive the Godhead as a part of some thing, we form an enormous concept of God, and we invent for God an imperfection that is not small. Wherefore the modesty of those seems praiseworthy and to be imitated, who piously think and profess that essence and personality are included in the person of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, not by way of composition, but by way of an ineffable conjunction or union.
Latin · §7
ART. VII. Quae sit causa cur compositionem ex essentia et existentia, item ex essentia et subsistentia, creatis substantiis, non autem DEO tribuant Philosophi. 1. Substantiae creatae singulares tribus modis possunt considerari, ut supra dictum est. Primo, quatenus habent talem essentiam. Secundo, quatenus sunt entia actu existentia in mundo. Tertio, quatenus habent talem existendi modum, seu quatenus sunt supposita. Si primo modo considerentur, habent compositionem ex suae essentiae partibus Physicis, et ejusdem partibus Metaphysicis: e.g. si Socrates consideretur quatenus est homo, Physice constituitur ex materia et forma sua; item Metaphysice, aut Logice, ex genere et differentia; h.e. ex animali et rationali. Si singulares substantiae secundo modo considerentur, duo includunt, videlicet essentiam et existentiam, quae secundum nostrum concipiendi modum se habent ut potentia et actus, ut supra explicavi: ideoque cum ex potentia et actu semper fiat compositum aliquod unum per se, merito dicimus singulares substantias sic consideratas, esse compositas ex essentia et existentia; h.e. ex natura et existendi actu. Sic Petrus quatenus est homo actu existens in mundo, haec duo includit: naturam humanam, et existendi actum; includit (inquam) tanquam duo principia ex quibus constituitur. 2. Si singulares substantiae creatae tertio modo considerentur, i.e. si considerentur quatenus sunt supposita, non solum habentia essentiam actu existentem in mundo, sed etiam talem modum existendi, nimirum per se et non in alio; si (inquam) sic considerentur, duo includunt, videlicet essentiam actu existentem, et subsistentiam, seu modum per se existendi, illi essentiae existenti superadditum: essentia autem seu natura singularis substantiae creatae est potentia respectu subsistentiae, et subsistentia est ejus actus ei superadditus, eamque perficiens; ideoque ex essentia seu natura actu existente, et subsistentia ei superaddita, merito dicimus fieri aliquod unum per se; videlicet ipsum suppositum. Sic Petrus, quatenus est talis persona, includit singularem essentiam, per quam est singulare Ens; et singularem subsistentiam, per quam est persona singularis. 3. Quaeret aliquis, quae sit causa, cur istae tres compositiones DEO non attribuantur: cum essentia, existentia, et subsistentia seu personalitas, in omnibus personis Trinitatis inveniantur, non minus quam in personis humanis et Angelicis: quaelibet enim persona Trinitatis suam habet essentiam et existentiam, sibi cum reliquis personis Trinitatis communem; habet etiam suam propriam subsistentiam, aut personalitatem, per quam a reliquis personis differt. Respondetur, earum compositionem nullam posse DEO attribui, salva ejus simplicitate, salva item infinita perfectione et dignitate gloriosissimae illius naturae. Hoc autem manifestum evadet, si istas compositiones sigillatim et seorsim consideremus et perpendamus. 4. Primo igitur, compositio essentialis, tum Physica, tum Metaphysica, a DEO removenda est: illa quidem, quia spiritualem naturam evertit; haec vero, quia DEUS sub nullo genere univoco continetur, ut postea probabitur (DEO favente) in quaestionibus de DEO. Secundo, compositio ex essentia et existentia a DEO removetur, ob duas rationes: primo, quia ad omnem compositionem, sive sit realis, sive rationis, requiritur ut unum superaddatur alteri, propter constitutionem alicujus tertii: at existentia, neque re vera, neque secundum nostrum concipiendi modum, est aliquid superadditum essentiae DEI, sed potius est aliquid in ipsa DEI essentia inclusum, ut declaravi Art. II. Ergo existentia DEI non potest cum ejus essentia concurrere ad constituendum aliquod tertium. Secundo, compositio ex essentia et existentia tribuitur substantiis creatis, quia earum esse ita se habet ut potentia, et existentia ut actus illi superadditus: at essentia DEI non potest appellari potentia, respectu existentiae divinae, quia in se includit existentiam, ut dictum est loco jam citato: nulla autem potentia in se includit actum suum, sed ad actum suum, tanquam ad aliquid ulterius et externum, dirigitur. 5. De tertia compositione, quae est suppositorum ex natura singulari et subsistentia, major est dubitatio: ea enim videtur DEO tribuenda, quia quaelibet persona Trinitatis haec duo includit: essentiam divinam, quae communis est omnibus tribus personis; et particularem suam personalitatem, per quam a reliquis duabus personis distinguitur; Ergo ex his duabus composita est. Si respondeas, personam aliquam ideo non esse compositam ex natura et subsistentia, quia subsistentia est aliquid in ipsa Dei essentia inclusum, sicuti jam dictum est de existentia; facile confutaberis: si enim subsistentia aut personalitas Patris esset de essentia ejus, esset toti Trinitati communis, sicut et ipsa ejus essentia est. At hoc est absurdum: Ergo et illud. De hac controversia meam mentem aliquot assertionibus proponam. 6. Assert. 1. Subsistentia, aut personalitas Patris (idem de Filii et Sp. Sancti hypostasi dicatur) non differt ab ejus essentia ullo genere realis diversitatis, neque tanquam res a re, neque tanquam modus rei a re, sed ab ea differt sola distinctione rationis. Probatur haec assert. sic: primo, quicquid est in Deo, est Deus. Ergo nihil est in Deo, quod revera, et a parte rei (ut loquuntur) ab ejus Deitate differt. Secundo, si persona Patris realiter componatur ex ejus essentia et subsistentia seu personalitate, duo sequentur absurda: Primo, Deum Patrem non esse absolute loquendo et summe simplicem; summa enim simplicitas omnem compositionem tollit, imprimis autem realem: secundo, Deitatem esse alicujus rei partem; omnis autem pars est incompletum aliquid, et minus perfectum quam totum illud cujus est pars. 7. Assert. 2. Deus non componitur ex natura et subsistentia, tali compositione, qualis cernitur in creatis substantiis. Haec assert. manifeste sequitur, et infertur ex precedente: si enim Deus non componitur realiter ex natura et subsistentia, non habet talem compositionem ex natura et subsistentia, qualem habent substantiae creatae; nam hae componuntur ex natura et subsistentia, tanquam ex duobus principiis re ipsa distinctis, et ideo earum compositio realis est. 8. Assert. 3. Quamvis subsistentia Patris de ejus essentia non sit, sed secundum nostrum concipiendi modum sit aliquid ejus essentiae superadditum, non tamen licet dicere, Patris personam esse ex iis duabus compositam compositione rationis; imo non concipere debemus ista duo in Patre, tanquam duas partes eum componentes: cum enim concipimus Deitatem tanquam alicujus rei partem, formamus de Deo enormem conceptum, et imperfectionem non exiguam Deo affingimus. Quare laudanda et imitanda videtur eorum modestia, qui pie sentiunt et profitentur, essentiam et personalitatem includi in persona Patris, Filii, et Sp. Sancti, non per modum compositionis, sed per modum ineffabilis conjunctionis aut unionis.
Given that every perfection is of God's essence, does personal subsistence follow; and is God, as communicable to three, a person (Cajetan)§8
8Article VIII. This being laid down — that every perfection is of the essence of God — whether it follows that personal subsistence is of his essence; and whether God, insofar as he is communicable to the three persons of the Trinity, is a person, as Cajetan maintains.
1. From the preceding doctrine there arises a difficulty of no small weight concerning subsistence or personality: for since it has been established that every perfection is of the essence of God, it seems necessarily to follow that subsistence, or personality, is included in his essence; and therefore that God, insofar as he is common to the three persons of the Trinity, is a suppositum or person. The reason of the connection is this: because subsistence is a certain substantial perfection, and that not a slight one; for every suppositum has a more perfect mode of existing than the nature which exists in the suppositum. Here, therefore, two things are to be discussed: first, whether personal subsistence is of the essence of God; second, whether God, as God, is a certain person common to the whole Trinity.
2. That the former difficulty may be removed, after two observations have been set down beforehand, I will propose my sentence in several assertions. First it is to be held that subsistence is taken by the philosophers in three ways, as was said above: for (1) those things are said to subsist which do not exist in a subject of inherence; (2) those which do not so inexist that they depend, as to the act of existing, upon those in which they inexist; (3) those which in no way inexist in another suppositum, or can inexist in one. Second it is to be held that to these three significations of this word a fourth can be added, which, although it is less frequent, is nevertheless no less proper. For that being can be said to subsist which so exists that it depends in its being upon no creating or conserving cause: this mode of existing is proper to God, and cannot be communicated to any created being; and therefore it is without doubt the most perfect mode of existing.
3. These things being laid down, let this be Assertion 1. Subsistence taken in the first and second way is essential to God, and equally common to the Trinity: for just as it belongs essentially to God to exist in act, so also it is of the essence of God so to exist that he neither exists in any subject, nor depends, as to the act of existing, upon that suppositum in which he is.
4. Second Assertion. Subsistence taken in the third way, although insofar as it is in God it does not differ in the thing from his essence, nevertheless cannot truly be said to be of the essence of God: for whatever is of the essence of God belongs to God as God. If therefore personality is of the essence of God, God insofar as he is God is a person, and consequently all three persons, insofar as they are one true God, can truly be called one person: which is plainly absurd, and contrary to the principles of our faith.
5. Assertion 3. Subsistence taken in the fourth way is of the essence of God, or is an essential attribute of his: for to be the first Being, having its being from itself and not from elsewhere, is the very nature or essence of God.
6. Assertion 4. This word "perfection" is to be distinguished; for some are perfections whose negation imports imperfection — as to be or to exist, to live, to be a Spirit, to be good, to be just: for their opposites, namely not to exist, not to live, and so on, are manifestly imperfections. Others are perfections whose negation imports no imperfection: thus the most wise decrees of God concerning the creation and governance of things are perfections, but their negation imports no imperfection: for even if God had had no such decrees, indeed even if he had had decrees contrary to these, he would not have been more imperfect. So to walk, to run, to sit, to speak are perfections of a human being — for they are acts, and every act is a perfection: but the negation of those acts involves no imperfection; although the negation of the potencies from which they arise brands the thing to which it is attributed with a mark of imperfection. I say that the negation of these acts involves no imperfection, because a human being is not more imperfect when he does not walk than when he walks, or when he does not speak than when he speaks.
7. All perfections of the former kind are of the essence of God, and necessarily belong to him as God: but concerning perfections of the second order one must think otherwise; for they are not of the essence of God, nor do they necessarily belong to him as God — for example, the decrees of God concerning the eternal salvation and death of human beings, although they do not differ in the thing from his essence, are nevertheless not truly said to be of the essence of God: for if that were true, they would be in God by the necessity of nature, and thus the liberty of the divine decrees would be taken away. To this latter genus of perfections we refer personal subsistence; for although its negation, when it is attributed to the finite essence of creatures, involves imperfection, yet when it is attributed to the Godhead, or to the divine nature, it imports no blot of imperfection. The reason of the disparity is this: the divine essence includes in itself a certain mode of existing far more perfect than personal subsistence — namely the mode of existing without dependence in being upon any creating or conserving cause. I say that this mode of existing is more perfect than personal subsistence, because in it is placed the perfection of the first being; and on that account it cannot be communicated to creatures: but personal subsistence is communicated both to human beings and to angels. On the contrary, the finite essence of creatures includes in itself neither the act of existing, nor any mode of existing more perfect than personality: and therefore it is imperfect on account of the defect of personality, whereas the Godhead is in no way imperfect on account of the lack of such subsistence.
8. Francisco Suárez, On the Trinity book 3, chapter 10, brings forward another distinction of perfection; but a more obscure and difficult one, and therefore I will not propose it here. But this is carefully to be noted which he adds to that distinction — namely, that divinity, the personal relations or subsistences being prescinded, does not formally include their perfections; yet it includes them eminently, both because this is necessary for the infinity of that being, and because the Godhead itself is the root and foundation of all those perfections.
9. The latter question is easily solved once the former difficulty has been removed: for since that subsistence which is proper to supposita does not belong to God as he is common to the three persons, it is to be said without fear that God so considered is not a person. But (says Cajetan) God, insofar as he is common to the three persons, although he is not a person strictly and properly speaking, can nevertheless be called a complete person. I answer with Fonseca that in divine things novel and unused locutions, abhorrent from every custom of the Fathers, are not to be employed — especially since someone can be deceived by such a manner of speaking and suppose that the three persons are one person, or one suppositum.
Latin · §8
ART. VIII. An hoc posito, quod omnis perfectio sit de essentia Dei, sequatur subsistentiam personalem esse de ejus essentia: et an Deus, quatenus est communicabilis tribus personis Trinitatis, sit persona, ut statuit Cajetanus. 1. Ex praecedente doctrina, non levis oritur difficultas de subsistentia seu personalitate: cum enim statutum sit, omnem perfectionem esse de essentia Dei, necessario sequi videtur subsistentiam, seu personalitatem in ejus essentia includi; ideoque Deum, quatenus est communis tribus personis Trinitatis, esse suppositum aut personam: ratio connexionis est; quia subsistentia est perfectio quaedam substantialis, eaque non exigua; suppositum enim omne perfectiorem habet modum existendi, quam natura quae in supposito existit. Hic igitur duo discutienda sunt: primo, an subsistentia personalis sit de essentia Dei: secundo, an Deus qua Deus, sit persona quaedam toti Trinitati communis. 2. Ut prior difficultas tollatur, praemissis duabus observationibus, meam sententiam aliquot assertionibus proponam; primo tenendum est: subsistentiam tribus modis accipi a Philosophis, ut supra dictum est: 1. enim ea subsistere dicuntur, quae non existunt in subjecto inhaesionis: 2. ea quae non ita insunt, ut ab iis in quibus insunt, quoad existendi actum pendeant: 3. ea quae nullo modo alteri supposito insunt, aut inesse possunt. Secundo tenendum est, tribus his significationibus hujus vocis, addi posse quartam, quae licet minus frequens sit, non minus tamen propria est. Illud enim Ens dici potest subsistere, quod ita existit ut a nulla causa procreante, aut conservante, in suo esse pendeat: hic modus existendi, Dei proprius est, nec ulli enti creato communicari potest; ideoque proculdubio perfectissimus modus existendi est. 3. His positis, haec sit Assert. 1. Subsistentia primo et secundo modo accepta, est DEO essentialis, aeque Trinitati communis: sicut enim essentialiter Deo competit actu existere, ita etiam est de essentia Dei sic existere, ut neque in aliquo subjecto existat, neque ab eo supposito in quo est, quoad actum existendi pendeat. 4. Secunda Assert. Subsistentia tertio modo accepta, etsi quatenus est in DEO, re non differat ab ejus essentia, non tamen vere dici potest esse de essentia DEI: quicquid enim est de essentia Dei, illud Deo, qua Deus est, competit. Si igitur personalitas est de essentia Dei, Deus quatenus est Deus, est persona, et per consequens, omnes tres personae, quatenus sunt unus verus DEUS, vere dici possunt una persona: quod sane absurdum est, et nostrae fidei principiis contrarium. 5. Assert. 3. Subsistentia quarto modo accepta, est de essentia DEI, seu est essentiale ejus attributum: nam esse primum Ens, a se et non aliunde suum esse habens, est ipsissima natura seu essentia DEI. 6. Assert. 4. Vocabulum hoc (perfectio) distinguendum est; aliae enim sunt perfectiones, quarum negatio imperfectionem importat, ut esse seu existere, vivere, esse Spiritum, esse bonum, esse justum: horum enim opposita, nimirum non existere, non vivere, etc. manifeste imperfectiones sunt. Aliae sunt perfectiones, quarum negatio nullam imperfectionem importat: sic sapientissima DEI decreta de creatione et gubernatione rerum, perfectiones sunt, sed eorum negatio nullam imperfectionem importat: quamvis enim DEUS nulla talia decreta habuisset, imo quamvis contraria his decreta habuisset, imperfectior non fuisset: sic ambulare, currere, sedere, loqui, sunt perfectiones hominis, sunt enim actus, omnisque actus est perfectio: at negatio horum actuum nullam imperfectionem involvit; quamvis negatio potentiarum ex quibus oriuntur, imperfectionis notam rei, cui tribuitur, inurat: dico negationem horum actuum nullam imperfectionem involvere; quia homo non est imperfectior cum non ambulat, quam cum ambulat, aut cum non loquitur, quam cum loquitur. 7. Prioris generis perfectiones omnes sunt de essentia DEI, illique, qua DEUS est, necessario conveniunt: at de perfectionibus secundi ordinis, aliter sentiendum est; non enim sunt de essentia DEI, nec illi necessario conveniunt, qua DEUS est, v.g. decreta DEI de hominum aeterna salute et morte, etsi re non differant ab ejus essentia, non tamen vere dicuntur esse de essentia DEI: si enim hoc esset verum, ex necessitate naturae DEO inessent, et sic libertas decretorum divinorum tolleretur. Ad posterius genus perfectionum, subsistentiam personalem referimus; etsi enim ejus negatio, cum essentiae finitae creaturarum tribuitur, imperfectionem involvat; cum tamen Deitati, seu naturae divinae attribuitur, nullam imperfectionis labem importat: ratio imparitatis est haec; essentia divina in se includit modum quendam existendi, longe perfectiorem subsistentia personali, nimirum modum existendi absque dependentia in essendo ab ulla causa procreante, aut conservante: dico hunc modum existendi esse perfectiorem subsistentia personali; quia in eo posita est perfectio primi entis; et ob id creaturis communicari nequit: subsistentia vero personalis et hominibus, et Angelis communicatur. Contra vero, essentia finita creaturarum in se neque existendi actum includit, neque ullum existendi modum personalitate perfectiorem: ideoque ea imperfecta est, ob defectum personalitatis, cum Deitas nullo modo imperfecta sit, ob carentiam talis subsistentiae. 8. Franciscus Suarez, lib. 3. de Trinit. Cap. 10, aliam distinctionem perfectionis affert; sed magis obscuram, et difficilem, ideoque eam hic non proponam: illud autem diligenter notandum est, quod isti distinctioni addit, videlicet, divinitatem, praecisis relationibus seu subsistentiis personalibus, non includere formaliter perfectiones earum: includere tamen illas eminenter, tum quia hoc necessarium est ad infinitatem illius entis; tum quia ipsa Deitas est radix, et fundamentum omnium illarum perfectionum. 9. Posterior quaestio facile solvitur, sublata priori difficultate: cum enim DEO, ut est communis tribus personis, ea subsistentia non conveniat, quae suppositorum est propria: intrepide dicendum est, DEUM sic consideratum non esse personam. At (inquit Cajetanus) DEUS quatenus est communis tribus personis, etsi non sit persona stricte et proprie loquendo, potest tamen dici persona completa. Respondeo cum Fonseca, in rebus divinis non usurpandas esse novas, et inusitatas locutiones, et ab omni Patrum consuetudine abhorrentes: praesertim cum quis decipi possit tali loquendi modo, et existimare tres personas esse unam personam, aut suppositum.
Whether God, as common to the three persons, is a singular substance; and whether the three persons of the Trinity are three singular substances§9
9Article IX. Whether God, insofar as he is common to the three persons, is a singular substance; and whether the three persons of the Trinity are three singular substances.
1. Among the Latins, substance is so called from subsisting (as some will have it) and from standing under accidents (as others will have it). According to the latter etymology, God Most High is not a substance, but the principle and cause of all substances; but according to the former, he is most truly and most properly a substance — not indeed a universal substance, but a singular and individual one. For second substances stand in need of first substances, that they may exist in them; but God, even insofar as he is common to the three persons, stands in need of no thing in which to exist. But someone will object: God, insofar as he is common to the three persons of the Trinity, is predicable of several; therefore he is a universal, and a second substance. I answer that the definition of the universal is to be conceived thus: a universal is that which can be predicated of those things that are several according to the very name of the universal. Thus man is predicated of those that are several according to the name of man — that is, of several men. But God is indeed predicated of several persons; yet he cannot be said to be predicated of several according to the name of God — that is, of several gods. Others say that that is universal which can be predicated of several, in which it is divided and multiplied: but it comes to the same thing.
2. Second objection: no first or singular substance contains under itself other first or singular substances; but God contains under himself three persons; and each person is a singular substance. Reply: no singular substance contains under itself other singular substances numerically — that is, distinct by individual differences; yet one singular substance can contain under itself several persons that have one essence numerically, and are distinct only by modes of existing.
3. The other question proposed in the title is this: whether the three persons of the Trinity are three singular substances. The difficulty of this question is set here: that the orthodox Fathers hold the Son to be ὁμοούσιον with the Father — that is, as the Latin Church translates it, consubstantial, or of one and the same substance; so that Jerome rightly said in his Letter to Damasus, Who would dare with a sacrilegious mouth to grant three substances in God? On the contrary, since a person is a singular substance, there seem to be as many singular substances in the Godhead as there are persons in it.
4. The determination of this question can be comprised in two assertions. First: new and unused locutions are not to be employed in the mysteries of the faith; for all manners of speaking that seem to favor heretics, even in appearance, are to be avoided. Those therefore who speak of the three persons of the adorable Trinity ought not to use the aforesaid manner of speaking, saying that they are three substances — lest they seem to favor the Arians, the Macedonians, Valentinus Gentilis, and his followers. Second: that locution can in no way be admitted, but is to be rejected as openly false and tritheistic. For if the three persons are three substances, they are either three finite substances, or three infinite substances. They are not three finite or created substances, as is plain; nor yet are they three infinite substances, because there are not three gods.
5. The consequence is not valid of the argument brought on the other side. For I will give a like consequence which is plainly vicious and inept in the judgment of all: as if someone should argue in this way — Peter standing, Peter sitting, and every other aggregate of that sort, is a singular substance clothed with a certain accident; therefore as many as there are such aggregates, so many are there singular substances clothed with accidents. If (I say) someone should argue thus, the inference will be vicious: because Peter standing and Peter sitting are two such aggregates; yet they are not two singular substances, but one substance numerically and individually. Someone will ask what can rightly and legitimately be gathered from this antecedent — a person is a singular substance. It is answered that this is a just and lawful consequence: a person is a singular substance; therefore as many as there are persons, so many are there those things to each of which it belongs to be a singular substance.
Latin · §9
ART. IX. An DEUS, ut est communis tribus personis, sit singularis substantia: & an tres personae Trinitatis, sint tres singulares substantiae. 1. Substantia apud Latinos a subsistendo (ut volunt nonnulli,) & a substando accidentibus (ut volunt alii) dicta est: juxta posteriorem Etymologiam, DEUS Opt. Max. non est substantia, sed substantiarum omnium principium, & causa: at juxta priorem, verissime & propriissime est substantia; non quidem universalis, sed singularis & individua: substantiae enim secundae indigent primis, ut in iis existant; at DEUS etiam qua communis est tribus personis, nulla re indiget, in qua existat. Sed objiciet aliquis: DEUS, ut est communis tribus personis Trinitatis, est praedicabilis de pluribus, Ergo est universalis, & secunda substantia. Respond. definitionem universalis, sic concipiendam esse; universale est id quod praedicari potest de iis quae sunt plura secundum ipsum nomen universalis: sic homo praedicatur de iis quae sunt plura secundum nomen hominis, i. e. de pluribus hominibus: at DEUS praedicatur quidem de pluribus personis, non tamen dici potest praedicari de pluribus secundum nomen DEI, i. e. de pluribus DIIS. Alii dicunt illud esse universale, quod praedicari potest de pluribus, in quibus dividitur, & multiplicatur: sed eodem res redit. 2. Secundo obj. nulla prima seu singularis substantia sub se continet alias primas, seu singulares substantias: at DEUS sub se continet tres personas; quaelibet autem persona est singularis substantia. Resp: nulla singularis substantia, sub se continet alias singulares substantias numero, h. e. differentiis individualibus distinctas, potest tamen una singularis substantia sub se continere plures personas unam numero essentiam habentes, & solis existendi modis distinctas. 3. Altera quaestio, in titulo proposita, est; an tres personae Trinitatis sint tres singulares substantiae? hujus quaestionis difficultas in hoc est posita; quod Orthodoxi Patres statuant filium esse Patri ὁμοούσιον, h. e. ut Ecclesia latina vertit, consubstantialem, sive unius & ejusdem substantiae; ut merito Hieronymus in Epistola ad Damasum dixerit, quis audeat ore sacrilego tres substantias in DEO concedere? Contra vero, cum persona sit substantia singularis, tot videntur esse singulares substantiae in Deitate, quot sunt in ea personae. 4. Hujus quaestionis determinatio duabus assertionibus comprehendi potest. Primo, novae & insolitae locutiones in mysteriis fidei non sunt usurpandae: vitandi enim sunt omnes modi loquendi qui Haereticis vel in speciem favere videntur. Qui igitur de tribus personis adorandae Trinitatis loquuntur, ii uti non debent supradicto loquendi modo, dicentes eas esse tres substantias; ne favere videantur Arianis, Macedonianis, Valentino Gentili, & ejus sectatoribus. Secundo, nullo modo admitti potest illa locutio, sed rejicienda est tanquam aperte falsa, & Tritheitica: si enim tres personae sint tres substantiae; vel sunt tres substantiae finitae, vel sunt tres substantiae infinitae: non sunt tres substantiae finitae, seu creatae, ut patet: at neque sunt tres substantiae infinitae, quia non sunt tres DII. 5. Consequentia non est valida argumenti allati in contrarium; dabo enim similem consequentiam, quae plane vitiosa & inepta est, omnium judicio: ut si hoc modo argumentetur aliquis; Petrus stans, Petrus sedens, & omne aliud ejusmodi aggregatum, est substantia singularis accidente quodam vestita; Ergo quot sunt talia aggregata, tot sunt singulares substantiae accidentibus vestitae. Si (inquam) aliquis sic argumentetur, vitiosa erit illatio: quia Petrus stans, & Petrus sedens sunt duo talia aggregata; at non sunt duae singulares substantiae, sed una numero & individua substantia. Quaeret aliquis, quid ex antecedente isto, persona est singularis substantia, recte & legitime possit colligi. Respondetur hanc esse justam, & licitam consequentiam; persona est singularis substantia, Ergo quot sunt personae, tot sunt ea quibus singulis competit esse singularem substantiam.
Whether Christ, as man, is a person; and whether Christ, as man, is everywhere§10
10Article X. Whether Christ, insofar as he is man, is a person; and whether Christ, insofar as he is man, is everywhere.
1. These arguments seem to prove the affirmative part of the question. 1. Just as all singular oxen, horses, lions, and so on, are irrational supposita, so also all singular human beings are rational supposita, or persons: therefore Christ, insofar as he is a singular man, is a person. 2. Every complete singular substance, signified by a concrete name, is a suppositum, as all the metaphysicians teach; but Christ, insofar as he is a singular man, is such: therefore he is a suppositum; and every rational suppositum is a person. 3. A singular human being differs from his singular essence as a suppositum differs from the nature existing in the suppositum; therefore Christ, insofar as he is a singular man, is a suppositum, and consequently a person.
2. Next, if Christ, insofar as he is man, is a person, as has now been proved, he is either an immense person existing everywhere, or a finite person comprehended in a definite place. The latter cannot be admitted, because then there would be two persons in Christ, one finite and the other infinite; therefore the former must be said — namely, that Christ, insofar as he is man, is an immense person, existing in every place and beyond every place. And therefore it must be confessed not only that the proposition 'Christ the man is everywhere' is true, but also that 'Christ, insofar as he is man, is everywhere' is true.
3. That this question may be satisfied, I say first that the proposition 'Christ, insofar as he is this man, is a person' is ambiguous, and therefore to be distinguished. For as Suárez speaks on the third part of St Thomas, volume 1, question 16, article 11, that particle 'insofar as' either reduplicates the suppositum or reduplicates the nature — that is, either this is its sense: Christ, by reason of the human nature assumed by him, is a person; and so the proposition is openly false, for Christ neither has from his humanity that he is a person simply, nor has he from it any new subsistence or personality; for then there would be a double hypostasis in him; nor is it true to say that the humanity assumed by him has its own proper subsistence or personality, because it inexistes in another and does not subsist. Therefore it is to be denied that Christ is a person by reason of his human nature. Or this is its sense: Christ, insofar as he is a suppositum including human nature, is a person; and so the proposition is most true, as those three arguments placed at the threshold of the article prove; for that suppositum in which the humanity is, is a person.
4. Others answer more briefly that Christ, insofar as he is this man, includes two things — namely, the divine subsistence and the human nature — and they say that Christ, insofar as he is man, is a person with respect to the divine subsistence, which he includes materially, but not with respect to the assumed human nature, which that word 'this man' more formally and directly imports.
5. I say second that that manner of speaking — 'Christ, insofar as he is man, is a person' — is to be fled. 1. Because it seems to favor the Nestorian dogma by which two persons are attributed to Christ. 2. Because reduplication properly taken imports the proper reason or cause why the attribute is in the subject; but it is certain that the reason according to which personality belongs to Christ is not in the human nature, and therefore Christ is not sufficiently conveniently called a person insofar as he is this man. 3. Because when theologians discuss Christ and use those reduplications 'insofar as God', 'insofar as man', or 'insofar as this man', they do not look to Christ's personal subsistence, but to the nature: for they designate the nature according to which these or those attributes belong to Christ. But personality does not belong to Christ according to the human nature, and therefore that locution is unusual: 'Christ, insofar as he is this man, is a person'.
6. As for the other part of the argument, the answer is as above: Christ, insofar as he is this man, includes two things — namely, the divine subsistence and the human nature superadded to it. With respect to the divine subsistence, which he includes in a certain material way, it can be said that Christ, insofar as he is this man, is an immense person and defined by no place. With respect to the human nature, which that word 'this man' more formally and directly imports, it is rightly denied that Christ, insofar as he is this man, is an immense person existing everywhere; and that because his human nature has its particular ubi and is comprehended in a definite place.
7. For the rest, although that proposition is true in some sense, as has now been said, yet because it smells of the Ubiquitarians' error, and because the sense which the words of that proposition more evidently carry before them is absurd — namely, that Christ by reason of the human nature is immense, or that his humanity is immense — therefore it is to be rejected and carefully avoided.
Latin · §10
ART. X. An CHRISTUS, quatenus homo, sit persona: item an CHRISTUS, quatenus homo, sit ubique. 1. Affirmativam quaestionis partem probare videntur haec argumenta. 1. Sicut omnes singulares Boves, Equi, Leones, &c. sunt supposita irrationalia; ita etiam, omnes singulares homines sunt supposita rationalia, seu personae: Ergo CHRISTUS, qua est singularis homo, est persona. 2. Omnis singularis substantia completa, & concreto nomine significata, est suppositum, ut docent omnes Metaphysici; at CHRISTUS, quatenus est singularis homo, est talis: ergo est suppositum: omne autem suppositum rationale est persona. 3. Homo singularis differt a singulari sua essentia, ut suppositum a natura in supposito existente; ergo CHRISTUS, quatenus est homo singularis, est suppositum, & proinde persona. 2. Deinde si CHRISTUS quatenus est homo, sit persona, ut jam probatum est, vel est persona immensa, & ubique existens, vel est persona finita, & certo loco comprehensa: posterius admitti non potest, quia sic in CHRISTO duae essent personae, una finita, altera infinita; ergo dicendum est prius, videlicet CHRISTUM quatenus est homo, esse personam immensam, in omni loco, & extra omnem locum existentem: & proinde non solum fatendum est, illam propositionem, CHRISTUS homo est ubique, esse veram; sed etiam illam, CHRISTUS quatenus homo, est ubique. 3. Ut huic quaestioni satisfiat, dico primo, ambiguam, & proinde distinguendam esse illam propositionem, CHRISTUS, quatenus est hic homo, est persona; nam ut loquitur Suarez in tertiam partem D. Thomae Tom. 1. quaest. 16. art. 11. illa particula quatenus, vel reduplicat suppositum, vel reduplicat naturam: h. e. vel hic est ejus sensus; CHRISTUS ratione naturae humanae ab eo assumptae est persona; & sic propositio est aperte falsa, nam CHRISTUS neque habet a sua humanitate quod sit persona simpliciter, neque ab ea habet novam aliquam subsistentiam, aut personalitatem; sic enim in eo duplex esset Hypostasis; neque verum est dicere humanitatem ab eo assumptam, suam propriam subsistentiam, aut personalitatem habere, quia ea alteri inexistit, & non subsistit: Idcirco negandum est CHRISTUM ratione naturae suae humanae esse personam: vel hic est ejus sensus: CHRISTUS quatenus est suppositum humanam naturam includens, est persona; et sic propositio est verissima, ut probant tria illa argumenta in limine articuli posita; illud enim suppositum, in quo est humanitas, est persona. 4. Alii brevius respondent, CHRISTUM, quatenus est hic homo, duo includere, videlicet subsistentiam divinam, & naturam humanam; et dicunt CHRISTUM quatenus est homo, esse personam respectu subsistentiae divinae, quam materialiter includit, non vero respectu naturae humanae assumptae, quam magis formaliter & directe importat illa vox, hic homo. 5. Dico secundo, illum modum loquendi, CHRISTUS quatenus homo est, est persona, fugiendum esse: 1. Quia Nestoriano dogmati, quo duae personae CHRISTO tribuuntur, favere videtur. 2. Quia reduplicatio proprie accepta importat propriam rationem, vel causam cur attributum insit subjecto: certum autem est rationem, secundum quam personalitas CHRISTO competit, non esse in natura humana, & proinde CHRISTUM non satis commode dici personam, quatenus est hic homo. 3. Quia Theologi, dum disserunt de CHRISTO, & utuntur illis reduplicationibus, quatenus DEUS, quatenus homo, aut quatenus hic homo, non respiciunt CHRISTI subsistentiam personalem, sed naturam: designant enim naturam, secundum quam haec vel illa attributa CHRISTO conveniunt: at personalitas non competit CHRISTO, secundum naturam humanam, ideoque insolens est illa locutio, CHRISTUS, quatenus est hic homo, est persona. 6. Quod ad alteram partem argumenti attinet, respondendum est ut supra, CHRISTUM, quatenus est hic homo, duo includere, videlicet subsistentiam divinam, & naturam humanam ei superadditam; respectu subsistentiae divinae, quam materialiter quadam ratione includit, dici potest CHRISTUS, quatenus est hic homo, esse persona immensa, & nullo loco definita: respectu naturae humanae quam magis formaliter, & directe importat illa vox, hic homo, recte negatur CHRISTUM, quatenus est hic homo, esse personam immensam, & ubique existentem; idque quia ejus natura humana habet suum particulare ubi, & certo loco comprehenditur. 7. Caeterum licet illa propositio aliquo sensu vera sit, ut jam dictum est; quia tamen Ubiquitariorum errorem redolet, quia item sensus quem verba istius propositionis evidentius prae se ferunt, est absurdus, videlicet quod CHRISTUS ratione naturae humanae sit immensus; seu quod ejus humanitas immensa sit; ideo rejicienda est, & sedulo cavenda.
Whether the Ubiquitarians' arguments drawn from the personal union are valid§11
11Article XI. Whether the Ubiquitarians' arguments drawn from the personal union are valid.
1. The first objection of those who invent a certain immensity of Christ's human nature is customarily put thus: Whatever is personally joined to the whole Logos exists wherever the Logos exists; but Christ's human nature is such: therefore. The answer is that the proposition is openly false; for from the personal union of the two natures in Christ it no more follows that the humanity is wherever the Deity is, than from the substantial union of our soul with the matter of the head it follows that the matter of the head is wherever the soul is — that is, that it is in the foot, because the soul is in the foot: I say that it is substantially joined to the whole soul, because the whole soul is in the whole body, and whole in each of its parts. If therefore the Ubiquists argue well and acutely when they construct such a syllogism, this argumentation will be good and effective: What is substantially joined to the whole soul exists wherever the soul exists; but the matter of the head is substantially joined to the whole soul: therefore it is wherever the soul is; but the soul is in the matter of the foot; therefore the matter of the head also is in the matter of the foot.
2. Second objection. The union of the two natures in Christ was made indivisibly and without interval: therefore one of them does not exist except where the other exists — that is, they coexist in all places. Answer: the adverbs 'inseparably' and 'indistantly', when used to explain the manner in which those natures are united in the person of the Logos, have a twofold use. First they are used to refute Nestorius's error, who not only distinguished these natures but divided and separated them, assigning to each nature its own proper hypostasis, and therefore did not join them into one hypostasis. Second, that we may know that that union is indissoluble, and that these natures, once they have been joined, can never be disjoined or separated. We therefore deny that consequence: the human and divine natures are indissolubly and inseparably joined in one person; therefore wherever one of them exists, there the other also exists. The reason is that by the distinction of the local presence of the two natures their union is not dissolved, but rather the truth of the natures is asserted and confusion is removed.
3. Someone will press first: If one of those natures exists there where the other does not exist, then one of them is separated from the other; but the former is true: therefore the latter also. Answer by denying the connection: for the human soul, which is whole in the matter of the head, is also whole in the other members in which the matter of the head does not exist; yet the union of the soul with the matter of the head is not by this means dissolved: for, as all know, the soul is torn away and separated from the head and the remaining members only by the death of the human being. Second instance: The soul, which exists whole in the matter of the head and whole outside it, is not united to the head by an adequate and complete union, but is united to it as to a partial and incomplete matter; whereas by an adequate and complete union it is united to the whole body, because the soul is so whole in the whole body that in no way is it outside it. Therefore, since on the Calvinists' view the whole Deity exists in the humanity and also whole outside it, the union of the Logos with the humanity will not be adequate and complete. Answer: the reason is unequal. For the union of the soul with the matter of the head is called incomplete because it is not a union of whole with whole — that is, of the whole form with the whole matter, but with a part of it; but the union of the Logos with the human nature is of whole with whole — that is, of the whole Deity of Christ with his whole humanity, in one hypostasis. The true reason, therefore, why the union of the soul with the matter of the head is inadequate is not that the soul exists outside the matter of the head, but that it is not a union of whole with whole — that is, of the integral form with the integral matter. Wherefore it is not that the Ubiquitarians should object against us that we dissolve the person of Christ, tear apart his natures, and invent an inadequate conjunction of natures for him; on the contrary, we grieve and marvel that such feeble arguments, such childish absurdities, could please and impose upon men distinguished for learning.
4. Third objection. The second person of the Trinity, after he assumed human nature, is always and everywhere GOD INCARNATE: therefore he is nowhere UN-INCARNATE, as Philip Nicolai insolently speaks. Answer: that argument concludes nothing against us, and therefore the whole of it can be admitted. For since the incarnation of God, once posited, consists in the assumption of human nature and its hypostatic conjunction with the divine, it is necessary that 'excarnation' (to speak with Philip Nicolai) signify the depositing, deserting, and dissolving of the union already made: but far be it from us to say that the most blessed Logos anywhere deposits, strips off, or expels from his hypostasis the flesh which he assumed in the Virgin's womb. Someone will press first: if the Logos exists outside the flesh, then he is somewhere un-incarnate; but the former is true on your view; therefore you are bound to admit the latter also. Answer by denying that connection; for just as the whole human soul exists outside the matter of the head with its union to the matter of the head preserved, so also the whole Logos exists both in the flesh and outside the flesh with his personal union to the human nature preserved; and therefore 'to be outside the flesh' does not necessarily infer excarnation, or the dissolution of that personal union. Matthias Martinius, a most acute theologian, answering an argument of this kind proposed by Balthasar Mentzer, says that the little word 'outside' is ambiguous; and that sometimes it is equivalent to 'beyond' — that is, it denies the inclusion of one thing in another; but sometimes it imports separation and denies union. In the former way he says the Logos exists outside the flesh assumed by him, but not in the latter way.
5. Someone will press second: If the Logos, in the former way, is outside the humanity, then somewhere he will not be man; but the Logos is nowhere not man: therefore he is nowhere outside the humanity. The assumption is proved: the Logos is always and everywhere man, for he is always and everywhere the God-man. Answer: Although Saint Thomas, and with him nearly all the scholastic theologians, think that proposition 'the Logos is everywhere man' simply false, yet I judge that a distinction is to be applied. For either this is its sense: the Logos everywhere is a person having human nature united to himself; or this is its sense: the Logos is a person having human nature united to himself everywhere, and therefore locally present to himself everywhere. In the former sense the proposition is true and is admitted by us, because it does not contradict our position; but in the latter it is plainly false, and therefore is never admitted by us. That there is a huge difference between these two senses of that proposition is clear from these examples: 'A husband everywhere, or wherever he exists, is a man having a wife' is a true proposition; but this, 'a husband is everywhere, or in all places, having a wife', is a false proposition. Likewise this, 'A master everywhere is a man having a servant', is a true proposition; but this, 'A master is a man, everywhere having a servant'.
6. Someone will press third: If the Logos does not have human nature united to himself everywhere and locally coexisting, then whole Christ is not everywhere, but only one of his natures, namely the Deity; but the latter is absurd: therefore the former also. Answer by denying the connection of the proposition; for from the antecedent of that connected proposition it follows well that the whole of Christ — that is, all the parts of Christ — is not everywhere; but it does not follow well that whole Christ is not everywhere. Why Doctor Jacob Andreae, and with him the remaining Ubiquitarians, should repudiate this distinction, I greatly wonder. For whole Christ is man, but not the whole of Christ; whole Christ suffered, died, and rose again; but not the whole of Christ — that is, both of his natures.
7. Someone will press fourth: Christ is not whole without the humanity: therefore if whole Christ is everywhere, the humanity of Christ is everywhere. Answer by denying the sequel; for the consequence of that argument is plainly ridiculous and unworthy of refutation, as is clear from these examples which contain a like consequence: Whole Christ is not without the Deity: therefore if whole Christ suffered and died, the Deity also suffered and died. Likewise, Christ is not whole without his foot: therefore if whole Christ is a man, the foot of Christ is a man.
Latin · §11
ART. XI. An Ubiquitariorum argumenta ab unione personali petita sint valida. 1. Prima objectio eorum, qui humanae CHRISTI naturae, immensitatem quandam affingunt, sic proponi solet: Quicquid personaliter conjunctum est cum toto Λόγῳ, illud existit ubicunque existit ὁ Λόγος: at natura humana CHRISTI est talis: Ergo. Respondetur, propositionem esse aperte falsam; nam ex personali unione duarum naturarum in CHRISTO, non magis sequitur, humanitatem esse ubicunque est Deitas, quam ex unione substantiali animae nostrae cum materia capitis, sequitur capitis materiam esse ubicunque est anima, h. e. esse in pede, quia anima est in pede: dico eam esse substantialiter conjunctam toti animae, quia tota anima est in toto corpore, & tota in qualibet ejus parte. Si igitur bene & acute argumentantur Ubiquistae, cum talem syllogismum extruunt, bona & efficax erit haec argumentatio: Quod substantialiter est conjunctum toti animae, illud existit ubicunque existit anima: at materia capitis est substantialiter conjuncta toti animae: Ergo est ubicunque est anima: anima autem est in materia pedis, Ergo etiam materia capitis est in materia pedis. 2. Secunda ob. Unio duarum naturarum in CHRISTO facta est ἀδιαιρέτως καὶ ἀδιαστάτως: Ergo non existit earum una nisi ubi existit altera: i. e. in omnibus locis coexistant. Respond. adverbia inseparabiliter & indistanter, cum adhibentur ad explicandum modum, quo uniuntur quae naturae in persona Λόγου, duplicem usum habere: primo enim adhibentur, ad refellendum Nestorii errorem, qui has naturas non tantum distinxit, sed divisit & separavit, utrique naturae suam propriam hypostasin assignans: ideoque illis non conjunxit in unam hypostasin. Secundo, ut sciamus istam unionem esse indissolubilem, & has naturas, postquam semel conjunctae sunt, nunquam disjungi aut separari posse. Negamus igitur istam consequentiam, humana & divina natura indissolubiliter, & inseparabiliter, in una persona conjunctae sunt: Ergo ubicunque existit earum una, ibi etiam existit altera; ratio est, quia per distinctionem localis praesentiae duarum naturarum earum unio non dissolvitur, sed potius naturarum veritas asseritur, & confusio tollitur. 3. Instabit aliquis primo: Si istarum naturarum una ibi existit, ubi non existit altera, tum earum una ab altera separatur: at verum est prius: Ergo etiam posterius. Resp. Negando connexionem: anima enim humana, quae tota est in materia capitis, est etiam tota in aliis membris, in quibus materia capitis non existit; at unio animae cum materia capitis, hoc pacto non dissolvitur: nam, ut omnes norunt, anima non nisi per mortem hominis, divellitur, & separatur a capite, & reliquis membris. Secundo inst. Anima, quae tota existit in materia capitis, & tota extra eam, non unitur capiti unione adaequata & completa; sed ei unitur, tanquam materiae partiali & incompletae: contra vero unione adaequata, et completa unitur toti corpori, quia anima ita est tota in toto corpore, ut nullo modo sit extra illud: Ergo, cum ex sententia Calvinistarum, tota Deitas existat in humanitate, & etiam tota extra eam, unio Του Λόγου cum humanitate, non erit adaequata, & completa. Respond. Imparem esse rationem: unio enim animae cum materia capitis, dicitur incompleta, quia non est unio totius cum toto: i. e. totius formae cum tota materia, sed cum ejus parte: at unio Του Λόγου cum humana natura, est totius cum toto: i. e. totius Deitatis CHRISTI, cum tota ejus humanitate, in una hypostasi. Vera igitur ratio cur unio animae cum materia capitis, sit inadaequata, non est quod anima existat extra materiam capitis, sed quod non sit unio totius cum toto: i. e. integrae formae cum integra materia. Quamobrem non est, quod Ubiquitarii nobis objiciant, nos personam CHRISTI solvere, naturas ipsius divellere, & inadaequatam conjunctionem naturarum ei affingere: sed contra est quod nos doleamus, & miremur, tam exilia argumenta, tam pueriles ineptias, viris ab eruditione claris placere, & imponere potuisse. 4. Tertia ob. Secunda persona Trinitatis, postquam humanam naturam assumpsit, semper & ubique est DEUS INCARNATUS: Ergo nusquam est EXCARNATUS, ut insolenter loquitur Philippus Nicolai. Resp. Illud argumentum, nihil concludere contra nos, & proinde totum admitti posse: cum enim incarnatio DEI posita, sit in humanae naturae assumptione, ejusque conjunctione hypostatica cum divina, necesse est excarnationem (ut cum Philippo Nicolai loquar) significare humanae naturae depositionem, desertionem, & unionis jam factae dissolutionem: absit autem dicamus beatissimum Λόγον carnem, quam in utero Virginis assumpsit, alicubi deponere, exuere, aut e sua hypostasi exterminare. Instabit aliquis primo: si ὁ Λόγος existit extra carnem, ergo est alicubi excarnatus: at verum est prius, ex vestra sententia. Ergo etiam posterius admittere tenemini. Resp. Negando illam connexionem; sicut enim tota anima humana, existit extra materiam capitis, salva ejus unione cum materia capitis, ita etiam totus Λόγος existit & in carne, & extra carnem, salva sua personali unione cum natura humana; & proinde τὸ esse extra carnem non necessario infert excarnationem, seu unionis istius personalis dissolutionem. Matthias Martinius acutissimus Theologus, ad hujusmodi argumentum a Balthasare Mentzero propositum respondens, dicit voculam extra esse ambiguam; & alias idem valere quod ultra, h. e. negare rei unius inclusionem in alia re: alias autem, importare separationem, & negare unionem; priore modo dicit τὸν Λόγον existere extra carnem a se assumptam, non vero posteriore modo. 5. Instabit aliquis secundo: Si Λόγος, priori modo est extra humanitatem, ergo alicubi non erit homo: at Λόγος nusquam non est homo: Ergo nusquam est extra humanitatem: probatur assumptio: Λόγος semper & ubique est homo nam semper & ubique est Θεάνθρωπος. Resp. Quamvis Sanctus Thomas, & cum eo fere omnes Scholastici Theologi, putent illam propositionem, Λόγος ubique est homo, simpliciter esse falsam, puto tamen distinctionem esse adhibendam: vel enim hic est ejus sensus, Λόγος ubique est persona, humanam naturam sibi unitam habens: vel hic est ejus sensus, Λόγος est persona habens naturam humanam, ubique sibi unitam, ideoque ubique sibi localiter praesentem. In priori sensu propositio est vera, & a nobis admittitur; quia nostrae sententiae non contradicit: in posteriore vero, plane falsa est, & proinde a nobis nunquam admittitur. Inter hos duos sensus istius propositionis, ingens esse discrimen, ex his exemplis liquet: Maritus ubique, seu ubicunque existit, est vir uxorem habens, est propositio vera: at haec, maritus est ubique, seu in omnibus locis uxorem habens, est propositio falsa: Similiter haec, Dominus ubique est vir, servum habens, propositio est vera: haec vero, Dominus est vir, ubique servum habens. 6. Instabit aliquis tertio: Si ὁ Λόγος non habet naturam humanam ubique sibi unitam & localiter coexistentem, totus Christus non est ubique, sed una tantum ejus natura, videlicet Deitas: at absurdum est posterius, Ergo etiam prius. Resp. Negando connexionem propositionis, nam ex antecedente istius connexae propositionis, bene sequitur totum CHRISTI, i. e. omnes partes CHRISTI, non esse ubique; non vero bene sequitur totum CHRISTUM non esse ubique. Hanc distinctionem cur repudiet D. Jacobus Andreae, & cum eo reliqui Ubiquitarii, magnopere demiror: Totus enim CHRISTUS est homo, sed non totum CHRISTI; totus CHRISTUS est passus, mortuus, & resurrexit; sed non totum CHRISTI: i. e. utraque ejus natura. 7. Instabit aliquis quarto: CHRISTUS non est totus, sine humanitate: Ergo si totus CHRISTUS est ubique, humanitas CHRISTI est ubique. Resp. Negando sequelam; istius enim argumenti consequentia, est plane ridicula, & refutatione indigna, ut patet ex his exemplis, quae similem consequentiam continent: Totus CHRISTUS non est sine Deitate: Ergo si totus CHRISTUS est passus & mortuus, Deitas etiam passa est, & mortua: Item, CHRISTUS non est totus, sine pede suo: Ergo si totus CHRISTUS est homo, pes CHRISTI est homo.
Whether the personal subsistence of the Logos is communicated to his human nature; and whether they speak rightly who say Christ's humanity subsists everywhere by that subsistence§12
12Article XII. Whether the personal subsistence of the Logos is communicated to his human nature; and whether they speak rightly who say Christ's humanity subsists everywhere by that subsistence.
1. From the common saying that the hypostasis, or subsistence, of the Logos is communicated to Christ's flesh, two corollaries are drawn. First, the Ubiquitarians gather from it that omnipresence — indeed all the properties of the Logos — are communicated to the human nature. The reason of the consequence is that the hypostasis of the Logos does not really differ from its essence, and therefore not from its essential properties either: if therefore it is true that the hypostasis of the Logos is communicated to the flesh, it must also be granted that his properties are communicated to it in the same way. Second, some even among our own theologians, who think Christ's flesh can be said to subsist in every place by the subsistence of the Logos although it exists in one place alone, reason from the same foundation thus: the subsistence of the Logos is communicated to Christ's human nature; since therefore the subsistence of the Logos is infinite and is enclosed by the bounds of no place, Christ's flesh, by that subsistence communicated to it, can be said to subsist everywhere. This latter argument is more dangerous than the former, because it so greatly pleases certain Orthodox theologians that they profess that in this controversy concerning the local presence of Christ's flesh we differ from the Ubiquitarians only by a dispute about words, and by a merely verbal disagreement — which, whether it be true, let those judge who have more carefully considered the history of the colloquy of Mompelgart and the polemical writings of Beza and of Jacob Andreae on this matter.
2. In order, then, that those two arguments may be clearly dissolved, the verb 'to communicate' must be distinguished, and it must be taught in what sense Christ's subsistence is communicated to the flesh. It is therefore to be held that something is said to be communicated to another in three ways. First, both inhesively and denominatively, in the way the odor of an apple is communicated to the hand; for that odor, at least the same in kind, inheres in the hand and denominates the hand — that is, is truly predicated of the hand. Second, something is communicated denominatively but not inhesively: in the way kings and emperors communicate the dignity of empire to their wives; for those wives are denominated Empresses and queens, not because they have imperial power or authority in themselves, but because their husbands have that authority. Third, something is communicated to another neither inhesively nor denominatively, but either effectively — in the way God is said to communicate himself to created beings, for those beings are called beings and goods by participation of the first being and the first good, as Zanchius speaks — or sustentatively, in the way a subject is communicated to its accidents, namely by sustaining them and receiving them into itself; or in some other similar mode. I say these are communicated neither denominatively nor inhesively, because God neither exists in creatures as an essential form, or as an accidental form in its subject, nor is predicated of them by true and affirmative predication; and the subject likewise neither inheres in its accidents nor denominates them, but on the contrary is denominated by them.
3. The hypostasis or subsistence of the Logos is communicated to his human nature in this third way: that is, it is communicated to it neither inhesively nor denominatively, but sustentatively only. The prior part of this assertion is declared thus: Christ's human nature (as Martinius well notes against Menzer) is void of all proper personal subsistence, and in no way subsists — that is, neither by itself nor by accident; or, to speak more plainly, neither by its own nature nor from the union. Therefore the subsistence of the Logos is communicated to it neither inhesively nor denominatively. The antecedent is proved: if Christ's humanity somehow subsists, it is somehow a suppositum or person, and therefore in some sense it will be true that Christ assumed a suppositum or a person; but the latter is absurd; therefore the former also. The connected claim is proved, because suppositum and subsistence reciprocate, so that every suppositum has subsistence, and everything that has subsistence is a suppositum. Someone will say: therefore Christ's flesh is plainly stripped of personality. It is answered that it is not stripped of personality in this sense, as if it were not united to some person — for it is united to the person of the Logos — but that subsistence properly and formally neither inheres in it nor can be attributed to it.
4. The same can also be demonstrated thus: if Christ's human nature subsists, either it subsists by itself — that is, has subsistence from itself — or it subsists insofar as it exists in the person of the Logos. The former will be admitted by no one; but neither is the latter free of manifest absurdity. Which is proved thus: Christ's flesh, insofar as it exists in the person of the Logos, has a certain mode of existing contrary to subsistence; therefore it does not subsist. The antecedent is proved: to be in another suppositum, and to subsist — that is, to be by oneself and outside every other suppositum — are two opposite modes of existing; but Christ's flesh, insofar as it exists in the person of the Logos, has the former mode of existing, that is, it exists in a suppositum; therefore it cannot have the latter, which is diametrically opposed to it.
5. The posterior part of our assertion is declared thus: the Logos graciously received and assumed our nature to his hypostasis, so that his hypostasis has the flesh intimately present to itself and bears it personally united to itself; but on the contrary the flesh clings in that hypostasis and is sustained. From which it follows that Christ's hypostasis, or personal subsistence, is rightly said to be communicated to the human nature sustentatively.
6. From this distinction of communication it is clear what is to be answered to either argument proposed at the threshold of this article. For since Christ's hypostasis is communicated to his humanity neither inhesively nor denominatively, it is evident that the Ubiquitarians cannot gather from the communication of the hypostasis of the Logos that his essential properties have been communicated to the assumed flesh, either inhesively or denominatively; and therefore all those inferences are to be denied by which, from that foundation, they conclude that Christ's flesh is omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, and so on. Likewise, since all those statements are false by which to subsist, or to have some personal being, is attributed to Christ's flesh — because, namely, it has no subsistence proper to itself, and no personal being, but a certain mode of existing contrary to them — it follows that Christ's humanity can neither be said to subsist everywhere by the subsistence of the Logos, nor to exist everywhere according to its personal being. Someone will say: Christ's human nature is joined to the person of the Logos, who is omnipresent and omnipotent; therefore the human nature can be called omnipresent and omnipotent personally. Answer: if that consequence is admitted, by equal reason these consequences also must be admitted: Christ's human nature is united to an infinite and eternal person; therefore it itself is infinite and eternal personally, or according to its personal being. Likewise, it is joined to that person who is God and Creator, and redeemer of the world; therefore these things belong to it personally.
7. Someone will ask here whether, just as the act of subsisting, so also the act of existing is to be removed from Christ's flesh. Answer: by no means. For Christ's flesh, although it does not subsist, nevertheless in truth has its own existence, distinct from the existence of the Logos, but dependent upon it. I say that it has an existence distinct from the existence of the Logos, because every created being has both an essence and an existence distinct from the essence and existence of the creator. I say that it has an existence depending on the existence of the Logos, because it cannot exist by itself and outside the person of the Logos.
Latin · §12
ART. XII. An subsistentia personalis τοῦ Λόγου, sit naturae ejus humanae communicata: Et an recte loquantur, qui dicunt, humanitatem CHRISTI subsistere ubique, per subsistentiam τοῦ Λόγου; Item existere ubique secundum esse suum personale. 1. Ex eo quod dici solet hypostasin, aut subsistentiam τοῦ Λόγου, communicatam esse carni CHRISTI, duo consectaria dicuntur: primo enim Ubiquitarii inde colligunt, omnipraesentiam, imo & proprietates omnes τοῦ Λόγου, esse humanae naturae communicatas; ratio consequentiae est, quia hypostasis τοῦ Λόγου non differt realiter ab ejus essentia; ideoque nec a proprietatibus ejus essentialibus: Si igitur verum est hypostasin τοῦ Λόγου, esse carni communicatam, etiam proprietates ejus, eodem modo ei communicatas esse fatendum est. Secundo, nonnulli etiam ex nostris Theologis, qui putant CHRISTI carnem posse dici ubique locorum subsistere, per subsistentiam τοῦ Λόγου, licet in uno solo existat, ex eodem fundamento, sic ratiocinantur, Humanae naturae CHRISTI communicata est subsistentia τοῦ Λόγου; cum igitur τοῦ Λόγου subsistentia infinita sit, & nullius loci ambitu includatur, caro CHRISTI, per eam subsistentiam sibi communicatam, dici potest ubique subsistere: hoc posterius argumentum periculosius est praecedente, quia tantopere placet quibusdam Orthodoxis Theologis, ut profiteantur nos in hac controversia de locali praesentia carnis CHRISTI, λογομαχίᾳ, & nonnisi verbali dissidio, ab Ubiquitariis discrepare; quod an verum sit, judicent illi qui historiam colloquii Mompelgartensis & Bezae ac Jacobi Andreae Polemica scripta super hac materia diligentius considerarunt. 2. Ut igitur duo illa argumenta perspicue diluantur, distinguendum est verbum communicandi, & docendum quo sensu CHRISTI subsistentia sit carni communicata: tenendum igitur est, aliquid tribus modis dici alteri communicari. Primo, & inhaesive & denominative, quo modo odor pomi communicatur manui, nam & odor ille, saltem idem specie, inest manui, & denominat manum, i. e. vere praedicatur de manu. Secundo, communicatur aliquid denominative, sed non inhaesive: quo pacto reges & imperatores communicant imperii dignitatem uxoribus suis, illae enim denominantur Imperatrices, & reginae, non quod in se habeant potestatem, aut authoritatem imperialem, sed quod earum mariti istam authoritatem habeant. Tertio, communicatur aliquid alteri, neque inhaesive, neque denominative, sed vel effective, quo modo DEUS dicitur communicare seipsum creatis entibus; illa enim dicuntur entia & bona, participatione primi entis, & primi boni, ut loquitur Zanchius; vel sustentative, quo modo accidentibus suis communicatur subjectum, ea videlicet sustentando, et recipiendo in se: vel aliquo alio simili modo. Dico haec neque communicari denominative, neque inhaesive, quia DEUS neque existit in creaturis tanquam forma essentialis, aut accidentalis in suo subjecto: neque de iis praedicatur, praedicatione vera & affirmativa: subjectum etiam neque inest accidentibus suis, neque ea denominat, sed contra ab iis denominatur. 3. Hypostasis seu subsistentia τοῦ Λόγου, tertio hoc modo communicatur naturae ejus humanae: h. e. neque communicatur ei inhaesive, neque denominative, sed sustentative tantum. Prior pars hujus assertionis sic declaratur: Humana natura CHRISTI (ut bene notat Martinius contra Menzerum.) omnis propriae personalis subsistentiae expers est, & nullo modo subsistit; h. e. neque per se, neque per accidens; sive, ut planius loquar, neque natura sua, neque ex unione. Ergo subsistentia τοῦ Λόγου, neque inhaesive, neque denominative ei communicata est: Probatur antecedens: Si humanitas CHRISTI aliquo modo subsistit, aliquo modo est suppositum aut persona, & proinde aliquo sensu verum erit, CHRISTUM assumpsisse suppositum, aut personam: at absurdum est posterius; Ergo etiam prius. Probatur connexum, quia suppositum & subsistentia reciprocantur, adeo ut omne suppositum habeat subsistentiam, & omne subsistentiam habens sit suppositum. Dicet aliquis: Ergo caro CHRISTI plane destituitur personalitate. Respondetur, eam non destitui personalitate hoc sensu, quasi non sit personae alicui unita, est enim unita personae τοῦ Λόγου; sed quod subsistentia proprie, & formaliter ei neque insit, neque attribui possit. 4. Idem etiam sic demonstrari potest: Si humana natura CHRISTI subsistit, vel per se subsistit, id est, ex se subsistentiam habet, vel subsistit quatenus existit in persona τοῦ Λόγου: prius a nullo admittetur: at neque posterius manifesta absurditate caret: quod sic probatur: Caro CHRISTI, quatenus existit in persona τοῦ Λόγου, habet modum quendam existendi subsistentiae contrarium, Ergo non subsistit. Probatur antecedens: Esse in alio supposito, & subsistere, seu esse per se, & extra omne aliud suppositum, sunt duo oppositi modi existendi, at caro CHRISTI, quatenus existit in persona τοῦ Λόγου, habet priorem modum existendi, i. e. existit in supposito: Ergo non potest habere posteriorem, qui ei e diametro opponitur. 5. Posterior pars nostrae assertionis sic declaratur: ὁ Λόγος naturam nostram, ad suam hypostasin gratiose recepit & assumpsit, ita ut ejus hypostasis carnem sibi intime praesentem habeat, eamque sibi personaliter unitam gestet: contra vero caro in illa hypostasi haereat, & sustentetur. Ex quo fit, ut CHRISTI hypostasis, seu personalis subsistentia, recte dicatur communicata humanae naturae sustentative. 6. Ex hac distinctione communicationis liquet, quid respondendum sit ad utrumque argumentum, in limine hujus articuli propositum: cum enim hypostasis CHRISTI neque inhaesive, neque denominative communicata sit humanitati ipsius; evidens est Ubiquitarios, ex communicatione hypostaseos τοῦ Λόγου, non posse colligere, proprietates ejus essentiales communicatas esse assumptae carni, aut inhaesive, aut denominative; & proinde negandas esse omnes illas illationes, quibus ex eo fundamento concludunt carnem CHRISTI esse omniscientem, omnipraesentem, omnipotentem, &c. Similiter, cum falsae sint omnes illae enuntiationes, quibus subsistere, aut esse aliquod personale carni CHRISTI tribuitur, quia viz. nullam habet subsistentiam sibi convenientem, nullumque esse personale, sed modum quendam existendi iis contrarium, consequens est CHRISTI humanitatem, neque posse dici subsistere ubique per subsistentiam τοῦ Λόγου, neque existere ubique secundum esse suum personale. Dicet aliquis, natura humana CHRISTI conjuncta est cum persona τοῦ Λόγου, quae omnipraesens est, & omnipotens: Ergo natura humana dici potest omnipraesens, & omnipotens personaliter. Resp. Si ista consequentia admittatur, pari ratione admittendae etiam sunt hae consequentiae: Humana natura CHRISTI unita est cum persona infinita, & aeterna: Ergo ipsa est infinita & aeterna personaliter, seu secundum suum esse personale: Item, est conjuncta cum ea persona, quae DEUS est & Creator, ac redemptor Mundi: Ergo haec ei conveniunt personaliter. 7. Quaeret hic aliquis, an quemadmodum actus subsistendi, ita etiam actus existendi, a CHRISTI carne removendus sit. Resp. Nequaquam: caro enim CHRISTI, licet non subsistat, revera tamen habet propriam existentiam, distinctam ab existentia τοῦ Λόγου, sed ab ea dependentem. Dico eam habere existentiam distinctam ab existentia τοῦ Λόγου, quia omne Ens creatum habet & essentiam, & existentiam distinctam ab essentia & existentia creatoris. Dico eam habere existentiam pendentem ab existentia τοῦ Λόγου, quia per se, & extra personam τοῦ Λόγου, existere non potest.
On the diversity of material and immaterial forms§13
13Second Exercise. On the origin of the soul and the propagation of sin.
Article I. On the diversity of material and immaterial forms.
So that we may settle the question of the soul's origin with a clear mind, I will first set down a few points about the kinds of forms, and about the different ways matter causes and receives the forms that enter it or are drawn out of it.
2. Hold first that effects made for a definite end — not at random or by chance — fall into three kinds, according as four causes, or three, or only two, concur in making them. Corporeal substances need all four: the two inward causes, matter and form, and the two outward ones, efficient cause and end, must join to give them the act of existing. Accidental forms or accidents, and every substantial form except the rational soul, are made by three — efficient, matter, and end. Angels and human souls are made by only two — efficient and end. Angels neither consist of matter and form nor exist in matter, so they can have no more than those two causes. Human souls, though they exist in matter, still do not consist of matter and form, and are not produced by the power of the matter they inhabit. Being spirits, they cannot be generated by any material power, as will be shown shortly; God creates them from nothing and introduces them into matter for the best end: his own glory and the eternal salvation of those persons.
3. Accidental forms such as whiteness or blackness need three causes if they are to have real being in the world. First, some end or purpose must stir and draw the efficient cause to act. Second, the efficient must apply its power — its active concurrence. Third, the matter-in-which, the subject of the whiteness, must concur passively and cooperate in giving that being to the accident: it does so by receiving the efficient's action that produces the whiteness, and by receiving and sustaining the whiteness itself. From these three the existence of whiteness and other accidents hangs — above all from the matter that receives them and, by passive concurrence, produces and sustains their being. Relative to efficient and end they depend only as to becoming; relative to matter or subject they depend both as to becoming and as to being. They cannot come to be without the concurrence of the matter in which they exist, nor keep the act of existing once that matter is gone. But if efficient and final cause are removed, an accident already produced can still persist in existence — as countless examples show.
4. Every substantial form except the human soul likewise needs three causes. For the form of a stone to exist in act, some end must move the efficient by what is called metaphorical motion; the efficient must, by its power in act, dispose the stone's matter to receive that substantial form; and matter, as a subjective cause, must concur in producing and sustaining the form. That form depends on matter for becoming, being, and operating: without the matter in which it exists it can neither come to be, nor be, nor operate. This dependence plainly shows that matter is a cause of the forms in it — not an active cause, but a passive, subjective one. Every dependence of one thing on another as on a prior in becoming and in being is a clear mark of causality. The human soul stands far otherwise. After a person's death it both exists and acts outside matter. Therefore it does not depend on matter for being or for operating, nor for becoming: matter cannot by any power or causal concurrence give being to a spiritual substance such as the rational soul, as will soon be proved, and so is in no way its cause. Hence the soul belongs with those things produced by only two causes — efficient and end. It is rightly called an immaterial form, independent of matter; every other form, substantial or accidental, is called material and dependent on matter. Fire's form cannot exist outside its matter, and without that matter it cannot heat or burn. A brute's form cannot exist without its matter — the body — and without that body it cannot sense or desire. The human soul not only exists outside matter after death; it also acts outside it, in understanding, willing, rejoicing, and grieving.
Latin · §13
EXERCITATIO SECUNDA De Origine animae, & propagatione peccati. ART. I. De formarum materialium, & immaterialium diversitate. 1. Ut decisio hujus quaestionis De origine animae, facilis intelligatur, quaedam premittam de formarum diversitate, deque varia causalitate, & potentia materiae, respectu formarum, quae in eam introducuntur, aut ex ea educuntur. 2. Primo igitur tenendum est, tria esse genera effectorium, quae propter certum aliquem finem, non vero temere aut fortuito producuntur: nam eorum alia omnium quatuor causarum, alia trium, alia duarum tantum concursu producuntur. Omnium quatuor causarum concursu producuntur substantiae corporeae, quae non possunt habere esse aliquod reale in mundo, nisi duae causae internae, viz. materia & forma, duae item externae, i.e. efficiens & finis concurrant, ad tribuendum iis existendi actum. Trium causarum concursu, videlicet efficientis, materiae, & finis, producuntur omnes formae accidentales seu accidentia, omnes item formae substantiales, sola anima rationali excepta: duarum causarum concursu, videlicet efficientis, & finis, producuntur angeli & animae humanae: Angeli enim neque ex materia & forma constant, neque in materia existunt; ideoque duas tantum habere possunt causas, videlicet efficientem & finem. Animae vero humanae, licet in materia existant, non tamen ex materia & forma constant, neque producuntur vi materiae, in qua existunt: cum enim sint spiritus, nullius materiae vi produci possunt, ut mox probabitur, sed a DEO ex nihilo creantur, & in materiam inducuntur, propter optimum finem, videlicet DEI gloriam, & ipsorum hominum salutem aeternam. 3. Dixi formas accidentales, ut albedinem, nigredinem, &c. trium causarum concursu produci, quia ut albedo habeat esse reale in mundo, 1. Oportet finem aliquem, seu propositum, excitare, & allicere efficientem ad agendum: 2. Oportet efficientem adhibere suam vim, seu concursum activum: 3. Oportet materiam in qua, seu subjectum albedinis, concurrere, & cooperari concursu passivo, ad tribuendum illud esse albedini: hoc autem praestat, recipiendo actionem causae efficientis & producentis albedinem, item recipiendo ipsam albedinem, eamque sustentando. Ex trium harum causarum concursu, pendet albedinis aliorumque accidentium existentia, praecipue vero a materia, in qua recipiuntur, quaeque concursu passivo producit & sustentat ipsorum esse: idque quia ex efficiente, & fine, pendent tantum quoad fieri, ex materia autem seu subjecto pendent, & quoad fieri, & quoad esse: nam neque possunt fieri sine concursu materiae in qua existunt, neque possunt in existendi actu perseverare, illa materia sublata: at efficiente & finali causa sublatis, potest accidens jam productum, in existendi actu perseverare, ut liquet ex infinitis pene exemplis. 4. Dixi omnes formas substantiales, anima humana excepta, etiam trium causarum concursu produci: quia ut forma lapidis v.g. actu existat, 1. Oportet finem aliquem motione metaphorica movere efficientem. 2. Necesse est efficientem actu sua virtute disponere materiam lapidis, ad recipiendam illam formam substantialem. 3. Oportet materiam, in genere causae subjectivae concurrere ad producendam, & sustentandam illam formam: idque quia illa forma pendet a materia, quoad fieri, esse, & operari; h.e. neque potest fieri, neque esse, neque operari, sine materia in qua existit: ista autem dependentia formarum substantialium a materia, manifeste arguit materiam esse formarum in ea existentium causam, non quidem activam, sed passivam, & subjectivam, ut vocant: omnis enim dependentia alicujus ab aliquo, tanquam a priori, in fieri, & esse, est evidens causalitatis indicium: at longe aliter se habet anima humana; ea enim post mortem hominis & existit, & operatur extra materiam: Ergo a materia non pendet quoad esse & operari; at neque ab ea pendet quoad fieri: idque quia materia non potest vi aliqua, aut concursu causali tribuere esse spirituali substantiae, qualis est anima rationalis, ut mox probabitur, & proinde nullo modo est ejus causa. Hinc consequitur, animam esse ex earum rerum numero, quae duarum tantum causarum concursu producuntur, efficientis videlicet & finis: patet item animam recte appellari formam immaterialem, seu independentem a materia, cum e contrario omnes aliae formae, tum substantiales, tum accidentales, vocentur formae materiales, & a materia pendentes: v.g. Forma ignis, sicut existere nequit extra suam materiam, ita etiam sine ea non potest calefacere, & comburere. Forma bruti, sicut existere nequit sine materia sua, i.e. corpore, ita sine eadem sentire, aut appetere non potest. At anima humana, non solum existit extra materiam post mortem hominis; sed etiam extra eam operatur, exercendo actus intelligendi, volendi, gaudendi, aut dolendi.
On matter's double causality and potency, and the eduction of forms from the potency of matter§14
14Article II. On matter's double causality and potency, and the eduction of forms from the potency of matter.
1. First note that matter — the material cause — has a double causality: one toward the composite or mattered thing, another toward the forms that depend on it. Toward the composite its causality lies in constituting that composite as an essential part. Toward the forms that hang on it, its causality lies in concurring passively with the agent to give them being and to keep that being.
2. Second, matter's potency is of two kinds. One is only receptive, not causative; the other is both receptive and causative. Matter has the first kind toward the rational soul alone: it can naturally receive the soul into itself, but it cannot concur as a material cause in giving the soul being. It has the second kind toward every other form, essential or accidental: it can receive them and, by passive concurrence, cooperate with the agent in producing them.
3. Third, those philosophers go wrong who explain eduction by saying the form already exists in act in the matter before generation, only hidden under the confusion of potency, and that generation merely makes it manifest — as if actual being that was concealed simply becomes clear and is led out of matter's darkness into light. That account is bad. If the form already existed in act and united with matter before generation, the composite would already exist before it was generated — which is openly absurd, since matter and form existing in act and united necessarily yield the composite. Someone will object: if the form is not in the matter beforehand, how can it be educed or drawn out of it? Nothing is drawn out of what it is not in. Reply: the form is said to be educed from matter not from matter's substance, but from matter's causative potency. Before generation it does not exist in the substance of matter, yet it truly exists in matter's potency insofar as matter can produce it as a passive principle. To be in matter's causative potency is simply to be producible by matter as a passive principle.
4. Fourth, those also are wholly wrong who say forms exist in matter before generation according to an incomplete, imperfect being — by degrees of their entity — and through generation first attain complete, finished being in matter. That view makes a substantial form vary in intensity like an accident; and it absurdly packs into one and the same matter, all at once, every form that could be educed from it, total or partial — nearly infinite diverse substantial entities in one thing. Someone will object: if the form is nothing at all before generation, then every form comes from nothing and is therefore created. Reply: forms may be said to come from nothing if that means from no pre-existing part of themselves; not if it means from no pre-existing matter, which is the same as creation. Forms come to be from matter: matter concurs as a subjective cause in giving them being.
5. Fifth, it is also a bad account of eduction to say a form is educed from matter's potency merely because matter, before the form arrives, can receive it. If that were enough, every form without exception would be educible from matter's potency, since matter can receive any form — by a natural potency or an obediential one. Natural potency can be brought into act by a natural agent: wood's passive potency for heat is natural because fire can actualize it. Obediential potency cannot be actualized by a natural agent, but only by a superior agent of another order to which the matter is so subject that it must obey: wood or stone's potency for a statue's form is of this kind (art, not nature, actualizes it); so is the soul's potency for supernatural gifts — faith, hope, charity — which no natural power can bring into act, but only the creator's infinite power.
6. With that in place, eduction is easy to state. Nothing is educed from a thing except what was already in it. So only those forms are educed from matter's causative potency that, before they exist, are in that potency — producible by matter's passive concurrence. While they do not yet exist in act they can receive being from matter as a passive, receptive principle; when they begin to exist in act by the agent's active power and matter's passive power, they are rightly said to be educed from matter's causative potency, because they are no longer producible by it. What has once been caused is no longer in the cause's potency; it has been led from potentiality into actuality. A brute's form is truly educed from the causative potency of the seed's matter: before generation it was producible by that matter's passive power; through the generator's action it is produced and set outside that potency, and is producible by it again only if it loses the existence it now has. The human soul is produced in matter, yet it is not educed from matter's causative potency; it is induced into matter. It never lay in that potency, and matter never had a power, by passive concurrence, to give the soul being.
Latin · §14
ART. II. De duplici materiae causalitate & potentia; item de formarum eductione ex potentia materiae. 1. In hoc articulo notandum est primo, Materiam seu causam materialem, duplicem habere causalitatem; unam respectu compositi, seu materiati, alteram respectu formarum ab ea pendentium. Causalitas ejus respectu compositi est in eo posita, quod tanquam pars essentialis constituat compositum: respectu formarum ab ea pendentium, causalitas ejus in eo est posita, quod concursu passivo concurrat cum agente ad tribuendum iis esse, & ad illud ipsum esse conservandum. 2. Secundo notandum est, duplicem esse materiae potentiam, unam receptivam tantum, & non etiam causativam, alteram & receptivam & causativam. Priorem potentiam habet materia respectu solius animae rationalis; habet enim potentiam naturalem recipiendi animam in se, sed non habet potentiam concurrendi in genere causae materialis, ad tribuendum esse animae: posteriorem habet respectu omnium aliarum formarum, tum essentialium, tum accidentalium: non solum enim potest eas recipere in se, sed etiam concursu passivo cooperari cum agente, ad eas producendas. 3. Tertio notandum est, illos Philosophos male explicare eductionem formarum ex potentia materiae, qui dicunt formam actu existere in materia, ante rei generationem, non tamen apparere, sed quasi sub confusione potentiae ejus latitare, per generationem vero manifestam fieri, ita ut illud esse actuale, quod prius erat quasi absconditum, non incipiat simpliciter per generationem, sed per eam incipiat fieri manifestum, & sic e tenebris ac confusione materiae, quasi in lucem educatur. Dico hanc explicationem eductionis malam esse, quia si forma existat actu in materia ante compositi generationem, ipsum compositum existit ante suam generationem; quod aperte absurdum est: ratio consequentiae est, quia ex materia & forma actu existentibus, & unitis, resultat compositum, iisque positis necessario ponitur compositum; ideoque si materia & forma existant unitae, ante generationem compositi, ipsum compositum existit ante suam generationem. Dicet aliquis: si forma non existit in materia ante rei generationem, non potest dici ex materia educi, seu extrahi: nihil enim potest educi, seu extrahi ex eo, in quo non est. Resp. Formam dici ex materia educi, non quod ex materiae substantia, sed quod ex materiae potentia causativa educatur seu extrahatur: quamvis enim forma ante generationem in ipsa materiae substantia non existat, in ejus tamen potentia vere & proprie existere dicitur, quatenus a materia est producibilis; nam esse in materiae potentia causativa, nihil est aliud, nisi a materia tanquam a principio passivo posse produci. 4. Quarto notandum est, illos etiam toto caelo errare, qui dicunt formas, ante generationem, secundum esse inchoatum & imperfectum, h.e. secundum gradus quosdam suae entitatis, existere in materia: per generationem vero incipere esse in materia, secundum esse completum, & consummatum. Dico hujus sententiae Patronos turpiter errare, quia inde sequitur formam substantialem variari, quoad gradus intensionis & remissionis, non minus quam accidentia; quia item absurdum est, in una & eadem materia actu existere omnes formas, quae ex materiae potentia educi possunt, sive sint totales, sive partiales; sic enim in una & eadem re, simul essent pene infinitae entitates substantiales & diversae. Sed objiciet aliquis: si forma ante rei generationem plane nihil sit, sequetur omnes formas fieri ex nihilo, & proinde creari. Resp. Formas omnes posse dici fieri ex nihilo, si fieri ex nihilo accipiatur pro fieri ex nulla sui parte praeexistente, non vero si fieri ex nihilo accipiatur proprie, pro eo quod est fieri ex nulla materia praeexistente, quo sensu idem valet ac creari: fiunt enim formae ex materia, h.e. fiunt materia concurrente in genere causae subjectivae, ad tribuendum iis esse. 5. Quinto notandum est, eos etiam male explicare eductionem formarum ex materiae potentia, qui dicunt formam ideo ex materiae potentia educi, quod materia ante adventum formae habeat potentiam ad eam recipiendam: Si enim haec explicatio esset veritati consentanea, omnes formae, nulla excepta, essent ex materiae potentia educibiles; idque quia materia habet potentiam ad quamlibet formam recipiendam, potentiam (inquam) vel naturalem, vel obedientialem. Potentia autem naturalis est ea, quae educibilis est in actum vi alicujus agentis naturalis, ut potentia passiva ligni ad recipiendum calorem, dicitur naturalis, quia educi potest in actum vi naturalis agentis, ignis videlicet. Potentia materiae obedientialis est, quae in actum educi non potest vi agentis naturalis, sed vi alicujus agentis superioris, atque alterius ordinis, cui ea materia ita subdita est, & subjecta, ut necessario ei obediat: talis est potentia ligni, vel lapidis ad formam statuae; non enim educitur in actum vi alicujus agentis naturalis, sed vi agentis per artem: talis etiam est potentia animae ad recipienda dona supernaturalia, ut fidem, spem, charitatem, non enim ulla vi naturali in actum educi potest, sed infinita vi & virtute creatoris. 6. His positis: facile est explicare eductionem formarum ex materiae potentia; cum enim nihil possit educi ex aliquo, nisi illud quod prius fuit in eo; manifestum est eas solas formas ex potentia causativa materiae educi, quae antequam existant, sunt in potentia causativa materiae, i.e. producibiles sunt per concursum passivum materiae: illae enim formae quamdiu actu non existunt, habent potentiam ad accipiendum esse a materia, tanquam a principio passivo & receptivo; ideoque cum actu existere incipiunt, vi activa agentis, & passiva materiae, recte dicuntur educi ex potentia causativa materiae, quia non amplius sunt in potentia causativa materiae, i.e. non jam sunt a materia producibiles; quod enim semel productum & causatum est, non amplius est in potentia causae, sed eductum est ex statu potentialitatis, in statum actualitatis. Forma igitur bruti vere dicitur educi ex potentia causativa materiae seminis, quia ante generationem bruti, illa forma fuit in potentia causativa materiae seminis, i.e. producibilis erat vi passiva istius materiae; jam vero per actionem generantis, illa forma producta est, & posita extra potentiam causativam materiae; ita ut non amplius sit producibilis vi passiva materiae, nisi amittat eam existentiam, quam nunc habet. Contra vero anima humana, licet producatur in materia: non tamen ex ejus potentia causativa educitur, sed in materiam inducitur, idque quia nunquam fuit in materiae potentia causativa, nec materia unquam habuit potentiam ad tribuendum esse animae, per passivum suum concursum.
Whether the rational soul is from a translate§15
15Article III. Whether the rational soul is from a translate.
1. The real question is this: is the rational soul educed from the potency of the seed's matter by seminal and prolific power, as plant and brute souls are — or does God produce it without any concurrence of pre-existing matter, creating it and infusing it into the body? Nearly all modern philosophers and theologians favor the second view, and rightly. I do not recall any contrary argument weighty enough to pull even a moderately practiced mind into the camp of those who say our souls are sown by parents in carnal generation and not created and infused by God. For immediate creation by God, Scripture's witness and philosophical arguments from known principles of nature both count. Leaving Scripture to the theologians — especially Junius on Genesis 1 — I offer reasons drawn from physics and metaphysics.
2. First: if the soul is generable, it is corruptible; but the consequent is absurd, so the antecedent is too. A form produced in generation by matter's concurrence depends on matter so that, once separated from what gave and kept its being, it must perish. Opponents reply that human souls are of themselves corruptible — the argument shows they depend on matter in becoming and being — yet will last forever because God has decreed to conserve them. Asked why the soul considered in itself is corruptible, they say that if God stopped conserving souls they would at once sink into nothing. That answer fails. When substances are divided into eternal and perishable, eternity does not mean independence from God's conserving influx; it means no creature can destroy them by a physical action. On that score angels, the heavens, and rational souls alike may be called incorruptible. Further, those who answer so cannot deny that the human soul cannot be destroyed by any physical or material action; from which I infer it also cannot be produced by any such action. Why can no physical action destroy it? Because it is a spiritual substance. For the same reason no material power can produce it: what is repugnant to a spirit in destruction is repugnant to it in production. Generation is a physical, material action — done in matter, by seminal virtue.
3. Second: God willed human souls to exist outside bodies after death, and brute souls to perish with their bodies. Therefore he gave the rational soul a nature independent of matter, so that by that nature it can exist outside corporeal matter. As to its nature, then, the soul is independent of corporeal matter.
4. Third: only that form is educed from matter's causative potency which comes to be with matter's passive concurrence giving it being. The seed's matter cannot by passive concurrence give being to the soul. Therefore the soul is not educed from matter's potency; God creates it and pours it into matter. The major is clear from what went before. The minor: no active power acts beyond its genus — it cannot produce what is of a higher nature and order. The soul exceeds the whole order of corporeal nature as a spiritual substance; no corporeal power can produce it. They reply that the material force in the seed cannot of itself make a spiritual substance, yet can, as instrument of the generating soul, be elevated beyond its species to produce a spirit — as a phantasm, a sensible material species, by the soul's power impresses intelligible (spiritual) images on the patient intellect. That evasion is empty. A created agent cannot, by a purely material instrument, produce something immaterial; and the prolific faculty in the seed is purely material. The case of intelligible species is different: the soul uses the agent intellect as a principal instrument to excite and elevate the phantasm. Universally, a material power cannot be the principal or sole instrument in producing a spiritual substance, though it may be a secondary instrument in producing a spiritual quality.
5. Fourth: opponents are driven to hard, absurd conclusions. To dodge these arguments they must deny that the soul is a spiritual substance, and allow that a physical action can destroy it unless God specially preserves it — claims that strip our soul of dignity and leave us no purchase against atheists from immortality. If the soul by nature depends on the body so that it cannot of itself exist outside it, how shall we persuade them it is immortal? The same conclusions slight divine wisdom: to say God willed souls to exist outside bodies and yet denied them a nature fit for that is to say he did not produce the soul wisely enough.
6. Fifth: though we hold that God creates the soul and infuses it, so that the parent does not give the child a soul, we can still maintain that a human generates a human as truly as a lion a lion or an ox an ox; and we can maintain that the natural hereditary corruption called original sin is passed from parents to children, and explain how. Nothing forces us into an opinion that contradicts the soul's nature and so deeply detracts from its dignity.
Latin · §15
ART. III. An anima rationalis sit ex traduce. 1. Verus hujus controversiae status est, utrum anima rationalis educatur ex potentia materiae seminis, vi seminalis & prolificae virtutis, sicut animae plantarum, & belluarum: an vero a DEO absque materiae praeexistentis concursu producatur, h.e. creatur, & corpori infundatur. Posterior sententia omnibus fere modernis Philosophis, & Theologis arridet, & merito; non enim memini me legisse ullum argumentum in contrarium, tanti ponderis, ut genium aliquem, vel mediocriter in hac controversia versatum, in eorum sententiam adduceret, qui contendunt animas nostras a parentibus, per carnalem generationem proseminari; non vero a DEO creari, & infundi. Contra vero, pro ea sententia, quae asserit animas humanas a DEO immediate creari, non solum faciunt varia S. Scripturae testimonia, sed etiam argumenta Philosophica principiis naturae notis nitentia: ego autem, omissis argumentis ex S. Scriptura petitis, quia ea luculenter proponuntur a Theologis, praecipue vero a clarissimo D. Junio, in explicatione 1. cap. Genes. rationes quasdam afferám, partim ex Physica, partim ex Metaphysica depromptas. 2. Prima ratio est haec: Si anima est generabilis, est corruptibilis: at absurdum est posterius: Ergo & prius: ratio majoris est haec; illa forma, quae ita dependet a materia, ut per concursum causae materialis in generatione producatur, ita etiam dependet a materia, ut si ab ea separetur, quae conferebat & conservabat ejus esse, necessario pereat. Ad hoc argumentum respondere solent Theologi, & Philosophi, qui sunt in contraria sententia, animas humanas esse ex se corruptibiles, ut probat illud argumentum; quia dependent a materia in fieri & esse, duraturas tamen esse in aeternum, quia DEUS statuit eas conservare. Quod si quis eos roget, cur anima, in se spectata, sit corruptibilis: Respondent hanc esse rationem, quia si DEUS cessaret ab actu quo conservat animas, illae statim in nihilum redirent. Sed haec responsio non placet, primo quia Theologi, & Philosophi, cum dividunt substantias in aeternas & caducas, non volunt aliquas substantias ideo esse aeternas, quod a conservativo DEI influxu non dependeant; sed quod a nulla creatura, per actionem Physicam destrui possint: hoc autem modo non solum Angeli, & Coelum, sed etiam animae rationales incorruptibiles dici possunt. Deinde illi qui ita respondent, non possunt negare animam humanam ita se habere, ut nulla actione Physica, seu materiali destrui possit: unde ego infero, eam nulla actione Physica, vel materiali, posse produci. Quaenam enim est ratio, quod nulla actione Physica destrui possit? Nonne, quia est substantia spiritualis? At ob eandem etiam rationem, nulla virtute materiali potest produci, idque quia, sicut repugnat spiritui actione Physica & materiali destrui, ita etiam repugnat spiritui actione Physica & materiali produci; generatio autem est actio Physica & materialis, tum quia fit in materia, tum quia fit per virtutem materialem, scilicet per virtutem seminalem. 3. Secunda ratio: Deus voluit animas humanas existere, extra corpora, post hominum mortem; voluit autem animas belluarum perire cum corporibus: Ergo dedit animae rationali, naturam independentem a materia, ut ratione illius naturae possit existere extra materiam corpoream; unde infero animam quoad naturam suam esse independentem a materia corporea. 4. Tertio, Ea sola forma educitur ex potentia causativa materiae, quae fit materia passive concurrente, ad tribuendum ei esse: sed materia seminis non potest concursu passivo, tribuere esse animae: Ergo non educitur ex potentia materiae, sed a Deo per creationem in materiam infunditur. Propositio manifesta est ex praecedentibus: assumptio probatur; nulla virtus activa agit ultra suum genus, ut loquuntur; i.e. non potest agendo producere eam rem, quae est excellentioris naturae, & superioris ordinis: sed anima excedit totum genus naturae corporeae, cum sit substantia spiritualis: nulla igitur virtus corporea potest animam producere. Ad hoc argumentum respondere solent, vim materialem in semine existentem per se non posse producere spiritualem substantiam animae, posse tamen virtute spiritualis illius substantiae, cujus est instrumentum, i.e. virtute animae hominis generantis, elevari ultra suam speciem, ad producendum spiritum: quemadmodum phantasma, quod est sensibilis & materialis species, virtute animae, cujus est instrumentum, species intelligibiles, h.e. spirituales rerum imagines intellectui patienti imprimit. Hoc effugium plane futile est, & nullius momenti; fieri enim non potest, ut a gente creatum opera instrumenti pure materialis, aliquid immateriale producatur; facultas autem prolifica in semine existens, pure materialis est; secus tamen accidit, in productione specierum intelligibilium; anima enim utitur vi intellectus agentis, ut principalis instrumenti, excitantis & elevantis phantasma, ad producendas illas species; quare universaliter verum est, virtutem materialem non posse esse aut principale, aut solitarium instrumentum, in productione spiritualis substantiae, licet esse possit instrumentum secundarium, in productione spiritualis qualitatis. 5. Quarto, Illi qui sunt in opposita sententia, coguntur admittere conclusiones admodum duras, & absurdas; nam ut vitent vim talium argumentorum, coguntur admittere animam non esse substantiam spiritualem; item animam posse actione Physica destrui, nisi DEUS eam speciali suo auxilio conservet ab interitu: quae conclusiones admodum derogant dignitati, & excellentiae animae nostrae, & nobis auferunt occasionem confutandi Atheos, argumentis petitis ab immortalitate animae. Si enim anima est forma natura sua dependens a corpore, ita ut extra corpus per se existere non valeat, quomodo persuadebimus iis, animam esse immortalem? derogant etiam hae conclusiones sapientiae divinae; quippe asserere DEUM voluisse animas existere, extra corpora, & negasse iis naturam ad hoc idoneam, est dicere DEUM non satis prudenter produxisse animam. 6. Quinto, Quamvis dicamus animam a DEO creari, & in corpus infundi, & proinde parentem non tribuere filio suo animam, satis tamen commode tueri possumus, hominem tam vere generare hominem, quam leo leonem, & bos bovem; possumus item tueri naturalem & hereditariam corruptionem, quam Peccatum Originale vocant, a parentibus ad liberos propagari, & hujus propagationis modum explicare: nulla ergo necessitas nos cogit amplecti eam sententiam, quae animae naturae repugnat, & ejus dignitati tantum detrahit.
Whether and how a human being is truly said to generate a human being§16
16Article IV. Whether and how a human being is truly said to generate a human being.
1. Philosophers and theologians who deny that the soul is translated through the seed, or drawn out of it, still disagree about what human generation is and in what action it consists. Some, pressed with the objection that the generator does not give the child the soul through which he is human and therefore does not generate a human, answer that a human generates a human by supplying the matter — the body — from which the human is made. That reply is cold and unworthy of a philosopher. It yields only that a human generates a human body, not the whole human — which is exactly what the objection proves. No philosopher has made substantial generation out to be the production or supply of matter; if producing a substance were supplying matter for it, the man who hands an artisan marble for a statue would be said to make the statue — which is absurd. To generate a human is to give a human being; and human being or nature is neither soul alone nor body alone. If it were either, separating soul from body would not destroy human nature. Human nature is the union of body and soul — truly consisting of both. If the generator only makes the body and does not make the child something consisting of soul and body, he does not truly give the child human being, and so does not truly generate a human.
2. Others, seeing the first reply fails, offer another almost as weak. They say a human truly generates a human because he not only gives a body but prepares the matter to receive the form, and by prolific virtue reaches the conjunction of soul and body that constitutes a human as a physical composite. They do not say the father joins the child's soul to the body by seminal virtue — that they leave to God who infuses the soul — but that he prepares the seed's matter for the human form, after which preparation the conjunction follows at once. On their view, generating is only a prior alteration and preparation of matter. Nearly all the older philosophers held this, nearly all the moderns, and most Roman theologians; the Coimbra commentators on De ortu 1 admit they once held it because it was common. It satisfies the objection no better than the first. Preparation of matter is a change in quality — alteration — and generation is not alteration: they are specifically different motions, one ending in quality, the other in substance. So generation is not preparation of matter. Generation is one simple change; that preparation is many alterations before the form arrives — dilating, solidifying, increasing or decreasing humor as the form requires. So it is an aggregate of changes, not generation. To generate is to give being; human being is consisting of soul and body. If God couples soul and body by infusion, God gives that being, not the generator. And a human is begotten in an instant, not gradually; so production is instantaneous, not successive.
3. A third reply says the generator gives neither matter alone nor preparation alone, but also a form — not the specific rational soul (God alone creates and unites that), but a vegetative and sensitive soul educed from the seed's potency. This is the weakest view of all. It makes a human generate not a human but a living thing and an animal. Human being is consisting of soul and body; if the child does not owe the father that he consists of a rational soul and a body, human nature has not been communicated by the father.
4. Rejecting these, we follow Du Val, Ruvio, and the Coimbra professors in a fourth account: a human truly generates a human even though God creates the soul — not by giving only a body, not by preparing the body for the soul, not by producing a vegetative or sensitive soul of the child in or from corporeal matter, but because from the generator comes the very action by which the rational soul is substantially united to the body and begins to inform, inhabit, and fill the whole matter of the body. On our view, human generation is that action by which, through prolific virtue, the soul is bound to the body by an essential bond.
Latin · §16
ART. IV. An & quomodo homo vere generare hominem dicatur. 1. Philosophi, & Theologi, qui dicunt animam non traduci per semen, aut ex semine elici, variis modis dissentiunt de generatione hominis, & actione in qua generatio hominis consistit. Primo enim nonnulli, cum iis hoc argumentum objicitur — homo generans non tribuit filio animam, per quam est homo: Ergo homo non generat hominem — Respondent hominem dici generare hominem, quia suppeditat materiam ex qua fit homo, id est, quia tribuit filio corpus hominis: verum haec responsio admodum frigida est & indigna quae ab ullo Philosopho proferatur: primo enim ex ea sequitur, hominem tantum generare corpus hominis, non vero totum hominem; & hoc est ipsum, quod argumentum probat. Secundo, quia nemo Philosophorum dixit, generationem substantialem esse productionem aut suppeditationem materiae; si enim producere substantiam, est suppeditare materiam ad producendam substantiam; pari ratione, is qui suppeditat artifici materiam ad conficiendam statuam, dicetur conficere statuam; quod admodum absurdum est. Tertio, generare hominem, est tribuere esse homini, ut ex ipsis terminis patet: at esse hominis seu natura humana, neque consistit in anima sola, neque in corpore solo, ut omnes fatentur: si enim natura humana in altero horum consisteret, per separationem animae a corpore non destrueretur natura humana: consistit ergo natura humana, in unione corporis & animae, i.e. consistit in eo, quod homo vere constet anima & corpore: si ergo generans non efficit, ut filius sit quid constans ex anima & corpore, sed tantum efficit ipsum corpus, homo generans non vere dicetur tribuere homini genito esse hominis, atque adeo non vere dicetur generare hominem. 2. Alii, cum vident se non posse evitare vim hujus argumenti per priorem responsionem, aliam responsionem adferunt, sed pene tam invalidam ac est prior: dicunt hominem vere generare hominem, quia non solum tribuit ei materiam, i.e. corpus; sed etiam praeparat materiam ad recipiendam formam; atque adeo per virtutem prolificam, attingit conjunctionem animae & corporis, per quam conjunctionem homo constituitur in esse hominis, & fit tale compositum Physicum: hi ergo non dicunt patrem conjungere animam filii cum corpore filii, per virtutem seminalem, (hoc enim tribuunt DEO qui animam infundit;) sed praeparare materiam seminis ad recipiendam formam humanam, quam quidem praeparationem, postquam completa fuerit, immediate sequitur conjunctio animae & corporis: hinc liquet ex eorum sententia, actionem generandi nihil aliud esse quam praeviam materiae alterationem, & praeparationem ad recipiendam formam: in hac sententia fuerunt pene omnes antiquiores Philosophi; etiam omnes pene Moderni, plerique etiam Pontificii Theologi; nam Conimbricenses, in explicatione lib. 1. de ortu, testantur se ipsos olim amplexos fuisse hanc sententiam, quia fuit recepta apud omnes: verum haec sententia, ut dictum est, non magis satisfacit argumento quam prior. Primo, quia praeparatio materiae est mutatio in qualitate, atque adeo est alteratio. Generatio autem non est alteratio; sunt enim diversi specie motus, in hoc differentes, quod altera terminetur ad qualitatem, altera ad substantiam: Ergo generatio non est mutatio, vel praeparatio materiae; neque generare, est praeparare materiam. Secundo, generatio est una simplex mutatio, vel simplex motus, ut omnes fatentur: at illa praeparatio non est posita in una mutatione, sed in variis alterationibus, quae praecedunt introductionem formae: nam aliquando dilatatur, aliquando consolidatur illa materia, aliquando humor augetur, aliquando minuitur, ita scilicet postulante natura formae introducendae: Ergo illa praeparatio non est generatio, sed aggregata, seu multiplex mutatio, sive alteratio. Tertio, generare est tribuere esse; esse autem hominis consistit in eo, quod constet ex anima & corpore: si ergo DEUS copulet animam cum corpore, infundendo (ut dicunt Theologi,) DEUS tribuit esse homini, non vero generans: solus enim ille qui copulat animam cum corpore, efficit ut homo constet ex anima & corpore. Denique homo in instanti gignitur, id est, in instanti fit homo: Ergo non gradatim; ideoque ejus productio, non est mutatio aliqua successiva, sed instantanea. 3. Tertius modus respondendi est eorum, qui dicunt hominem generare hominem, neque quod ei tribuat materiam, neque quod materiam praeparet; sed quod tribuat ei etiam formam, non quidem specificam, id est, animam rationalem (hanc enim volunt tribui a solo DEO, qui eam creat, & unit cum corpore;) sed quod ex potentia seminis educat animam vegetativam, & sensitivam: verum haec sententia minime omnium placet, quia manifeste ex ea sequitur, hominem non generare hominem, sed hoc vivens, & hoc animal; praeterea (ut dicebam) esse hominis in eo consistit, quod homo constet ex anima & corpore; Si ergo filius non debeat patri, quod constet ex anima rationali & corpore, non habet naturam hominis a patre sibi communicatam. 4. Rejectis his sententiis, nos cum doctissimis Philosophis, Du Val, Sc. Ruvio, & Professoribus Academiae Conimbricensis, quartum dicendi modum amplectimur, asserentes hominem vere generare hominem, quamvis anima a DEO creatur; non quod tribuat ei corpus solummodo, neque quod praeparet corpus ad recipiendam animam; neque quod in materia, aut ex materia corporea, efficiat animam vegetativam, aut sensitivam sui filii; sed quod ab homine generante sit ipsa actio, qua anima rationalis substantialiter corpori unitur, ac incipit informare, inhabitare, & implere totam materiam corporis: adeo ut ex nostra sententia, generatio hominis sit posita in illa actione, qua, per virtutem prolificam, anima essentiali vinculo cum corpore copulatur.
Whether generation is placed in the production of the form or in the conjunction of form with matter§17
17Article V. Whether generation is placed in the production of the form or in the conjunction of form with matter.
1. To make our view clear I will first show that the generator's action — speaking of generation in general — is placed in the conjunction of matter and form; then I will say something more particular about the action that unites soul and body. Generation of a composite is not production of matter. Matter properly so called is ingenerable and incorruptible: only the creator can make it. If a creature produced prime matter from no pre-existing matter, it would create it; no creature creates, for creation needs infinite power. When air comes from fire, air generates air by turning fire into air; it does not produce new matter, but introduces a new form into matter already there.
2. Substantial generation is not production of matter, as shown; nor is it production of form. That is clear for those who hold souls are created by God, and no less clear against traducians. First: human nature is consisting of soul and body. By the action that unites soul to body — whether the soul is from God or from the father — a human becomes a composite of soul and body. So by that action the human receives human being and is produced: to produce a human is to bring it about that a being consisting of soul and body exists. Second: a physical composite is never produced anew — by generation or any other change — unless matter and form are newly joined into one per se. Yet a physical composite can be produced anew even when its form is not newly produced. So making a physical composite is joining matter and form rather than producing the form. Proof from the resurrection: then humans will be newly produced and newly receive human being by a true substantial production, though extraordinary; yet their soul is not newly produced — it has existed since creation — but only newly united with matter. So production of a physical composite is uniting form with matter, not producing form. If anyone denies that the resurrection is a true substantial production: to produce a corporeal substance is to give it being; God then truly gives the dead — who while dead lacked the being of a natural substance, not consisting of united matter and form — the full being of a natural body by making them consist of body and soul. So by that action God truly produces natural bodies. The action differs from ordinary generation, yet it is a true substantial production: to produce a substance is to confer being on what did not have substantial being before. Further: God can create an infant's soul some time before generation and then, in generation itself, join that soul to the body. So there can be true substantial generation without producing the form.
3. On the second point: those of our opinion on the soul's origin say that in brutes the seminal virtue has a double operation — educing the form from matter's potency, and uniting that form with the composite — operations diverse only in reason, because one and the same action educes the form and substantially unites it with matter. In humans, they say, the seminal virtue has only one principal action: uniting the form — the soul — with corporeal matter (lesser actions of preparing the body for the soul also proceed from it). So in producing a human there are two actions from two agents: creation of the soul, and uniting it with matter. Creation is God's alone. Uniting soul and body is not the human's alone — God cooperates — but the human's and God's together. And generation is placed in that uniting, not in another action: as shown, producing a composite is neither producing matter nor producing form, but uniting form with matter. In the same instant God creates the soul in the body, the generating human by seminal virtue substantially joins the God-created soul to the body. God's action terminates in the soul's being simply; the father's terminates not in that simple being but in the soul's being in the body — the union of soul and body.
4. To the objection that a human is human through the soul, so if the father does not give a soul he does not give human being: they reply that a human is human neither through soul alone nor through body alone, but through the whole nature or human essence. By uniting soul and body through seminal virtue the father gives the child to consist of soul and body, and so gives the nature and essence through which he is human. A thing is such a thing through the whole essence, not through one part — for essence is that through which a being is a being. The common saying that each thing is such through its form means: through the form as the principal part of the essence, not as an adequate reason (the adequate reason is having such an essence). Comparing the parts of a physical essence, a thing is such through form rather than matter; comparing either part with the whole essence, it is such through the essence rather than through either matter or form alone.
5. A serious difficulty remains. If God infuses the soul, as all of this opinion say, the conjunction of soul and body seems God's rather than the generator's — for what is infusion into corporeal matter but conjunction with matter? Some answer that God is said to infuse the soul not because he alone couples them, but because he does it through seminal virtue used as an instrument — not a necessary instrument (he can connect them of himself) but an ordinary one, as in every animal generation. Others more probably say God is said to infuse the soul not by substantially but by locally joining soul and body: he creates the soul in the body and by creating it in that place makes it locally present. In that same instant the seminal virtue connects the parts by a substantial bond. Local presence of the soul is far different from substantial union with matter: an angel clothed in an assumed body is locally present to that body, yet not substantially joined to it as form to its matter.
Latin · §17
ART. V. Utrum generatio posita sit in productione formae, an vero in conjunctione formae cum materia. 1. Ut nostrae sententiae veritas appareat, primo ostendam actionem generantis (loquendo in genere, de omni generatione) esse positam in conjunctione materiae & formae: secundo, nonnihil specialius dicam de illa actione, qua anima corpori unitur. Quod ad prius attinet, generatio compositi non est productio materiae; idque quia materia proprie dicta est ingenerabilis, & incorruptibilis; h.e. a nullo potest fieri, nisi a creatore: si enim creatura aliqua produceret materiam primam, produceret eam ex nulla materia praeexistente; atque adeo crearet eam; nulla autem creatura creat, cum creatio requirat infinitam virtutem. Deinde cum ex igne fit aer, aer generat alium aerem, mutando ignem in aerem, non autem per illam generationem producit materiam novi aeris, sed in materiam praeexistentem introducit formam novi aeris. 2. Generatio substantialis, non est productio materiae, ut jam ostensum est; at neque est productio formae, quod quidem certum est, & evidens apud eos, qui dicunt animas a DEO creari: at non minus evidenter etiam probari potest contra eos, qui dicunt animam esse ex traduce. Primo enim natura hominis est in eo posita, quod constet ex anima & corpore: at per actionem qua anima unitur corpori, sive anima sit a DEO sive a patre, homo fit compositum constans ex anima & corpore: Ergo per illam actionem, homo accipit naturam, vel esse hominis; & proinde per illam actionem producitur: quid enim est aliud, producere hominem, quam efficere ut existat homo, seu Ens constans ex anima & corpore? Secundo, nunquam potest compositum Physicum de novo produci, sive per generationem, sive per aliam mutationem, nisi ejus materia & forma de novo conjungantur, & coeant in unum per se, ut evidens est: potest tamen compositum Physicum de novo produci, & revera fieri, quamvis ejus forma non producatur de novo: Ergo efficere compositum Physicum, potius est materiam & formam conjungere, quam formam producere: probatur assumptio; primo, ex resurrectione mortuorum in die judicii: tum enim homines de novo producentur, & de novo accipient esse hominis, per veram productionem substantialem, licet non ordinariam, sed plane extraordinariam; at tum eorum anima non potest dici de novo produci, quia existabat semper postquam creata est; sed tantum de novo uniri cum materia: Ergo productio compositi Physici non est productio formae, sed potius unitio formae cum materia. Si quis tam impudens sit, ut neget in resurrectione mortuorum fieri veram productionem substantialem, contra eum utar hoc argumento; Producere substantiam corpoream, est tribuere esse substantiae corporeae: at tum DEUS hominibus mortuis, qui quamdiu mortui erant non habebant verum esse substantiae naturalis, quia non constabant ex materia & forma unitis, vere & proprie dabit integrum & plenum esse corporis naturalis, efficiendo ut vere constent ex corpore & anima: Ergo DEUS per illam actionem vere producit corpora naturalia. Non negari quidem potest, illam actionem esse actionem longe diversam a generatione substantiali, & modo generandi ordinario; certum tamen est eam actionem esse veram productionem substantialem; quod probamus ex definitione productionis substantialis; quid enim aliud est producere substantiam, quam conferre esse illi substantiae, quae ante illam actionem, non habebat esse substantiale. Secundo probatur assumptio sic; DEUS potest creare animam infantis per aliquod tempus ante ejus generationem, & postea, in ipsa generatione, illam animam cum corpore ejus conjungere: Ergo potest esse vera generatio substantialis absque productione formae. 3. Quod ad posterius attinet: Theologi & Philosophi, qui sunt in nostra sententia de origine animae, afferunt virtutem seminalem in belluis duplicem habere operationem; scilicet eductionem formae ex potentia materiae, & unitionem ejusdem formae cum composito; quas quidem actiones dicunt non realiter sed ratione sola diversas esse: idque quia per unam & eandem actionem educitur forma ex potentia materiae, & unitur substantialiter cum materia. Contra, afferunt virtutem seminalem, quae in semine hominis existit, habere unam tantum actionem; scilicet unitionem formae, i.e. animae cum materia corporea; unam (inquam) actionem principalem, nam certum est, ab ea virtute proficisci varias actiones minus principales, scil. praeparationes materiae corporeae ad recipiendam animam: quare dicunt in productione hominis esse duas actiones proficiscentes a diversis agentibus; scilicet creationem animae, & unitionem ejusdem cum materia: creationem animae aiunt esse operationem solius DEI, quod evidens est; unitionem vero animae cum corpore, volunt esse actionem, non quidem solius hominis; DEUS enim cooperatur cum homine in actione illa; sed hominis & DEI simul: & addunt, in hac unitione, & non in alia actione, positam esse generationem hominis: quod ex eo patet, quia supra ostensum est, producere compositum, neque esse producere materiam, neque producere formam, sed formam cum materia unire, & copulare; ex nostra ergo sententia, eodem instanti, quo DEUS creat animam in corpore, homo generans per virtutem seminalem animam a DEO creatam cum corpore, substantialiter unit, & connectit; adeo ut actio DEI terminetur ad animae esse simpliciter; actio vero patris terminetur, non quidem ad animae esse simpliciter, sed ad ejus esse in corpore, seu ad unionem animae cum corpore. 4. Ad illud argumentum, homo est homo per animam; si ergo pater non tribuit filio animam, non tribuit ei esse hominem. Respondent, hominem esse hominem, neque per animam seorsim acceptam, neque per corpus, sed per integram naturam, sive per essentiam humanam; & aiunt patrem uniendo animam cum corpore, per virtutem seminalem tribuere filio το συνεστάναι ex anima & corpore; & proinde ei tribuere naturam & essentiam per quam est homo; patet autem unamquamque rem, esse talem rem non per alteram essentiae partem, sed per totam essentiam, quia essentia est id, per quod Ens est Ens; atque adeo talis essentia est id, per quod res est talis res: illud autem quod dici solet, unamquamque rem esse talem rem per formam suam, ita concipiendum est ut intelligamus unamquamque rem esse talem rem per formam, non quidem tanquam adaequatam rationem (ratio enim adaequata cur res sit talis res, est quia habet talem essentiam) sed tanquam principalem partem essentiae; si enim inter se conferamus partes essentiae Physicae, res quaelibet est talis res per formam, potius quam per materiam; interim si conferamus aut formam, aut materiam cum integra essentia, res quaelibet est talis res potius per essentiam, quam aut per materiam, aut formam. 5. Verum, hic oritur magna difficultas; si enim DEUS infundit animam, (ut omnes Theologi loquuntur, qui sunt in hac sententia) conjunctio animae cum corpore potius tribuenda erit DEO, quam homini generanti; quid enim aliud est animae infusio in materiam corpoream, quam conjunctio animae cum materia? Respondent nonnulli DEUM dici infundere animam, non quod per se solum copulet animam cum corpore; sed quod per virtutem seminalem illud praestet, cujus ministerio utitur tanquam instrumento, non quidem necessario (ipse enim potest per se connectere animam & corpus.) sed ordinario, quia scilicet ejus usus est ordinarius in omni animalium generatione. Alii probabilius respondent, Deum dici infundere animam in corpus, non quod substantialiter, sed quod localiter conjungat animam & corpus: id est, quod creat animam in corpore, & per ejus creationem in tali ubi, efficiat eam localiter praesentem corpori: dicunt enim, eodem instanti quo DEUS creat animam localiter praesentem corpori, eodem (inquam) instanti virtutem seminalem eas partes connectere, vinculo substantiali: docent autem localem praesentiam animae, esse quid longe diversum ab ejus unione substantiali cum materia; quia Angelus assumpto corpore vestitus, est localiter praesens illi corpori, non vero substantialiter ei conjunctus, ut forma materiae suae.
Whether the preceding doctrine abolishes the propagation of original sin§18
18Article VI. Whether the preceding doctrine abolishes the propagation of original sin.
1. Those who deny that God immediately creates the human soul and hold instead that it is educed from the seed's potency commonly object that our doctrine abolishes original sin's propagation and leaves no way to explain how that sin passes from parents to children. To dissolve the cavil by the fact itself, I will name the quasi-integral parts of that sin and show how each is propagated.
2. Original sin has three parts. First: participation in the first parents' sin — the common sin of the whole human race. Second: lack of original justice, the defect of the gifts of intellect and will with which Adam and Eve were adorned before the fall. Third: propensity or inclination to evil. We not only lack the original justice that inclined us to good; when it was removed a contrary quality opposed to the law took its place and makes us prone to every baseness.
3. The first part is propagated neither through soul nor through body as such, but through natural generation — as lineage, nobility, and hereditary right are. Charles is heir because he is the king's son, and the king's son because the king begot him; he is noble because he descends by natural generation from noble parents. So Adam's sin is ours because we are his sons and heirs by natural generation from him. This coincides with those who say a God-created soul becomes corrupt and guilty through hypostatic union with the body: from that union comes the whole human who is Adam's successor and so guilty of Adam's disobedience.
4. Note three points carefully. First: this concerns only a successor begotten by natural generation — by the ordinary concurrence of male and female. Otherwise our Lord Jesus Christ would be guilty of Adam's sin, which is absurd and impious. Second: the blessed Virgin is necessarily guilty of Adam's sin. What makes us guilty of it is found in her; she descends from Adam as we do; therefore she is no less guilty than we.
5. Third: only the first human's sins pass to children, not later parents' sins. The first human received justice not for himself alone but for all his posterity: if he remained in it he would transmit it with nature; if he forsook it by sinning he would pour the stain with nature into all posterity. Later parents were not instituted under that law, so their sins — like their justice — are not propagated but remain singular and personal.
6. Parents transmit the second part — lack of original justice — negatively, as poor and ignoble parents transmit want and obscure lineage: children lack goods their parents cannot confer. So a newborn lacks original justice because the parents lack it and cannot communicate it. Why then do not faithful parents, somewhat restored by grace, transfuse those gifts? Because transmitting this gift to descendants was granted only to the first parents before the fall — not to later parents, nor even to Adam after he once sinned.
7. The third part is commonly said to be transmitted as leprosy is — through seed. Infection in a leper's seed is not leprosy formally and actually but only virtually, a hidden disposition toward leprosy. So spiritual infection in the seed is not sin actually and formally but a hidden disposition toward sin; thus a soul God creates in the body contracts vice from the body from the first, as in a foul place. The solid ground is the natural mutual sympathy — communication of passions and affections — between body and soul as substantial parts of one natural composite. When the body is badly affected, the soul is badly affected.
Latin · §18
ART. VI. An precedens doctrina tollat peccati originalis propagationem. 1. Qui putant humanam animam a DEO immediate non creari, sed ex potentia seminis educi, objicere solent, nostram sententiam plane tollere peccati originalis propagationem, & nullum modum relinquere quo explicari possit istius peccati derivatio a parentibus ad liberos: ut igitur hoc cavillum ipso facto diluam, partes quasi integrantes illius peccati enumerabo, & quomodo singulae propagentur docebo. 2. Partes peccati originalis sunt tres: Primo, participatio peccati primorum parentum; illud enim fuit commune peccatum totius generis humani. Secundo, carentia originalis justitiae, id est, defectus donorum, tum intellectus tum voluntatis, quibus Adamus & Eva ante lapsum ornati sunt. Tertio, propensio vel inclinatio ad malum; non enim solum caremus originali justitia, quae nos ad bonum propensos faciebat, sed etiam a sublata successit contraria qualitas legi adversa, quae nos ad omnem turpitudinem pronos reddit. 3. Prima pars peccati originalis eodem modo propagatur a parentibus ad liberos, quo coloris vel generis splendor, item jus haereditarium: nimirum neque per animam, neque per corpus, sed per naturalem generationem. Sicut enim Carolus, v.g., ideo haeres regni est, quia Regis filius est, & ideo filius Regis, quia a Rege genitus est; sicut etiam Carolus ideo nobilis est, quia nobilium parentum proles est, & ideo proles, quia a nobilibus parentibus per naturalem generationem descendit: ita etiam Adae peccatum ideo est nostrum, quia nos ejus filii & haeredes sumus; i.e. quia per naturalem generationem descendimus ab Adamo. Haec sententia de propagatione primae hujus partis peccati originalis coincidit cum eorum sententia, qui dicunt animam a DEO creatam evadere corruptam & ream per hypostaticam suam unionem cum corpore, quia ex illa unione animae & corporis resultat totus homo, qui est successor Adami, atque adeo reus inobedientiae Adami. 4. Hic tria diligenter notanda sunt: Primo, ea quae jam dicta sunt non esse de quolibet successore Adami, sed de successore per naturalem generationem genito, i.e. de eo, qui per ordinarium modum generandi, videlicet per concursum maris & feminae, ab Adamo descendit; alioqui enim sequeretur Dominum nostrum IESUM CHRISTUM esse reum peccati Adami, quod absurdum & impium dictu est. Secundo notetur, beatam Virginem necessario esse ream peccati Adami; si enim illud ipsum propter quod nos rei sumus peccati Adami, inveniatur in beata Virgine, ipsa non minus est rea quam nos: at verum est prius; illa enim eodem modo descendit ab Adamo quo nos: Ergo etiam verum est posterius. 5. Tertio notetur, solius primi hominis, non vero posteriorum parentum peccata transire in eorum filios: cujus rei ratio praecipue est haec: primus homo justitiam accepit non sibi tantum, sed toti etiam ejus posteritati; ut si permaneret in justitia, eam simul cum natura in posteros transmitteret; sin eam peccando desereret, cum eadem natura labem quoque in omnem posteritatem transfunderet. Cum igitur nemo posteriorum parentum simili lege sit institutus, patet istorum peccata non magis quam justitiam propagari in posteros, sed singularia & (ut loquuntur) personalia tantum esse. 6. Secundam partem peccati originalis, viz. carentiam originalis justitiae, parentes in posteros transmittunt eo modo quo parentes egeni, inglorii, & ignobiles suam egestatem & generis obscuritatem in liberos transfundunt, viz. modo aliquo negativo, non positivo: sicut enim ignobilium & pauperum filii ideo ignobiles sunt & pauperes, quia eorum parentes istis bonis carent, & proinde ea liberis suis conferre nequeunt: ita etiam infans recens natus originali justitia caret, quia parentes ipsius justitia destituti sunt, & proinde eam proli suae communicare nequeunt. Dicet aliquis: parentes fideles, per gratiam restitutionis aliquatenus sibi restituta, cur non ergo ea dona in posteros transfundunt? Resp. quia nulli proximorum parentum, imo ne ipsi Adae, postquam semel peccavit, concessum est ut donum hoc in posteros transmittat; hoc enim concessum est solis primis parentibus ante eorum lapsum. 7. Quod ad tertiam partem peccati originalis attinet, communis sententia est, eam eodem modo propagari & transmitti in liberos, quo lepra transmittitur a parentibus leprosis in eorum liberos, mediante semine ab eis emisso: hoc autem sic declaratur; infectio, quae est in semine leprosi, non est lepra vel esse formaliter & actu, sed solum virtualiter; nam est occulta quaedam dispositio ad lepram: ita etiam infectio spiritualis, quae est in semine, non est peccatum actu & formaliter, sed occulta quaedam dispositio ad peccatum; ex quo fit ut anima in corpore a DEO creata, veluti in loco faedo, a prima sua origine ex corpore vitium contrahat. Hujus rei solidissimum fundamentum est, mutua eaque naturalis sympathia, i.e. passionum & affectionum communicatio, inter corpus & animam, tanquam inter duas partes substantiales idem compositum naturale constituentes. Unde fieri videmus, ut corpore male affecto anima male afficiatur.
Objections against native corruption's propagation through parental seed are answered§19
19Article VII. Objections against native corruption's propagation through parental seed are answered.
1. First objection: a body cannot act on a spirit by impressing a vicious quality; so concupiscence is not derived from body to soul. Pareus (from Augustine) answers that the soul contracts vice from vitiated flesh not wholly by nature but by God's hidden judgment for the first parents' fault — the body cannot naturally act on spirit, yet by the hidden justice of the divine law it can happen. Others locate it not in flesh's action on soul but in natural concomitance between matter and form: as the soul communicates life and sense to the body, so the body's dispositions are communicated to the soul (a soul infused into a badly disposed body becomes dull, as in the naturally foolish — Esthius). Zanchi adds: infection comes from conjunction with the body not by physical action but by God's just ordinance — as Adam's justice would have flowed to children if he had not sinned, so when he sinned nature's corruption flows from him as head into all, through seed as the vehicle of the stain.
2. Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure: the soul is vitiated in an unclean body not by flesh truly acting on spirit, but because flesh stripped of original rectitude and rebellious to reason draws the mind down and warps it. Pareus: imagine the body prone to evils and unfit as an organ for good acts; the soul, robbed of original purity, follows that vicious temperament (Hommius likewise).
3. Second objection: if God thrusts a pure soul into so impure a prison he acts cruelly — which is blasphemous to say, so the premise is absurd. We concede the whole: we do not say God sends a just, pure soul into an impure body (that would make souls just before infusion — refuted in Art. VIII). Press: God infuses a soul that of itself has no sin into a contagious body, so he acts unjustly. Deny the consequence. Injustice is doing what equity binds one to do the contrary of. God is not bound to give Adam's children — who sinned in Adam and merited eternal death — pure bodies before infusion; by the threat In the day you eat you shall die he is bound not to purge them.
4. Third: the cause of a cause is cause of the caused; God causes union; union causes the soul's sin; so God causes sin. Zanchi: union is a cause of sin only per accidens — had Adam not sinned, God would have joined souls and bodies without sin following. Further: God creates souls in the body; parents by prolific virtue substantially unite them. Having souls in bodies is from God; having them created in impure bodies is from the fall. The rule applies to causes per se, not per accidens. God causes his law; the law causes sin per accidens (Rom 7:8–14); yet God is not the cause of sin.
5. Fourth: what the body lacks it cannot use to infect the soul; but soul-proper sin (ignorance, aversion from good) is not in the body. Answer: as leprous seed produces leprosy without having leprosy formally — only a hidden disposition — so flesh can infect the soul with only a virtual disposition toward sin. What the body has neither formally nor virtually cannot infect; what it has virtually can.
6. Fifth: in Adam sin was first in the soul and passed to flesh, not reverse; so in his children the soul is first-sufferer. Pareus: the order in vice from free choice differs from the order in vice generated from flesh. Or: the soul is still first-sufferer actually and formally, though the body has the disposition virtually first. Those who put original sin actually and formally in the seed before the soul are absurd: habit and privation concern the same subject; original justice cannot be in seed, so neither can its privation. If seed had sin formally, seed would have a law, face eternal damnation, and be able to be redeemed, repent, and believe — absurdities Keckermann says can scarcely be outdone.
Latin · §19
ART. VII. Solvuntur argumenta quae afferri solent contra praecedentem doctrinam de propagatione nativae corruptionis per semen parentum. 1. Objicitur primo sic: corpus non potest agere in spiritum, vitiosam aliquam qualitatem ei imprimendo: Ergo concupiscentia seu propensio ad malum a corpore ad animam non derivatur. Respondet ex Augustino Pareus, lib. 4. de amissione gratiae, cap. 12., non omnino fieri naturaliter, sed occulto DEI judicio, quod anima a carne vitiata, ob culpam primorum parentum, vitium contrahat; i.e. licet corpus in spiritum naturaliter agere nequeat, per occultam tamen justitiam divinae legis illud fieri posse. 2. Alii respondent, id non fieri per actionem carnis in animam, sed per quandam naturalem concomitantiam & communicationem quae est inter materiam & formam; sicut enim anima corpori communicat suas affectiones, ut vitam, sensum, & alia hujusmodi, ita etiam dispositiones corporis communicantur animae; nam anima infusa corpori male disposito fit stolida, ut videre est in naturaliter fatuis; ita sentit Esthius Theol. Pontif. lib. 2. sent. 35. art. 1. 3. Tertio, Hieron. Zanchius, de operibus DEI parte 3. lib. 2. cap. 5., respondet animam ex conjunctione cum corpore peccato infici, non per Physicam actionem corporis in animam, sed ex justissima DEI ordinatione, qui sic initio constituerat, ut sicut si Adam non peccasset, tota illius justitia in liberos propagaretur, sic illo peccante tota naturae corruptio, quae ejus inobedientiam est consecuta, ab illo tanquam a capite in omnes homines flueret & derivaretur, idque per semen tanquam vehiculum quo ista labes a parente ad prolem transfertur. 2. Quarto, Alensis & Bonaventura in 2 Sent. dicunt animam in corpore immundo vitiari, non quod caro spiritum inficiat vera & reali actione, sed quod caro destituta originali rectitudine ac rebellis rationi effecta animum deorsum trahat, ac per hoc obliquam & distortam efficiat. Hanc sententiam explicans Pareus dicit nos posse imaginari corpus, licet brutum sit, ad mala pronum esse, & non aptum animae ad bonas actiones organum: animam vero rectitudine & puritate originali orbatam sequi inclinationem & vitiosum temperamentum corporis: idem etiam innuit clariss. Hommius in suo Antibellarmino, disput. 58. Thes. 5. 3. Secundo objicitur: Si DEUS animam puram in carcerem tam impurum detrudit, crudeliter ac injuste agit: at impium & blasphemum est posterius; Ergo & prius est absurdum. Resp. concedendo totum; nos enim non dicimus DEUM immittere animam justam & puram in corpus impurum; inde enim sequitur animas nostras esse justas ante earum infusionem & conjunctionem cum corporibus, quod postea refutabitur art. 8. Instabit aliquis: DEUS infundit animam, ex se peccatum non habentem, corpori impuro & contagioso: Ergo injuste agit. Resp. negando consequentiam; is enim agit injuste qui illud agit cujus contrarium agere tenetur ex aequo & bono; sed DEUS non tenetur animas filiorum Adae, qui in Adamo peccaverunt & sic aeternam mortem meriti sunt, puris corporibus infundere; h.e. non tenetur corpora nostra, labe peccati foedata, ante infusionem animarum purgare; sed contra, tenetur ea non purgare, idque vi illius comminationis, Quo die comederis, moriendo morieris. 4. Tertio obj.: causa causae est etiam causa causati: at DEUS est causa unionis animae cum corpore; anima ex conjunctione cum corpore contrahit peccatum; nam unio est causa illius peccati in anima: Ergo DEUS est causa peccati. Respondet Zanchius, unionem animae cum corpore non per se, sed per accidens esse causam peccati, idque quia si Adam non peccasset, DEUS copulasset animas cum corporibus sine ulla peccati consecutione: quare ex accidente est quod nunc animae labes eam conjunctionem consequatur. 2. Respond. DEUM tantum creare animas in corpore, parentes vero per virtutem prolificam animas substantialiter cum corporibus conjungere: quare quod animas habeamus in corporibus nostris, est a DEO; quod vero animas habeamus in corporibus impuris & contagiosis creatas, est a lapsu primorum parentum. In summa, illa regula, causa causae est causa causati, intelligenda est de causis per se, non per accidens. DEUS enim est causa suae legis, & lex divina est causa peccati per accidens, ut patet ex cap. 7. ad Rom. a vers. 8. ad 14.; nemo tamen inde concludere potest DEUM esse peccati causam. 5. Quarto obj.: quod corpus non habet, eo non potest animam inficere; at peccatum, quod animae est proprium, nimirum ignorantia mentis & aversio voluntatis a bono, non inest corpori: Ergo corpus peccato animam inficere non potest. Resp. sicut semen parentis leprosi producit lepram in corporibus filiorum, licet actu & formaliter in se non habeat lepram, sed occultam quandam dispositionem ad lepram, ita etiam caro potest inficere animam peccato, licet actu & formaliter in se non habeat peccatum, sed tantum dispositionem virtualem ad peccatum. Respondetur igitur ad propositionem: quod corpus in se habet nullo modo, h.e. neque formaliter neque virtualiter, eo non potest inficere animam; potest tamen virtualiter habere quod formaliter non habet. 6. Quinto obj.: in Adamo peccatum primo fuit in anima, quam in carne, & ab anima in carnem, non a carne ad animam transit: Ergo eodem ordine in filiis Adae vitium existit; anima enim, non corpus, est πρωτοπαθὲς peccati. Respondet Pareus, alium fuisse ordinem in vitii operatione quae a libero arbitrio cepit; alium esse in vitii generatione quae a carne procedit. Responderi etiam potest eundem ordinem adhuc servari, & animam etiam nunc esse πρωτοπαθὲς peccati, idque quia ignorantia, contumacia, & aversio a bono actu & formaliter primo inest animae, deinde corpori; licet dispositive & virtualiter insint corpori prius quam animae. Hic nobis se offert occasio reprehendendi crassam & absurdam eorum sententiam, qui dicunt peccatum originis actu & formaliter in semine inesse ante adventum animae. Primo enim habitus & privatio versantur circa idem: Ergo privatio non potest esse in subjecto in quo habitus inesse non potest; atqui in semine non potest esse justitia originalis, quae est habitus: ergo neque in eo existere potest peccatum originale, quod est ejus privatio. Secundo, si semen actu & formaliter in se peccatum habet, varia sequentur absurda. Primo, semini datam esse legem, lex enim, inquit Paulus, data est peccatoribus; secundo, semen esse obnoxium aeternae damnationi, quod enim proprie peccatum in se habet, id damnari in aeternum potest; tertio, semen posse a CHRISTO redimi, salvari, poenitentiam agere, & credere, quae omnia tam absurda sunt, inquit Keckermannus, ut cogitari vix absurdus possit.
Several questions on the propagation of original sin are proposed and answered§20
20Article VIII. Several questions on the propagation of original sin are proposed and answered.
1. First: how can original sin be translated when its subject, the soul, is not? Esthius: accidents often pass by affection or infection without the subject's passing — as heresies, errors, and vices spread from one to many without the soul's passing. That holds for an accident the same in species, not in number; a numerically identical accident requires its subject's transfer too. Some philosophers similarly say that when odor passes into a handling hand, the fruit's subtler parts that proximately bear the odor also pass.
2. Second: Did the soul sin in Adam's loins? Distinguish. As to being simply, the soul was not in Adam's loins and did not sin there. As to being in the body and union with it, it can be said to be drawn from Adam, to have been in his loins, and to have sinned: the whole human was in Adam's loins by natural generation and so is guilty of Adam's sin; the whole human is not bound to punishment unless both soul and body are.
3. Third: Does God impress original sin by creating and infusing the soul? No. In creating the soul God confers neither justice and holiness nor impurity and propensity to evil, but only a spiritual essence and properties that flow from it. He does not breathe the lethal poison of concupiscence — he will not be evil's author — nor does he infuse holiness and justice, for the soul is created as a constitutive part of Adam's son and successor, to whom God is not bound to give spiritual gifts (Junius on Gen 2).
Latin · §20
ART. VIII. Proponuntur & solvuntur aliquot quaestiones de propagatione peccati originalis. 1. Prima quaestio est, quomodo possit peccatum originale traduci & propagari, cum anima, quae illius subjectum est, non traducatur; non potest enim accidens traduci sine subjecto? Respondet Doctor Esthius, accidentia frequenter traduci, id est, affectione quadam vel infectione transire in alterum, non transeunte subjecto; nam haereses, errores, vitia ab uno in multos propagantur non transeunte eorum subjecto, hoc est, anima; quae quidem responsio vera & solida est, si intelligatur de ea traductione qua accidens non idem numero, sed idem specie, transit & traducitur ab uno in aliud; cum enim traducitur idem numero accidens, necesse est etiam ejus subjectum traduci & transire. Sic, ut putant nonnulli Philosophi, odore transeunte in manum hominis contrectantis, transeunt etiam subtiliores partes pomi, in quibus odor proxime existit. 2. Secunda quaestio: An anima peccaverit in lumbis Adae? Distinguendum est: anima potest considerari vel quoad esse simpliciter, vel quoad esse in corpore & unionem cum corpore. Priori modo considerata anima non potest dici fuisse in lumbis Adae, & per consequens non potest dici peccasse in lumbis Adae; posteriori vero modo considerata bene dici potest ab Adamo extrahi, in lumbis ejus fuisse, & peccasse; totus enim homo fuit in lumbis Adae, idque quia ab Adamo descendit per naturalem generationem, & proinde totus homo est reus peccati ab Adamo admissi; totus autem homo ad poenam obligari nequit, nisi & anima & corpus ejus ad poenam obligentur. 3. Tertia quaestio: An DEUS creando & infundendo animam, peccatum originale in eam imprimat? Respondemus negative. DEUS creando animam non confert ei puritatem seu justitiam & sanctitatem, neque impuritatem & propensionem ad malum, sed tantum essentiam spiritualem & proprietates ab essentia dimanantes: dico DEUM non inspirare animae venenum lethale concupiscentiae, quia mali author esse non vult: dico etiam eum non infundere animae sanctitatem & justitiam, quia anima creatur ut sit pars constitutiva filii & successoris Adami, cui DEUS spiritualia dona conferre non tenetur; vide clarissimi Junii Comment. in Cap. 2. Genes.
Lighter arguments against the creation and infusion of the soul are dissolved§21
21Article IX. Lighter arguments against the creation and infusion of the soul are dissolved.
1. Objection: God finished creation in six days and rested (Gen 2; Exod 20), so new souls are not now created. Answer: after the sixth day he ceased creating new species, not new individuals. Souls he now creates differ from Adam's first-created soul in number, not in species.
2. Genesis 5: Adam begot a son in his image; a son is the father's image according to the soul; so Adam begot according to the soul. Answer: the likeness is chiefly of the whole person consisting of soul and body, not of the soul alone. Adam begot not only a like son but the very person composed of soul and body in which that likeness chiefly consists (Esthius).
3. Genesis 46: seventy souls went out from Jacob's thigh — supposedly translation by seed. Answer: souls stand synecdochically for humans. Or: souls went out from Jacob's thigh not as to simple being but as to existence in the body and union with it; the seed's virtue effected that union.
4. If generating does not produce a rational soul, humans are worse off than brutes and plants that produce their own vegetative and sensitive souls. Esthius: humans are better off even in generating, because generative power reaches the union of the noblest form with matter. It is dignity to have a soul so excellent that no natural power can produce it — which is why even angels have no generative power.
5. If the father generates only the body, he does not generate the whole human but the less noble part. Deny the sequel. Mary did not beget Christ's deity yet truly begot the whole Christ; fire from wood generates fire's form, not its matter, yet generates that whole fire (Aristotle: generation is change of the whole). Distinguish the whole human from the whole of the human: the father generates the whole human — all the parts.
6. If God creates each soul of whoever is begotten, he cooperates with fornicators and adulterers. Answer: God cooperates with natural generation, good of itself and nature's work — not with the vice by which they complete generation against his law.
Latin · §21
ART. IX. Diluuntur leviora argumenta quae afferri solent contra creationem & infusionem animae. 1. Objicitur primo: DEUS sex primis diebus totum creationis opus absolvit, postea vero requievit ab opere suo, Gen. 2, Exod. 20; non igitur novae animae nunc creantur. Respond. DEUM post sextum diem cessasse a creatione novarum specierum, non vero novorum individuorum: animae autem, quas jam creat, non specie sed numero differunt ab anima Adami, quam primo creavit. 2. Secundo obj.: Genes. 5 dicitur Adam genuisse filium ad imaginem suam; est autem filius imago & similitudo patris secundum animam: Ergo Adam genuit filium secundum animam. Resp. filium esse imaginem & similitudinem patris non tam ratione animae quam ratione totius suppositi, i.e. quatenus est quid constans ex anima & corpore: Adam ergo non solum genuit filium similem patri, ut vult Esthius, sed etiam genuit id in quo illa similitudo potissimum consistit, videlicet ipsam personam filii sui, ex anima & corpore conflatam. 3. Tertio obj.: Genes. 46 dicuntur 70 animae egressae de femore Iacobi, quod non est aliud quam feminis propagatione traduci. Respond. animas synecdochice pro hominibus esse positas: addere etiam possumus, ipsas animas egressas fuisse ex femore Iacobi, non quod e femore Iacobi traductae sint quoad earum esse simpliciter, sed quod ex eo descenderint quoad earum existentiam in corpore & unionem cum corpore; virtus enim seminis egressi ex femore Iacobi effecit unionem corporis & animae. 4. Quarto obj.: si homo generando non producit animam rationalem, pejoris est conditionis quam bruta & plantae, quae producunt animas sibi proprias, videlicet vegetativam & sensitivam. Respondet Esthius, hominem esse melioris conditionis etiam in officio generandi quam sunt bruta aut plantae, eo quod vis ejus generativa pertingat ad unionem nobilissimae formae cum materia, ut supra declaratum est. Adde quod hoc ipsum ad magnam dignitatem pertinet, talem habere animam, ad quam producendam, propter ipsius excellentiam, nulla vis naturae possit pertingere; qua ratione nec angelis, quorum natura excellentior est quam hominum, vis ulla generandi competit. 5. Quinto obj.: si homo non generat animam filii sed corpus, non generat totum hominem, sed alteram ejus partem, imo ignobiliorem ejus partem. Resp. negando sequelam: Maria enim non genuit Deitatem CHRISTI, & tamen vere dicitur genuisse totum CHRISTUM: ignis etiam, cum ex ligno generat alium ignem, non generat materiam illius ignis, sed tantum formam, & tamen dicitur generare seu producere totum illum ignem; secundum definitionem Aristotelis, generatio est mutatio totius, &c. Quare hic distinguendum est inter totum hominem & totum hominis; pater enim generat totum hominem, id est, omnes partes. 6. Sexto obj.: si DEUS sigillatim creat animas omnium qui quomodocunque gignuntur, cooperatur scortatoribus & adulteris: nam fornicariis & adulterinis conceptibus animas creat & largitur, quod videtur absurdum. Resp. DEUS cooperatur generationi naturali, quae est per se bona & opus naturae; non autem vitio quo fornicatores & adulteri contra legem DEI generationem perficiunt.
Whether a more convenient account of the traduction of concupiscence can be given than we gave as original sin's third part§22
22Article X. Whether a more convenient account of the traduction of concupiscence can be given than we gave as original sin's third part.
1. Those who reject the common view — that the soul is infected from a body disposed to sin — fall into four classes. First: Traducians, who attack soul-creation and claim their foundations yield a far safer account of sin's traduction than ours. Of them later.
2. Second class: they say a human naturally consists of flesh and spirit, sharing nature with beasts and with angels. By flesh he has a propensity to corporal, sensible good via sense and appetite; by spirit, to spiritual, intelligible good via intellect and will. From these contrary propensities, flowing necessarily from essential principles, they posit a fight between sense and reason and from it a huge difficulty of acting well.
3. Second, they say providence at creation added original justice as a golden bridle to remedy that diseased languor arising from the essential principles, holding sensitive appetite under reason.
4. Third, after the fall Adam lost that gift; so now concupiscence flows partly from the soul's essential constitution (sensitive and rational parts) and partly from lack of the original justice that subjected sense to intellect.
5. Our theologians rightly reject this. First: it underwrites the absurd dogma that concupiscence in the regenerate after baptism is not sin but a natural disease. Second: calling the sensitive appetite's rebellion natural insults God — as if the most holy God who hates sin impressed on human nature at creation a propensity to sin and to dishonest objects. Third: Bellarmine himself admits (Loss of Grace 5) that vicious concupiscence is also in the will, prone to honors, empty glory, and objects pleasant to sense and displeasing to reason — though it once held the contrary naturally. Here Bellarmine sticks until he takes our view of concupiscence in the regenerate.
6. Answering us (Grace of the First Human 7), Bellarmine says fleshly concupiscence was natural in the first state not as a good of nature but as a defect or disease following from matter's condition. So it is rightly called not from God, hate-worthy, evil, contrary to nature: it would have existed beside the author's intention if humans were created in pure naturals; and God had removed it, and by human fault it has place in us.
7. Crass and absurd. First: rebellion from nature yet not from God, nature's fount, is a contradiction. Second: God cannot produce what is contrary to his nature — goodness itself and propensity to good, contrary to propensity to evil. Third: on Bellarmine's view the supernatural gift of justice did not remove the sensitive appetite's natural propensity against reason's order (that would overturn its nature) but only restrained actual resistance. So Adam in integrity already had a propensity to evil in his appetite, though not yet broken into acts — and so was stained with original sin. What else is original sin than propensity to evil?
Latin · §22
ART. X. An possit reddi commodior aliqua, aut expeditior ratio traductionis concupiscentiae, seu propensionis ad malum, quam diximus esse tertiam partem peccati originalis. 1. Qui communem sententiam de infectione animae a corpore ad peccandum disposito spernunt & rejiciunt, illi ad quatuor classes seu ordines vocari & reduci possunt. Primo enim, Traduciarii, qui animarum creationem impugnant, firmissime asseverant se ex suae sententiae fundamentis posse reddere longe meliorem & tutiorem rationem traductionis peccati quam nos, qui animarum creationem defendimus: de his postea. 2. Secundo, sunt qui dicunt hominem naturaliter constare ex carne & spiritu, & ideo partim cum bestiis, partim cum Angelis communicare naturam: & quidem ratione carnis & communionis cum bestiis, habere propensionem quandam ad bonum corporale & sensibile, in quod fertur per sensum & appetitum; ratione spiritus & communionis cum Angelis, habere propensionem ad bonum spirituale & intelligibile, in quod fertur per intellectum & voluntatem. Ex his autem diversis vel contrariis propensionibus in uno eodemque homine naturaliter seu per necessariam consecutionem ex principiis essentialibus, existere volunt pugnam quandam inter sensum & rationem, & ex ea pugna ingentem bene agendi difficultatem, dum una propensio alteram impedit. 3. Dicunt secundo, divinam providentiam, initio creationis, ut remedium adhiberet huic morboso languori naturae humanae, qui ex conditione principiorum essentialium oriebatur, addidisse homini donum quoddam insigne, justitiam videlicet originalem, qua veluti aureo quodam freno appetitus sensitivus contineretur & rationi subjiceretur. 4. Dicunt tertio, post lapsum Adamum amisisse illud donum originale, & proinde nunc in nobis concupiscentiam seu propensionem ad malum dimanare ex ipsa animae constitutione essentiali, qua constituitur ex parte sensitiva & parte rationali; partim ex carentia originalis justitiae, quae partem sensitivam parti intellectivae subjiciebat. 5. Haec doctrina merito rejicitur a nostris Theologis. Primo, quia est fundamentum absurdi illius dogmatis de concupiscentia in renatis, quod videlicet post baptismum non sit peccatum, sed morbus & languor quidam naturae. Secundo, quia falso asserit rebellionem appetitus sensitivi contra rationem & ejus directionem esse naturalem: nam illi qui hoc asserunt DEO contumeliosi sunt, dicentes DEUM illum sanctissimum, qui peccatum odit & exsecratur, ipsi naturae humanae in prima creatione indidisse impetum tam rebellem & iniquum, videlicet propensionem ad peccandum, & talia ac inhonesta objecta appetendum. Tertio, quia (fatente Bellarmino ipso, lib. 5. de amissione gratiae) vitiosa illa concupiscentia non solum est in appetitu sensitivo qui rationi resistit, sed etiam in voluntate quae prona est ad concupiscendos honores, inanem gloriam, & appetendum illa objecta quae sensui jucunda sunt & rationi displicent, cum prius contrario modo se habuerit, idque naturaliter. Hic haeret Bellarminus, & aeternum haerebit, donec nostram sententiam de concupiscentia in renatis amplexus fuerit. 6. Bellarminus ad secundam rationem a nobis jam allatam respondens, lib. de gratia primi hominis cap. 7., concupiscentiam (inquit) carnis fuisse homini in primo statu naturalem, non quidem ut bonum aliquod naturae, sed ut defectum & quasi morbum quendam naturae ex materiae conditione consequentem. Quare rectissime dicitur concupiscentiam non esse ex DEO, odio non amore dignam, malam, naturaeque contrariam, propter duas causas: primum quia non ex intentione authoris naturae sed praeter ejus intentionem in homine extitisset, si in puris naturalibus homo creatus fuisset; deinde quia DEUS illam sustulerat, & ex ipsius hominis culpa locum in nobis habet. 7. Haec doctrina Bellarmini nimis crassa & absurda est. Primo, quia dicit hanc rebellionem esse a natura, & tamen non esse a DEO, qui fons est & causa naturae — manifestam contradictionem implicat. Secundo, quia DEUS non potest producere aliquid suae naturae contrarium; natura enim DEI sicut est ipsa bonitas, ita est ipsa propensio ad bonum, & proinde contrariatur propensioni ad malum. Tertio, donum illud supernaturale justitiae, ex sententia Bellarmini, non sustulit naturalem propensionem appetitus sensitivi ad concupiscendum contra ordinem rationis — sic enim ipsam naturam appetitus sensitivi evertisset — sed tantum eam cohibuit ne actu resisteret rationi & aliquid appeteret contra rationis directionem: Ergo Adamus in statu integritatis habuit in appetitu suo propensionem ad malum, quamvis nondum erupisset in actus & exercitia istius propensionis, & per consequens originali peccato inquinatus fuit; quid enim aliud est peccatum originale, quam propensio ad malum?
Two other opinions on the traduction of sin are considered§23
23Article XI. Two other opinions on the traduction of sin are considered.
1. Next are the third and fourth classes that reject the common view of the soul's infection from the body. Third class: original sin is translated by natural generation alone, without infection of soul from body. Generation explains why we are guilty of Adam's sin, they say, but not our blindness, ignorance, and propensity to evil. So this view can account for the first part of original sin, not the second and third.
2. Fourth class: they agree with us on the first and second parts, but say the third is propagated not through itself but through the second — lack of original justice, to which it is necessarily joined. Why is a newborn guilty of Adam's sin? Because he is Adam's son by natural generation. Why does he lack original justice? Because parents lack it and cannot confer it. Whence propensity to evil? It necessarily follows lack of justice, as darkness follows lack of light.
3. This does not satisfy. Lack of original justice is mere privation and non-being; non-being cannot cause a real being such as propensity to evil, which imports a positive real habit (Molinaeus ch. 8). So lack of justice has no real positive causality for producing concupiscence. Objection: blindness causes a fall; lack of light causes wandering — and those are real. Answer: privation is not a positive efficient cause but a condition sine qua non, or a cause per accidens.
4. For readers who have not met Molinaeus: his first assertion — that the intellect destitute of original justice and not yet called by the word neither knows nor can know spiritual and supernatural goods while that state lasts — needs no proof. Bellarmine (Grace and Free Choice 6.1): all theologians, Pontifical and Evangelical, agree those mysteries of faith cannot be known without divine revelation.
5. His further claims do not prove concupiscence arises merely from lack of justice. Concupiscence is not only proneness to excessive love of earthly things from ignorance of heavenly ones; it is also proneness to despising revealed heavenly goods known from the word, and to doing what we know from God's word to be base. So Paul (Rom 7:22–23): I delight in God's law in the inner human, but see another law in my members rebelling and leading me captive under sin's law.
6. If fleshly concupiscence were only inordinate love of earthly things from ignorance of heavenly ones, it would not remain after the word's illumination and regeneration — yet experience and Scripture say it remains in the regenerate. So explaining the third part by mere lack of justice is to be rejected.
Latin · §23
ART. XI. Considerantur duae aliae sententiae de traductione peccati. 1. Sequuntur in hoc articulo considerandae tertia & quarta classes eorum qui communem sententiam de infectione animae a corpore rejiciunt. Ad tertiam classem eos refero, qui dicunt peccatum originale traduci a parentibus ad liberos per solam generationem naturalem, absque ulla infectione animae a corpore: generationem (inquiunt) esse quidem causam cur nos rei sumus peccati ab Adamo commissi; non vero posse esse causam nostrae caecitatis, ignorantiae, & propensionis ad malum; & proinde haec opinio in eo peccat, quod secundum eam explicari possit traductio primae partis peccati originalis, non vero secundae & tertiae partis. 2. Ad quartam classem eos refero, qui nobiscum consentiunt in explicanda traductione primae & secundae partis peccati originalis, dissentiunt vero in explicanda traductione tertiae partis; dicentes eam propagari & traduci a parentibus ad liberos, non per se, sed per secundam partem; h.e. per carentiam originalis justitiae, cum qua necessario connexa & conjuncta est. Si quis igitur eos roget, undenam sit quod infans recens natus sit reus peccati ab Adamo commissi? Respondebunt, quia est filius Adami, h.e. quia ab eo per naturalem generationem descendit. Item si roget, unde caret originali justitia? Respondebunt, quia parentes ea carent & eam conferre nequeunt. Si vero roget, unde propensio ad malum? Dicent eam necessario consequi carentiam justitiae originalis, tanquam tenebras carentiam luminis. 3. Verum haec sententia non satisfacit. Primo, quia carentia justitiae originalis est mera privatio & non Ens; at non Ens non potest esse causa Entis realis, qualis est propensio ad malum, quae habitum quendam positivum & realem importat, ut docet ipse Molinaeus cap. 8. istius operis: Ergo carentia justitiae non habet realem & positivam causalitatem ad producendam concupiscentiam. Dicet aliquis: caecitas, quae est privatio, potest esse causa lapsus, & privatio luminis potest esse causa aberrationis a via; lapsus autem & aberratio a via sunt entia realia. Resp. lapsus & aberratio non producuntur a privatione tanquam a causa efficiente positiva, sed privatio est conditio sine qua non, seu causa per accidens. 4. Secundo, proposita sunt nonnulla asserta Molinaei de intellectu hominis justitia originali destituti, idque in eorum gratiam qui nondum Molinaeum legerunt. Prima assertio: Intellectus hominis originali justitia destituti, & nondum per verbi praedicationem vocati, neque cognoscit, neque cognoscere potest, durante eo statu, bona spiritualia & supernaturalia. Haec assertio probatione non eget; nam ut docet Bellarminus lib. 6. de gratia & libero arbitrio cap. 1., convenit inter omnes Theologos, sive sint Pontificii sive Evangelici, ista mysteria fidei sine divina revelatione cognosci non posse. 5. Secunda assertio Molinaei non probat concupiscentiam oriri mere ex carentia justitiae. Tertio, concupiscentia seu propensio ad malum non solum est pronitas ad nimium amorem rerum terrenarum, orta ex ignorantia rerum caelestium & supernaturalium (ut statuit haec sententia); sed etiam est pronitas quaedam ad contemnenda & negligenda bona illa caelestia quae nobis patefacta & revelata sunt, h.e. quorum cognitionem ex verbi auditu acquisivimus; item est propensio ad ea agenda quorum turpitudinem ex DEI verbo cognitam & perspectam habemus. Unde Paulus de seipso conqueritur, Rom. 7:22–23: Delector (inquit) lege DEI secundum interiorem hominem; sed video aliam legem in membris meis rebellantem legi mentis meae, & captivum me ducentem in lege peccati quae est in membris meis. 6. Quarto, si concupiscentia carnis nihil aliud sit nisi propensio ad inordinatum amorem rerum terrenarum, orta ex ignorantia rerum caelestium, absurdum sequetur dogma: videlicet concupiscentiam post illuminationem verbi & regenerationem non manere; at experientia & Scriptura docent eam manere in renatis. Quare sententia quae tertiam partem peccati originalis sola carentia justitiae explicat, rejicienda est.
Those who attack the creation of souls disagree among themselves; three of their opinions on the soul's origin are refuted§24
24Article XII. Those who attack the creation of souls disagree among themselves; three of their opinions on the soul's origin are refuted.
1. After defending the common view on the soul's origin and sin's propagation, I meant also to propose and confute the adversaries' traducian opinions — for readers who have not yet met Molinaeus. Because I seriously reject eduction of the rational soul from matter's potency, it seemed worthwhile to confute one by one every opinion on soul-traduction I remember reading or hearing.
2. First: Jacob Martini (Miscellanies 3.7) — the child's soul is from the father's by a translate in an uninvestigable, unknown way. Easy, but dishonest, and unworthy of so sharp a man. Against those who hide in that den: what no natural cause produces per se in any way known to us cannot be said to be produced by a natural cause in an unknown way; but no natural cause produces the rational soul in a known way; therefore not in an unknown way either. Seeking ignorance's hiding-place when physical causes cannot be assigned destroys the opinion rather than strengthens it.
3. Second: those who say the soul is educed from the seed's potency — which Meisner keenly defends and which is rightly rejected. His own arguments: an accident (seminal virtue) cannot produce so noble a substance; the soul is an immaterial form, so not in the seed before arrival; material forms are educed from matter's potency, but the soul is spiritual. As these strike eduction from matter, they also strike a material translate.
4. Third: the parent emits with the seed a particle of his soul, so the seed is actually animated when emitted; the child's soul comes by division and a kind of diminution of the father's. Meisner rightly judges this unsafe: it makes the soul divisible and therefore material and corruptible — for what is divided and diminished is quantitative and material.
Latin · §24
ART. XII. Ostenditur eos qui animarum creationem impugnant multum inter se dissentire; & confutantur tres primae eorum sententiae de origine animae. 1. Statueram apud me, in hac Exercitatione, postquam communem sententiam de origine animae & propagatione peccati proposuissem & defendissem, etiam adversariorum sententias de traduce propositae & confutatae essent, idque in eorum gratiam qui nondum Molinaeum legerunt. Et nihilominus serio damnare & rejicere dogma illud de eductione animae rationalis ex potentia materiae ideo operae pretium me facturum sentiebam, si proponerem & sigillatim confutarem omnes sententias quas memini me legisse aut audivisse de traductione animarum. 2. Prima sententia est Jacobi Martini, qui in lib. 3. Miscellanearum quaestionum, disput. 7., dicit animam filii esse ab anima patris per traducem, modo tamen impervestigabili & nobis incognito. Hic modus recedendi a communi sententia facilis est, sed inhonestus, & si quid judico, tanti viri acumine indignus: verum ne illi qui his latebris se occultant secure delitescant, contra eos utar unico argumento, sed nisi me animus fallit, valido & perspicuo; illud autem sic proponi potest: Quod a nulla causa naturaliter & per se producitur, nisi modo aliquo nobis cognito, id non potest dici a causa naturali produci modo nobis incognito: at anima rationalis a nulla causa naturali producitur modo nobis cognito: Ergo neque modo nobis incognito. Qui enim latibulum ignorantiae quaerit, cum causas physicas assignare nequit, is sententiam suam non firmat sed destruit. 3. Secunda sententia est eorum qui dicunt animam educi ex potentia seminis — quam sententiam Meisnerus acerrime propugnat, non immerito rejicitur. Argumenta ejus haec sunt: 1. Accidens, videlicet virtus seminalis, non potest producere tam nobilem & excellentem substantiam. 2. Anima est forma immaterialis: Ergo non est in semine ante adventum animae. 3. Formarum materialium proprium est educi e potentia materiae; anima autem est forma spiritualis. Vide caetera apud ipsum Meisnerum, loco citato. Haec argumenta, ut contra eductionem ex potentia materiae valent, ita etiam ostendunt animam non esse ex traduce materiali. 4. Tertia sententia est eorum qui affirmant parentem simul cum semine emittere suae animae particulam, & proinde semen primo cum emittitur esse actu animatum; hi igitur volunt animam filii esse ab anima patris per ejus divisionem & quasi imminutionem. Hunc modum tuendi animarum traducem non satis tutum judicat Meisnerus, & merito; quia ex eo sequitur animam divisibilem & proinde materialem & corruptibilem esse; quia quod dividitur & imminuitur, quantum & materiale est.
Meisner's fourth opinion is refuted§25
25Article XIII. Meisner's fourth opinion is refuted.
1. Meisner's fourth opinion agrees with the preceding that the soul is not educed from the seed's potency but translated from parent to offspring and infused with the seed into the womb, so the seed is actually animated as soon as emitted. It differs in holding that the soul in the seed is not cut off or partitioned from the father's soul but generated and produced anew by it. Meisner (p. 924): as soon as the parent transfuses seed into the mother's womb, he transmits with it a soul — not his own or a part of it, but one like his own.
2. Something can come to be from something in four ways: effectively (effect from efficient cause); materially (a small nail from a mass of iron); subjectively (educed from a subject's potency, as material forms from matter); constitutively (natural bodies from matter and form).
3. On Meisner's view the father's soul creates the child's. What produces from nothing creates; the father's soul produces the child's from nothing; so it creates and has infinite power. The child's soul is not from the father's by partition (Meisner admits); not subjectively educed from its potency (or it would exist in the father's soul as in a subject); not constitutively (the father's soul is not a constitutive part). So from nothing — creation by the father's soul — which is absurd.
4. The likeness from light is inept. Light is educed from matter's potency (Fonseca): no one doubts light is educed from air's potency; when another torch is brought to a shining one, flame is educed from the applied torch's matter.
5. A power to procreate like souls without eduction from matter would belong to the rational soul as such, not as vegetative — and that cannot be granted without creation.
6. Both parents emit seed (Scholastics on Sent. 3 — Scotus, Bonaventure, Major, Ockham, and others — and physicians from anatomy: Galen, Fernel, Lemnius, Vesalius, Laurentius). If both seeds are animated, two souls in one fused seed; if only one, why does generation not always follow when sufficiently disposed seed is emitted?
7. It is absurd that a true miracle should occur whenever a father emits sufficiently disposed seed and animation (hence generation) does not follow — yet that would follow on Meisner's view with nature's course miraculously held back.
8. Every rational thing is a human; seed actually animated by a rational soul would be a human before the body is formed — absurd.
Latin · §25
ART. XIII. Refellitur quarta sententia, quae est Balthasaris Meisneri. 1. Quarta sententia, quam amplectitur Balthasar Meisnerus, in hoc convenit cum praecedente, quod statuat animam non e potentia seminis educi, sed a parente in prolem traduci, & una cum semine in matricem infundi; ac proinde semen quamprimum emittitur, esse actu animatum: differt tamen ab ea, quatenus asserit animam illam in semine existentem non fieri ex anima patris per decisionem & partitionem animae paternae, sed ab ea generari & produci de novo. Hanc sententiam explicans Meisnerus pag. 924. sic ait: quamprimum parens semen transfundit in uterum genitricis, unc una cum semine transmittit animam, non quidem suam aut suae partem, sed suae similem. 2. Quatuor sunt modi quibus aliquid fieri dicitur ex aliquo. 1. Fit aliquid ex aliquo effective, ut effectus a causa efficiente. 2. Fit aliquid ex aliquo materialiter, quomodo dicimus exiguum clavum fieri ex ingenti massa ferri, & exiguum annulum ex ingenti massa auri. 3. Fit aliquid ex aliquo subjective, illud videlicet quod ex alicujus subjecti potentia educitur, quomodo dicimus omnes formas materiales fieri & educi ex potentia materiae. 4. Fit aliquid ex aliquo constitutive, quomodo dicimus omnia corpora naturalia fieri ex materia & forma. 3. His positis, sic probatur animam patris creare animam filii ex Meisneri sententia: Quod producit aliquid ex nihilo, illud creat: at anima patris producit animam filii ex nihilo, ex Meisneri sententia: Ergo creat, atque proinde infinitam virtutem habet; nam producere ex nihilo seu creare infinitam virtutem arguit: propositio major est perspicua, nam nititur definitione creationis. Probatur minor: anima filii non fit ex anima patris decisive, seu per divisionem & partitionem, ut ipse Meisnerus fatetur. Tertio, non fit ex ea subjective, h.e. non educitur ex ejus potentia, quia quod educitur ex alicujus subjecti potentia, illud in eo subjecto recipitur & in eo existit; sed nemo dixerit animam filii existere in anima patris tanquam in subjecto. Quarto, anima patris non est pars constitutiva animae filii: ergo anima filii non fit ex ea constitutive. Ergo fit ex nihilo; ergo creatur ab anima patris — quod absurdum est. 4. Quod autem ad illam similitudinem a lumine petitam attinet: tenendum est eam ineptam esse, & nullo modo pro ejus sententia facere; nam lumen educitur de potentia materiae, ut omnes fatentur: unde Fonseca, 5. Metaph. cap. 2. quaest. 4. sect. 1.: Nemo (inquit) dubitat lumen educi de potentia aeris; & certe cum faci lucenti admovetur fax alia, manifestum est ex potentia materiae istius facis admotae educi flammam. 5. Praeterea, facultas procreativa similium animarum absque eductione ex potentia materiae competit animae rationali per se, & non quatenus est vegetativa — at hoc Meisnero concedi non potest sine creatione. 6. Quarto: In generatione uterque parens emittit semen, ut docent non solum Scholastici Theologi complures, lib. 3. Sent., ut Scotus, Bonaventura, Major, Occamus, Lichetus, Gabriel; sed etiam Medici multis manifestis indiciis ab Anatomica experientia ductis convincunt, quae hoc loco in medium afferre non possum; ea tamen scriptis mandarunt Galenus, Fernel, Levinus Lemnius, Vesalius, Laurentius, & multi alii. Hoc igitur posito sic argumentor: Semen utriusque parentis vel est animatum, vel alterum tantum. Si utrumque, duae animae in uno semine conflato; si alterum tantum, cur non semper generatio sequitur quando semen sufficienter dispositum emittitur? 7. Quinto: absurdum est toties verum & proprie dictum miraculum fieri, quoties pater semen sufficienter dispositum emittit & illam emissionem animatio & proinde generatio non consequitur — quod tamen sequeretur si Meisneri sententia vera esset, naturae cursu miraculose inhibito. 8. Sexto, omne rationale est homo: at semen, si actu animatum anima rationali, esset homo — absurdum ante formationem corporis.
Bright's fifth opinion is confuted§26
26Article XIV. Bright's fifth opinion is confuted.
1. As I was finishing this disputation, Timothy Bright of Cambridge's On Health, Disease, and Death came to hand, with a new opinion on the soul's origin. He answers: neither the whole nor a part of the parents' mind is translated, nor is some accident a mind-rudiment. What then? A substance born from the soul — neither whole nor part — as an immortal seed of the soul, principle of the offspring's future soul. As corporeal seed cut from the parents' bodies is neither the body nor a member, so the soul is translated through a fertile soul-seed, not through the soul or a part of it. The integral soul is referred to the parents as received; but something seminal is shut out from soul as from body, and by the blessing of fertility goes forth into a rational immortal soul.
2. First confutation: that spiritual seed truly pre-existed in the parent's soul — real emission presupposes real inherence — yet it cannot really inhere there, so cannot be really emitted. Not as part in whole (Bright admits); not as accident in a subject (it is a substance); not as in a surrounding place or vessel (repugnant to the soul's spiritual nature).
3. Second: the spiritual seed comes from the whole father's soul, or a part, or nothing. Not from corporeal matter — it is spiritual, and Bright says it is born from soul not body. Not from the whole soul (the whole would convert into seed); not from a part (the soul is indivisible). So from nothing — which is creation.
4. Third: conversion of that seed into a soul is accidental or substantial. Not accidental: then it would differ from the soul only by degree of accidental perfection — an inchoate imperfect rational soul — contradicting Bright's claim that it is not actually a soul but a principle of a future soul. If substantial, it happens by abolishing the whole, or one part of the essence while the other remains.
5. Fourth: God could annihilate that seed and in the same instant produce a soul from nothing; then production belongs to God alone, not the father — a huge absurdity if their traducian doctrine is true.
6. Fifth: conversion cannot abolish one essential part while another remains. That would make the spiritual seed-substance corruptible and capable of substantial change like physical bodies; and would make it composed of physical matter and form or essential parts — for only of those is it true that when one is destroyed the other can remain in actual existence.
7. Sixth: if the spiritual seed converts into a soul, generation cannot occur without the seed's perishing; yet the seed's form (the soul) would remain, and substantial conversion requires the prior form's perishing. So Bright's opinion is no safer than the preceding.
Latin · §26
ART. XIV. Confutatur quinta sententia, quae est Timothei Bright Cantabrigiensis. 1. Cum extremam manum huic disputationi admovebam, cum acutissimi Timothei Brighti Cantabrigiensis librum de Sanitate, de Morbo, & de Morte, in manus meas incidit; in quo ille novam & insolitam sententiam de origine animae proponit. Verba ejus haec sunt: Quibus respondemus, nec totam, nec partem animi parentum traduci, neque accidens aliquod animi rudimentum esse. Quid ergo? Sane substantiam quandam ab anima natam, nec totam ipsam nec partem, tanquam animae immortale semen, prolis animae futurae principium: & sicut semen corporeum de parentum corporibus decisum nec corpus ipsum, nec corporis aliquod membrum emittit, ita anima per semen animae fecundum, non per animam aut animae partem aliquam, traducitur in prolem: & paulo post, Ergo tenemus, animam ut integram & absolutam parentibus referendam acceptam; sed seminale quid ab anima, aeque atque a corpore exclusum, & tandem verbi illius virtute (sc. foecunditatis benedictione) in animam rationalem & immortalem proditurum. 2. Hanc sententiam clarissimi & doctissimi Timothei sic confuto. Primo: Spiritus ille seu semen spirituale, quod a parentis anima excluditur & emittitur, vere & realiter praeexistebat in anima: realis enim emissio praesupponit reale inesse; at spiritus ille non potest realiter inesse animae parentis: Ergo neque realiter excludi & emitti ab ea. Probatur assumptio: spiritus ille non potest inesse animae patris ut pars in toto, fatente ipso Timotheo; neque ut accidens in subjecto, idque quia est substantia; substantiae autem repugnat inesse subjecto; neque ut res in loco ambiente, aut in vase continente — talis enim modus continentiae & circumscriptionis naturae spirituali animae repugnat. 3. Secundo: semen illud spirituale vel fit ex tota anima patris, vel ex parte animae patris, vel ex nihilo: non enim potest fieri ex materia corporea, tum quia est spiritualis substantia, tum quia ipse Brightus testatur illud non ex corpore sed ex anima natum esse: non fit ex tota anima patris, quia sic anima patris tota in semen converteretur; non ex parte, quia anima est indivisibilis; Ergo ex nihilo — quod creationem importat. 4. Tertio: conversio illius seminis spiritualis in animam vel est conversio accidentalis, qualis est conversio seu mutatio qua homo malus convertitur & mutatur in bonum, & color albus in nigrum; vel est conversio substantialis, qualis fuit conversio uxoris Loth in statuam salis, & conversio ligni in substantiam illius ignis cui approximatur. Non est conversio accidentalis, quia inde sequeretur semen illud spirituale non differre specie & essentialiter, sed gradu perfectionis accidentalis, ab anima — hoc est, esse animam rationalem accidentali aliqua ratione inchoatam & imperfectam: hoc autem contradicit verbis ipsius Timothei, dicentis semen illud non esse actu animam sed animae futurae principium. Si vero est conversio substantialis, tunc vel fit per abolitionem totius, vel per abolitionem unius partis essentiae altera remanente. 5. Quarto: DEUS valeat semen illud annihilare, & eo annihilato animam eodem instanti ex nihilo producere; non patri sed DEO soli tunc animae productio adscribenda est — quod ingens absurdum est, si vera sit ipsorum doctrina de traduce. 6. Quinto: conversio seminis in animam non potest fieri per abolitionem unius partis essentiae, altera remanente: primo, quia inde sequeretur spiritualem substantiam seminis illius esse corruptibilem & capacem transmutationis substantialis, non minus quam corpora Physica; illa enim aboleri & destrui possunt naturaliter quoad unam solam essentiae partem, formam videlicet: secundo, sequeretur substantiam illam spiritualem esse compositam ex materia & forma Physica, aut in partes essentiales — nam de his solis verum est quod earum una destructa altera remanere possit superstes quoad actualem existentiam. 7. Sexto: generationem hominis fieri sine interitu seminis non potest, si semen illud spirituale in animam convertitur; forma enim seminis, i.e. anima, maneret — at conversio substantialis interitum prioris formae requirit. Unde concludo Brighti sententiam non magis tutam esse quam praecedentes.
All the adversaries' opinions on the translate have been confuted; none of them can explain sin's propagation more safely or easily than we who defend the creation of souls§27
27Article XV. All the adversaries' opinions on the translate have been confuted; none of them can explain sin's propagation more safely or easily than we who defend the creation of souls.
1. Those who hold the soul from a translate, not created and infused by God, must say either that it is educed from the seed's potency by matter's passive concurrence, or produced by the father's soul without the seed's matter — there is no middle. The first was confuted in Arts. III and XII. The second splits four ways: the father's soul produces the child's from its whole substance, or a part, or a spiritual seed, or nothing. I confuted the first in Art. XII, the second and the from-nothing case in Art. XIII, the spiritual seed in Art. XIV. So no traducian opinion stands that is not absurd and against sound philosophy.
2. No Traducian explains original sin's propagation more safely or easily than we who defend soul-creation. Meisner's argument, even limited, is weak. They say: if God creates and infuses the soul, original sin cannot pass into it, because an accident does not pass from subject to subject. But Arts. VI–VII showed how each part propagates without soul-traduction: the first by natural generation as hereditary right; the second negatively, by justice parents cannot confer; the third by a virtual disposition in the seed through body–soul sympathy. Soul-creation does not abolish sin's propagation — it best reconciles it.
3. Traducians who want the soul materially translated fall into worse absurdities: they make the soul divisible and corruptible, or give the parent creative power, or invent an inexplicable spiritual seed. Safer and easier, with the catholic church and the sounder philosophers: God creates and infuses the soul, and original sin propagates as we have explained.
4. End of the Second Exercise. The Third follows — On Faith, Knowledge, and related questions.
Latin · §27
ART. XV. Confutatas jam esse omnes sententias de traduce; item neminem ex isto numero posse tutius aut facilius explicare peccati propagationem, quam nos qui animarum creationem defendimus. 1. Qui putant animam esse ex traduce, & a DEO non creari & infundi, illi necesse habent asserere animam aut educi ex potentia seminis per concursum passivum materiae, aut produci ab anima patris absque concursu materiae seminis: nam inter haec duo nullum datur medium. Prior sententia a me confutata est, art. 3. & 12. Posteriorum modum loquendi in quatuor alios dispesce ac subdividere possumus: Si enim anima patris sine concursu materiae seminis producit animam filii, vel producit eam ex tota sua substantia, vel ex parte suae substantiae, vel ex semine quodam spirituali, vel ex nihilo: primum modum confutavi art. 12.; secundum art. 13.; tertium art. 14.; et quartum art. 13. unde concludo, nullam dari sententiam de traduce quae non sit absurda & contradicens principiis sanae Philosophiae. 2. Jam vero ostendendum est, neminem ex Traduciariis posse tutius aut expeditius explicare peccati originalis propagationem quam nos qui animarum creationem defendimus. Meisneri ratio etiam sic concepta & limitata parum efficax est. Dicunt enim: Si anima a DEO creatur & infunditur, non potest peccatum originale in eam transfundi a parentibus, quia accidens non transit a subjecto in subjectum. At nos supra ostendimus, art. 6. & 7., quomodo singulae partes peccati originalis propagentur absque traductione animae: prima per naturalem generationem tanquam jus haereditarium; secunda negative, per carentiam justitiae quam parentes conferre nequeunt; tertia per dispositionem virtualem in semine, mediante sympathia corporis & animae. Quare creatio animae non tollit, sed optime conciliat, peccati propagationem. 3. Contra, Traduciarii, dum animam materialiter traduci volunt, in majora absurda incidunt: aut enim animam faciunt divisibilem & corruptibilem, aut parenti virtutem creandi attribuunt, aut semen spirituale inexplicabile fingunt. Quare tutius & facilius est, cum Ecclesia Catholica & sanioribus Philosophis, animam a DEO creari & infundi, & peccatum originale propagari modo a nobis explicato. 4. Finis Exercitationis Secundae. Sequitur Exercitatio Tertia, De Fide, Scientia, &c.
On the firmness, certainty, and evidence of the mind's acts of assent§28
28Third Exercise. On Faith, Science, and Opinion.
Article I. On the firmness, certainty, and evidence of the mind's acts of assent.
1. Every intellective habit has knowledge — or assent — as its proximate end: the mind assents to those propositions whose truth it perceives and cognizes. It is therefore worthwhile to premise something about the mind's assent, its affections, and its species, so that the diversity of our mind's acts may be understood.
2. Assent of the mind is the judgment by which the intellect judges some proposition true. The mind assents to "man is an animal" by embracing and approving it — that is, by judging it true.
3. Philosophers have marked three degrees of perfection in assent: firmness, certainty, and evidence. Opposed to them are three degrees of imperfection: infirmity or vacillation, uncertainty, and inevidence.
4. Firm assent is without hesitation, doubt, or fear of the opposite side. Infirm or vacillating assent is when the mind so assents that it doubts the proposition's truth, or at least somehow fears that by assenting it may err.
5. Certain assent rests on some certain or solid foundation, not on a light or fallacious reason. Uncertain assent is the contrary. Note carefully: for certainty it is required that the foundation on which the mind rests while assenting not only be certain in itself, but also appear such to the one who assents. Unless he knows that the reason on which he rests is certain, his assent will in no way be certain and stable.
6. Evident assent is when someone, by the force of his own sense or reason and apart from another's information or testimony, perceives that the proposition to which he assents is true. When I see Socrates standing near me and assent to "Socrates stands," my assent is evident — not by another's report, but by my own sense. Likewise when I assent to "man is an animal," the assent is evident because by my own intellect I perceive that a sensitive nature is in man. Even if no one asserted it — even if all asserted the contrary — I would still judge that proposition true.
7. Assent is inevident when someone assents not because sense or solid reason demonstrates the proposition true, but either because a light reason persuades it (a light reason does not drive away the mind's darkness, and so leaves the assent obscure and inevident) or because another testifies that it is true. He who has seen Peter slain and assents to "Peter is slain" has evident assent; he who assents only because of that man's narration has inevident assent, because neither sense nor reason shows him that it is true.
8. These three degrees so stand that the second includes the first and adds something; the third includes both and adds something further. For firmness it is enough that the foundation appear certain and solid to the one assenting. Even if in reality it is not such, if it appears such he will assent firmly and without hesitation. So heretics firmly assent to their errors: though their foundations are neither certain nor solid, to them — such is their blindness — they seem most efficacious and valid.
9. For certainty, and freedom from error, more is required: the foundation must not only appear certain and solid to the one assenting, but really and in itself be such. Otherwise the assent is erroneous and false. We may grant heretics firmness in judging; we do not grant them certainty of judging. Certainty and error cannot stand together.
10. For evidence still more is required: the foundation must appear certain and solid, and be such in itself — and it must not be another's testimony or narration, but either sense or some solid reason that clearly demonstrates that the matter so holds.
11. Assent can therefore be firm without being certain — as in heretics who without fear assent to dogmas that conflict with the Catholic faith or with good morals. Assent can also be certain without being evident. He who assents to a proposition because of God's testimony in Sacred Scripture has assent that is without doubt very certain, resting on the most certain foundation — God's own testimony — yet it is not evident. The theologian does not assent because sense or reason shows him that the matter so holds, but because God asserts or says that it so holds.
12. These three degrees of perfection in the mind's assent therefore stand so that the first extends more widely than the second, and the second than the third — just as among the degrees of necessity the "in a respect" sense extends more widely than the "in itself" sense, and that more widely than the "in itself primarily."
Latin · §28
EXERCITATIO TERTIA De Fide, Scientia, & Opinione. ART. I. De firmitate, certitudine, & evidentia assensuum mentis nostrae. 1. Cum omnis habitus intellectivus, pro fine proximo habeat notitiam, sive assensum, quo mens assentitur iis propositionibus, quarum veritatem percipit & cognoscit; operae pretium erit, nonnihil praefari de assensu mentis, deque eius affectionibus, & speciebus, ideo ut intelligatur diversitas actuum mentis nostrae. 2. Assensus mentis, est judicium quo intellectus judicat propositionem aliquam esse veram: mens enim assentitur huic propositioni, homo est animal, eam amplectendo & approbando, hoc est, judicando eam esse veram. 3. Tres sunt gradus perfectionis, quos in assensu mentis observarunt Philosophi, videlicet firmitas, certitudo, & evidentia: quibus opponuntur totidem gradus imperfectionis, videlicet infirmitas seu vacillatio, incertitudo, & inevidentia. 4. Assensus firmus, est is qui est sine haesitatione, dubitatione, formidine partis oppositae. Infirmus vero, seu vacillans assensus, est cum mens ita assentitur huic vel illi propositioni, ut de eius veritate dubitet, aut saltem aliquo modo metuat ne isti propositioni assentendo erret. 5. Assensus certus, est qui nititur certo aliquo aut solido fundamento, non vero levi aut fallaci ratione. Assensus incertus, est qui contrario modo se habet. Hic diligenter notandum est, ad certitudinem assensus requiri, ut fundamentum quo mens nititur, dum assensum praebet, non solum sit in se certum, sed etiam assentienti tale videatur: nisi enim ille sciat rationem, qua nititur, esse certam, eius assensus nullo modo erit certus & stabilis. 6. Denique assensus evidens, est cum quis per se hoc est, vi sui sensus aut rationis, absque alterius informatione & testificatione percipit eam propositionem cui assentitur, esse veram: exempli gratia, cum video Socratem apud me stantem, assentior huic propositioni, Socrates stat: & assensus meus est evidens, idque quia non per alterius informationem aut testimonium, sed vi mei sensus, rem ita se habere percipio: item cum assentior huic propositioni, homo est animal, assensus est evidens, idque quia vi proprii intellectus, seu rationis, percipio homini inesse naturam sensitivam: adeoque quamvis nemo illud assereret, imo quamvis omnes contrarium assererent, istam propositionem veram esse judicarem. 7. Contra vero, inevidens est assensus, cum quis assentitur propositioni, non quod sensus aut solida ratio eam veram esse demonstret: sed vel quod levis aliqua ratio illud suadeat (levis enim ratio non pellit mentis tenebras, atque adeo facit assensum obscurum & inevidentem) vel quod alius testetur eam esse veram: sic qui vidit Petrum interfectum, & assensum praebet huic propositioni, Petrus est interfectus, eius assensus est evidens: qui vero propter hujus narrationem & testimonium, assensum praebet isti propositioni, eius assensus est inevidens, idque quia neque sensu, neque ratione percipit eam esse veram. 8. Hi tres gradus perfectionis, qui in assensu cernuntur, ita se habent, ut secundus includat primum, eique aliquid superaddat; tertius vero includat et primum et secundum, illisque aliquid superaddat: nam ut assensus sit firmus, satis est quod fundamentum, quo nititur ille assensus, assentienti certum et solidum videatur: quamvis enim revera non sit tale, si tamen assentienti tale esse videatur, is proculdubio firmiter et absque haesitatione assentietur: sic haeretici firmiter assentiuntur suis erroribus; quamvis enim fundamenta quibus nituntur, non sint certa & solida, iis tamen (quae eorum est caecitas) efficacissima et validissima videntur. 9. At vero ut assensus sit certus, et plane ab errore alienus, non tantum requiritur, ut fundamentum quo nititur, videatur assentienti certum, & solidum, sed etiam ut revera & in se tale sit; alioqui assensus noster erit erroneus, & falsus: quare quamvis haereticis attribui patiamur firmitatem in judicando, non tamen putamus iis competere certitudinem judicandi: certitudo enim & error simul consistere nequeunt. 10. Tandem vero, ut assensus sit evidens, non tantum requiritur, ut ejus fundamentum assentienti videatur certum et solidum, & etiam in se sit tale; sed etiam requiritur, ut illud fundamentum non sit alterius testimonium, vel narratio; sed vel sit sensus, vel solida aliqua ratio perspicue demonstrans rem ita se habere. 11. Quemadmodum igitur assensus potest esse firmus, quamvis non sit certus, ut videre est in Haereticis, absque ullo timore aut formidine assensum praebentibus iis dogmatis, quae Catholicae Fidei aut bonis moribus repugnant, ita etiam assensus potest esse certus, quamvis non sit evidens: qui enim assentitur propositioni alicui propter DEI testimonium in Sacra Scriptura propositum, ejus assensus proculdubio est valde certus, quia nititur certissimo fundamento, videlicet DEI testimonio, non tamen est evidens, non enim ideo assentitur Theologus, quod aut sensu aut ratione percipiat rem ita se habere, sed quod DEUS asserat, aut dicat rem ita se habere. 12. Ex his patet, hos tres gradus perfectionis, qui in assensu mentis cernuntur, ita se habere, ut primus latius pateat secundo, & secundus tertio; quemadmodum etiam in gradibus necessitatis kata meros latius patet quam kath hauto, & kath hauto quam kath hauto proton.
How knowing, believing, and opining differ from one another§29
29Article II. How knowing, believing, and opining differ from one another.
1. Every assent of the mind is an act of knowing, of believing, or of opining. Whenever we judge something true, either we certainly know it, or we believe it because of another's testimony, or we opine it because of a light and inefficacious reason.
2. The act of knowing, opposed to believing and opining, is taken broadly for any actual certain and evident knowledge. Science so taken appears not only in speculative disciplines but in practical ones. In moral philosophy we do not opine or believe but evidently know that acts of liberality are honorable and the opposed vices dishonorable. Skilled architects do not opine or believe but evidently know that foundations must be set to the level and columns to the perpendicular. This knowledge concerns singulars as well as universals: when I see Peter standing or hear him speaking, I do not opine or believe — I know that he speaks and stands.
3. The division is sufficient: every assent rests either on testimony or on reason. If on testimony, it is actual faith — an act of believing. If on reason, either on certain and solid reason (science) or on merely probable reason (opinion).
4. Assent on another's testimony is either divine faith (on divine testimony) or human faith (on human testimony), as the Scholastics speak.
5. Note the Papists' error in passing. They grant with us that faith resting chiefly on men's testimony is human, not divine; yet they boldly claim that our assent to the articles of faith and to Scripture itself rests on the testimony of the "representative" Church — bishops and pastors in general council — and of the "virtual" Church, the Roman Pontiff. They must either confess that all wayfarers' faith is human (divine faith abolished) or call their bishops not men but gods.
6. Compare science, opinion, and divine faith. Science is firm, certain, and evident assent. Divine faith is firm and certain, but not evident. Opinion is sometimes firm (without hesitation), yet often neither firm nor certain nor evident.
7. Science is firm because the knower assents without doubt or hesitation; certain because he rests on a solid foundation — else he would opine, not know; evident because he assents not because another testifies, but because by some evident argument he himself perceives that the matter so holds.
8. Divine faith is firm because believers in God do not hesitate about sacred history and the divine promises; certain because it rests on God's testimony, who is truth itself; yet not evident — for the believer assents not because sense or reason shows him that the matter so holds, but because God testifies and asserts it.
9. So the Apostle in Hebrews 11:1 excellently expressed divine faith's nature: calling it hypostasis he marks its firmness and certainty; calling it the evidence of things not seen he declares its inevidence and enigmatic obscurity.
10. Opinion can sometimes be firm — people take light reasons for strongest arguments and assent without fear of the opposite — but it is never certain or evident. The one who opines rests on light reasons or men's testimonies, which never yield certainty or evidence of judging.
11. Does this comparison derogate from faith's dignity, since any science would then be a more perfect assent than faith for want of evidence? Answer: science is more perfect than faith in a respect, because it is evident assent; but faith is more perfect than any science simply and absolutely — for two reasons. First, faith concerns the noblest object: that great mystery of godliness — God revealed in the flesh, justified in the Spirit, seen by angels, preached to the nations. Second, faith rests on the most certain foundation: God's own testimony, who is truth itself and can neither deceive nor be deceived.
Latin · §29
ART. II. Quomodo inter se differant, scire, credere & opinari. 1. Omnis assensus mentis vel est actus sciendi, vel actus credendi, vel actus opinandi; quandocunque enim judicamus aliquid esse verum, vel certe scimus illud esse verum, vel credimus illud esse verum propter alterius testimonium; vel propter levem et inefficacem rationem opinamur illud esse verum. 2. Actus sciendi, cum opponitur actibus credendi & opinandi, late accipitur, pro quavis notitia actuali certa & evidente; quomodo accepta scientia non solum cernitur in disciplinis speculativis, sed etiam in practicis; nam in Philosophia morali, quae est disciplina practica, non opinamur, aut credimus, sed evidenter scimus actiones liberalitatis esse honestas, actiones vero vitiorum ei oppositorum esse inhonestas; in aedificatoria arte non opinantur aut credunt, sed evidenter sciunt periti Architecti bases in aedificiis esse ad libellam collocandas, columnas esse ad perpendiculum erigendas, aliaque similia: nec solum circa universalia, sed etiam singularia versatur haec notitia. Nam cum video Petrum stantem, aut audio Petrum loquentem, non opinor, aut credo, sed scio Petrum loqui & stare. 3. Hujus divisionis sufficientia sic demonstratur: omnis assensus mentis vel nititur testimonio, vel ratione: si nititur testimonio, est fides actualis, seu actus credendi; si vero nititur ratione, vel nititur ratione certa & solida, estque scientia; vel nititur ratione tantum probabili, estque opinio. 4. Assensus nitens alterius testimonio, vel nititur testimonio divino, & a Scholasticis appellatur fides divina; vel nititur testimonio humano, & appellatur fides humana. 5. Hic obiter notare possumus Pontificiorum errorem; qui nobiscum fatentur, eam fidem non divinam sed humanam esse, quae praecipue testimonio hominum nititur; & nihilominus audacissime asseverant, assensum, quem praebemus articulis fidei & ipsi sacrae Scripturae, unde illi articuli colliguntur, niti testimonio Ecclesiae (ut vocant) representativae, h. e. Episcoporum & Pastorum in generali concilio congregatorum; item Ecclesiae (ut ipsi loquuntur) virtualis, h. e. ipsius Pontificis Romani: atque ita aut fateri cogentur, omnem fidem viatorum humanam esse, penitus videlicet sublata fide divina, aut eorum Episcopos non homines sed DEOS indigitandos esse. 6. Pulchra institui potest comparatio inter scientiam, opinionem, & fidem divinam: scientia enim est assensus firmus, certus, & evidens; fides divina est assensus firmus & certus, sed non evidens; opinio denique etsi aliquando sit assensus firmus, h. e. sine haesitatione aut dubitatione, saepe tamen neque est firmus, neque certus, neque evidens. 7. Scientia est assensus firmus; quia is qui scit propositionem aliquam esse veram, non dubitanter aut haesitanter assentitur, sed firmiter: est assensus certus, quia is qui scit, nititur solido aliquo fundamento; alioqui non sciret, sed opinaretur: denique est evidens, quia sciens non ideo assentitur, quod alius testetur eam propositionem esse veram, sed quod ipse vi alicujus evidentis argumenti, percipiat rem ita se habere. 8. Fides divina est assensus firmus, quia illi qui in DEUM credunt, non haesitant, aut dubitant de veritate historiae sacrae, & promissionum divinarum: est assensus certus, quia nititur certissimo fundamento, videlicet DEI testimonio, qui est ipsa veritas: non tamen est evidens; is enim qui credit, non ideo assentitur, quod sensu aut ratione percipiat rem ita se habere, sed quod DEUS hoc testetur & asserat. 9. Hinc patet, quam egregie Apostolus, undecimo ad Hebraeos, versu primo, naturam fidei divinae expresserit; cum enim dicit eam esse hypostasin, indicat ejus firmitatem & certitudinem; cum vero dicit eam esse elenchon pragmaton ou blepomenon, ejus inevidentiam & obscuritatem enigmaticam declarat. 10. Opinio aliquando potest esse assensus firmus, (nonnunquam enim homines ita moventur levibus rationibus, ut eas pro validissimis argumentis habeant, ideoque absque ulla haesitatione aut formidine partis oppositae assentiuntur;) nunquam vero est certus aut evidens: is enim qui opinatur, vel nititur levibus rationibus, vel hominum testimoniis, quae nunquam pariunt nobis aut certitudinem aut evidentiam judicandi. 11. Dicet aliquis, hanc comparationem fidei, scientiae, & opinionis, quam jam attulimus, derogare de dignitate fidei; ex ea enim sequitur, quamlibet scientiam esse perfectiorem assensum fide, quia viz. deest fidei evidentia, quae tamen competit scientiae. Respond. Scientiam esse perfectiorem fide secundum quid, quia viz. est assensus evidens; fidem vero esse perfectiorem qualibet scientia simpliciter & absolute; idque propter duas rationes. 1. enim fides versatur circa nobilissimum objectum, h. e. circa magnum illud mysterium pietatis, DEUM in carne revelatum, justificatum in spiritu, conspectum ab Angelis, & praedicatum Gentibus. 2. Fides nititur certissimo fundamento, h. e. DEI ipsius testimonio, qui ipsa veritas est, quique nec fallere nec falli potest.
Whether faith is always the evidence of things not seen§30
30Article III. Whether faith is always the evidence of things not seen.
1. The previous article showed that every faith — divine or human — is inevident assent. Hence the Apostle in Hebrews 11:1 calls faith the evidence of things not seen. The same is confirmed by 1 Corinthians 13:12 (we now see through a glass, in an enigma) and by the Apostle's teaching that faith will cease and be evacuated in the homeland — not perfected, as charity is — because obscurity and inevidence belong to faith's very notion and essence. So Augustine on John 14 ("I go to prepare a place for you"): let the Lord go that he may prepare a place; go that he may be seen, be hidden that he may be believed. Gregory likewise: appearances have not faith but recognition; what cannot be seen is truly said to be believed.
2. To make this plainer I will solve arguments that put even seen or known things under faith's object. First, the Lord's word in John 14: I have told you before it comes to pass, that when it is come to pass you may believe — as if faith were sometimes of things known by experience and so seen.
3. Next John 20: Thomas said, unless I see I will not believe (Christ risen); the Lord said to him already believing, because you have seen me, Thomas, you have believed.
4. Third: the other Apostles, the Virgin Mary, and many faithful believed what they saw — Christ as man, suffered, dead, buried, risen, ascended, and much else in the articles of faith. So 1 John: what we have heard, seen with our eyes, looked upon, and handled of the word of life, we announce to you.
5. Fourth: a philosopher who knows by demonstration that one God is principle and cause of all can, becoming a Christian from a pagan, receive faith of the same proposition while the prior cognition remains — and so have faith and science together, faith having for object things evidently known or seen.
6. To remove these arguments I first set foundations, then confute Fonseca, Estius, and others on the supposed repugnance of faith and science. First: "faith" or "to believe" is often taken in Scripture and among approved authors for assenting in any way that something is true — as when one "believes his eyes," or dialecticians say an argument "makes faith."
7. Second: St Thomas and the other Apostles and faithful saw one thing and believed another — a man seen, God believed. Augustine: they beheld a living man whom they had seen dying, and believed God hidden in the flesh; a man appeared among men, offering man to those who see, keeping God for those who believe.
8. Third: faith is called inevident assent and the evidence of things not seen — not because the things believed are altogether unseen, but because insofar as they are believed they lack evidence from that on account of which they are believed. Science's foundation (the middle of demonstration) convinces by the thing's evidence, opening causes; faith's foundation (God's authority) convinces by its certainty and infallibility, not by the evidence of the thing assented to. Faith's office is not to make obscure things clear, but to make the intellect yield to the speaker's authority. So things believed, as believed, are inevident (see Pareus; Field). Yet they may be evident in another respect — to sense or reason. One proposition can be necessary as a demonstration's conclusion and contingent as a probable syllogism's; so certain articles of faith have clarity insofar as the Apostles perceived them by sense or we demonstrate them by reason, but insofar as they are believed because of God's testifying authority they lack that evidence and are rightly called things not seen.
Latin · §30
ART. III. An fides semper sit elenchos pragmaton ou blepomenon. 1. Ostensum est superiori articulo, fidem omnem, sive sit divina, sive humana, esse assensum inevidentem; & ob id Apostolum 11. ad Hebraeos, vers.1. asserere fidem esse elenchon pragmaton ou blepomenon; idem etiam confirmari potest ex 1 Corinth. cap.13. vers.12. ubi Apostolus asserit, nos nunc videre per speculum, & in enigmate. Item ex doctrina ejusdem Apostoli, de cessatione & evacuatione fidei, quae futura est in patria; ideo enim fides evacuari dicitur, & non perfici, sicut charitas, quia imperfectionem, nimirum obscuritatem & inevidentiam, in sui ratione & essentia involvit: quare Augustinus in illud Johannis 14. vado parare vobis locum, egregie dicit, eat DOMINUS, ut paret locum; eat, ut videatur, lateat, ut credatur. Similiter docet Gregorius, Hom. 16. in Evang. & lib. Dial. cap.5. apparentia (inquit) non habent fidem, sed agnitionem: & iterum: hoc veraciter dicitur credi, quod non valet videri. 2. Ut autem hoc planius evadat, afferami & solvam ea argumenta, quae probant ea etiam quae videntur vel sciuntur, sub fidei objecto comprehendi: quale imprimis est illud DOMINI ad discipulos, Johanne 14. dixi vobis priusquam fiat, ut cum factum fuerit, credatis: hinc enim colligitur, fidem esse aliquando rerum per experientiam cognitarum, atque adeo visarum. 3. Deinde Johan.20. cum dixisset Thomas Apostolus, nisi videro, non credam; CHRISTUM videlicet redivivum; dixit ei DOMINUS jam credenti, quia vidisti me Thoma, credidisti. 4. Tertio; caeteri quoque Apostoli & Virgo Maria, multique alii fideles, quod viderunt hoc crediderunt; CHRISTUM videlicet hominem, passum, mortuum, sepultum, a mortuis resurgentem, & in coelos ascendentem, et alia multa quae ipsis fidei articulis expressa sunt: unde Joh. Epist.1. ait, quod audivimus, quod vidimus oculis nostris, quod perspeximus, & manus nostrae contrectaverunt, de verbo vitae annuntiamus vobis. 5. Quarto: Philosophus aliquis sciens per Demonstrationem, unum DEUM esse omnium rerum principium & causam, potest ejusdem propositionis accipere fidem, manente priori cognitione; si videlicet e Pagano fiat Christianus: is ergo simul habebit fidem & scientiam, ejusque fides pro objecto habebit res evidenter scitas seu visas. 6. Ut haec argumenta tollantur, primo ponam aliquot fundamenta, ex quibus horum argumentorum solutiones colligi possunt; deinde Fonsecae, Estii, & aliorum pravam doctrinam de repugnantia fidei & scientiae confutabo. Primum fundamentum sit hoc: Fides seu to credere saepenumero in Scriptura, & apud probatos Authores generaliter accipitur, pro eo quod est quovis modo assentiri & judicare aliquid verum esse: sic enim dicitur aliquis oculis suis credere, & apud Dialecticos qualecunque argumentum fidem facere dicitur. 7. Secundum fundamentum est: S. Thomam, aliosque Apostolos & fideles, aliud vidisse, aliud credidisse: hominem enim viderunt, & DEUM crediderunt: h.e. ut ait Augustinus; Cernebant hominem viventem quem viderant morientem, & credebant DEUM in carne latentem; & alibi, apparuit inter homines homo, offerens HOMINEM videntibus, DEUM servans credentibus. 8. Tertium fundamentum: fides dicitur assensus inevidens; item dicitur esse elenchos pragmaton ou blepomenon, non quod ea quae creduntur omnino inevidentia sint, & nullo modo videantur; sed quod quatenus creduntur, inevidentia sint, seu quod non habeant evidentiam ab eo propter quod creduntur. In hoc enim differt fides a scientia, quod fundamentum quo nititur scientia (h.e. medium demonstrationis) per evidentiam rei intellectum convincat, causas ejus aperiendo; fundamentum vero quo nititur fides (videlicet DEI authoritas) intellectum convincat, non per evidentiam rei cui assentimur, sed per certitudinem suam & infallibilitatem. Cum igitur munus fidei, non sit efficere ut res obscurae fiant perspicuae, sed efficere ut intellectus cedat authoritati dicentis, & sic assentiatur; manifestum est ea quae creduntur quatenus creduntur esse inevidentia, seu non habere evidentiam a fundamento suo propter quod creduntur: vide D. Pareum de justificatione, lib. 2. cap.5. & D. Richardum Field, de Eccl. lib.4. cap.8. Caeterum hoc non impedit, quo minus ea quae creduntur alia ratione evidentia sint, & ex se manifesta vel sensibus externis vel rationi: sicut enim una & eadem propositio, quatenus est conclusio demonstrationis judicatur esse necessaria, & non posse aliter se habere; quatenus vero est conclusio probabilis syllogismi, judicatur ab eodem homine contingens, & posse aliter se habere: ita etiam articuli quidam fidei, quatenus ab Apostolis sensu percipiebantur, aut a nobis ratione manifesta demonstrantur, evidentiam habent & claritatem; quatenus vero creduntur propter DEI testantis authoritatem, evidentiam illam non habent, & ob id recte dicuntur pragmata ou blepomena.
Whether faith can coexist with science of the same proposition in the same intellect§31
31Article IV. Whether faith can coexist with science of the same proposition in the same intellect.
1. The question is whether one and the same person can at once believe and know the proposition to which he assents, or whether faith and science so repugn that they cannot coexist in one intellect. Opinions diverge so widely that two celebrated men scarcely agree. Scotus holds that neither act nor habit of faith and of science can coexist in the same intellect about the same subject.
2. Durandus holds the contrary: faith and science can coexist about the same proposition in the same intellect, as to both act and habit. Fonseca: the habits can coexist about the same subject, yet the act produced is not an act of faith but a certain supernatural science, because faith concurs in producing it. Estius: (1) the habits can coexist about the same object; (2) each can exercise its act at different times; (3) the act the habit of faith then elicits is not faith in the full amplitude of its meaning — not according to all required conditions — because it is not inevident knowledge of the thing.
3. The fifth and truest view is Antonio Rubio's: (1) these habits can be together in the same intellect about the same object; (2) each can exercise its act at different times, but not at the same time; (3) acts elicited at different times are true and proper acts of those habits, and the habit of knowing derogates nothing from the act of believing. Rubio speaks there of science and opinion, but the same reason holds for science and faith.
4. Against Scotus: the habits can coexist. What would impede them is chiefly repugnance of their acts — but that does not impede. Habits are easy potencies for acts; we can have at once potencies for repugnant acts exercised at different times (weeping and laughing, walking and sitting) though not both acts at once. Further: one who by faith knows God created the world can later acquire demonstrative science of creation without destroying that faith — else a Christian could not study metaphysics and physics, from which such demonstrations are gathered, and one may not do what destroys or diminishes faith.
5. Against Durandus: the intellect cannot in one and the same instant elicit both faith's inevident assent and science's evident assent. As sight cannot see the same thing at once distinctly and confusedly, so the intellect (the soul's eye) cannot perceive the same thing at once evidently and inevidently.
6. Against Fonseca and Estius: even while coexisting with the habit of science, the habit of faith can elicit a true and proper act of faith with all conditions required for believing — so faith and science can be in the same intellect about the same proposition as to acts, but elicited at different times. A believer, even after acquiring science of creation, can resolve: I so firmly assent that God created the world because of God's testifying authority that even if reason did not show it — even if corrupt reason said the contrary — I would still assent without fear.
7. That judgment comes from faith alone, not from science and faith together, and is a true act of faith. Neither science nor any natural habit can dictate such a resolve. The assent rests on the testifier's authority alone and is inevident: a foundation that yields certainty but not evidence makes the assent inevident; God's authority convinces by certainty and irrefragability, not by the thing's clarity. As the medium is, so is the assent — certain or uncertain, evident or inevident.
Latin · §31
ART. IV. An fides possit esse simul cum scientia de eadem propositione, & in eodem intellectu. 1. Quaeritur solet de scientia & fide, utrum unus & idem homo possit simul credere & scire eam propositionem cui assentitur esse veram, an vero tanta sit repugnantia fidei & scientiae, ut simul in eodem intellectu existere nequeant. In hac controversia, tanta est opinionum varietas, ut vix invenias duos celebres viros de ea idem sentientes: primo enim Scotus, in 3. Sent. Dist. 24. quaestione unica dicit, Neque actus, neque habitus fidei & scientiae posse simul in eodem intellectu existere circa idem subjectum. 2. Secundo, Durandus, quaest. 1. prologi Sent. & lib. 3. Sent. dist. 24. quaest.4. plane contrarium statuit, dicens fidem & scientiam circa eandem propositionem & in eodem intellectu simul existere posse, tam secundum actum, quam secundum habitum. Tertio, Petrus Fonseca, in lib.6. Metaph. cont. qu.1. Sect. 5. asserit habitus fidei & scientiae posse existere in eodem intellectu, & de eodem subjecto, ita tamen ut actus ab iis productus non sit actus fidei, sed scientia quaedam, eaque supernaturalis, propter concursum fidei ad eum producendum. Quarto: Guilielmus Estius, Duacensis Theologus, in 3. Sent. dist. 24. Art. 3. tria asserit: 1. habitus fidei & scientiae posse simul existere in eodem intellectu, & de eodem objecto. 2. Utrumque habitum diversis temporibus posse suum actum exercere. 3. Actum quem tunc elicit habitus fidei, non esse fidem consideratam secundum totam amplitudinem suae significationis: hoc est, secundum omnes conditiones in ea requisitas, quia videlicet non est inevidens rei notitia. 3. Quinta sententia, eaque verissima, est acutissimi Doctoris Antonii Ruvii Rhodensis, in suo opusculo de habitibus, tractatu 3. quaest. 3. ubi etiam tria innuit: primo, hos habitus posse simul esse in eodem intellectu, & de eodem objecto. 2. Utrumque habitum diversis temporibus posse suum actum exercere, sed non eodem tempore. 3. Actus ab illis habitibus, diversis temporibus elicitos, esse veros & proprie dictos illorum habituum actus, & per praesentiam habitus sciendi nihil derogari de proprietate actus credendi. Dico Ruvium haec tantum innuere, quia expresse & directe ibi loquitur solummodo de scientia & opinione; eadem autem ratio est scientiae et fidei, quoad possibilitatem & impossibilitatem coexistendi, ut cuivis manifestum est. 4. Primo igitur probatur contra Scotum; habitus fidei & scientiae posse simul esse in eodem subjecto, et circa idem objectum, idque hac ratione: Si quid impedit quo minus hi habitus in eodem intellectu coexistant, illud maxime est repugnantia actuum ad quos referuntur: Sed hoc non impedit: Ergo &c. Probatur assumptio; Habitus nihil sunt aliud, nisi faciles & expeditae potentiae ad actus: sed non est absurdum, aliqua habere simul potentias ad repugnantes actus, quos potest diversis temporibus exercere, licet simul non possit exercere utrumque: nam simul habemus potentiam ad flendum, et potentiam ad ridendum: item potentiam ambulandi, et potentiam sedendi; quamvis harum potentiarum actus adeo repugnantes sint, ut non possint uni subjecto simul inesse. Secundo, potest aliquis, qui per fidem novit mundum a DEO fuisse creatum, postea per Demonstrationem acquirere scientiam de Creatione Mundi, qua producta & acquisita non destruitur fides de illo articulo; sic enim non liceret homini Christiano, Metaphysicae & Physicae operam dare, ex quibus colliguntur Demonstrationes de creatione Mundi: non enim licet ea facere quae fidem aut destruunt, aut imminuunt. 5. Secundo: probatur contra Durandum, non esse possibile, ut intellectus eodem tempore, hoc est, uno et eodem instanti eliciat, et inevidentem assensum fidei, et evidentem assensum scientiae, quia sicut impossibile est, ut homo per sensum visus eandem rem eodem tempore distincte & confuse videat, ita etiam impossibile est, ut homo per intellectum, qui est animi oculus, eandem rem eodem instanti evidenter et inevidenter percipiat; ideoque impossibile est, ut simul habeat duos actus; unum evidentem, scientiae, alterum inevidentem, fidei. 6. Tertio: probatur contra Fonsecam et Estium; habitum fidei, quamvis in eodem intellectu coexistentem habeat habitum scientiae, posse elicere verum et proprie dictum actum fidei, idque secundum omnes conditiones in actu credendi requisitas: et proinde fidem et scientiam posse esse in eodem intellectu, & de eadem propositione, hoc etiam quoad actus; sed diversis temporibus elicitos: ratio est haec: potest aliquis fidelis, etiam post acquisitam scientiam de creatione mundi, ita apud se statuere: Ego tam firmiter assentior huic propositioni, DEUS creavit mundum; propter DEI testantis authoritatem, ut quamvis per rationem aliquam non perciperem mundum esse a DEO creatum; imo quamvis corrupta ratio contrarium dictitaret, assentirer tamen isti propositioni sine ulla formidine aut metu. 7. Hoc judicium mentis sine controversia provenit a sola fide, non scientia & fide simul, estque verus & proprie dictus fidei actus; hoc est, non deest ei ulla conditio in actu credendi requisita: prius probatur contra Fonsecam; quia neque scientia, neque aliquis alius naturalis habitus potest aliquid tale dictitare. Posterius etiam probatur, tum contra Fonsecam, tum contra Estium; quia assensus iste nititur sola authoritate testantis: est inevidens: consequentiae ratio est, quod assensus iste sit inevidens, cujus fundamentum quo nititur non valet parere evidentiam, sed certitudinem tantum; at hic assensus est talis; nam authoritas testantis non convincit intellectum nostrum per evidentiam & claritatem rei, sed per suam certitudinem & irrefragabilitatem. Ratio probabilis majoris est haec: talis est assensus, quale est medium & fundamentum quo nititur: Si enim medium sit certum, possitque intellectum nostrum certificare, & ut tale cognoscatur ab assentiente, noster assensus est certus: Si vero non ita se habet, est incertus: Ergo pari ratione, si medium valeat parere evidentiam intelligendi, assensus est evidens: si vero non valeat, est inevidens.
On the division of faith into explicit and implicit; and whether the inevidence we ascribe to faith favors the blind and implicit faith of the Papists§32
32Article V. On the division of faith into explicit and implicit; and whether the inevidence we ascribe to faith favors the blind and implicit faith of the Papists.
1. Theologians divide faith into explicit and implicit — Lombard's distinct and veiled or confused (Tilenus, Durandus, Thomas, Estius). Explicit faith believes something distinctly in itself and in particular. Implicit faith believes something not in itself but in another, as in a universal. Simpler Christians who grasp only what is absolutely necessary to salvation — articles, Decalogue, and the like — when they sincerely hold Scripture to be God's word and worthy of faith, believe that general object explicitly, and believe particular histories and dogmas of Scripture (Noah's three sons, Abraham's two, the scepter not taken from Judah before the Messiah) implicitly and by consequence in that general. Those who believe the whole Scripture true have implicit faith of all its histories, dogmas, and prophecies whose distinct knowledge they have not yet acquired.
2. May Reformed schools admit this division? First assertion: yes, if soundly conceived. Not only laypeople but the most learned theologians believe some things implicitly under the general that Scripture is God's word — things they have not yet distinctly understood. Daily progress in knowing Scripture shows not Scripture's obscurity (as Papists claim) but our mind's weakness and the immense wealth of heavenly mysteries poured little by little into the narrow vessel of the human mind.
3. Second assertion: taken as the Papists take it, the division is crude, absurd, and contrary to faith's nature. Their "implicit faith" is laypeople believing unknown dogmas under the general that whatever the Roman Church believes is true. That is human faith, not divine — resting on men's testimony, not God's; a light conjecture on a fragile foundation, not hypostasis or elenchos.
4. Does the inevidence Orthodox doctors ascribe to faith favor that blind Papist faith? That confused assent on Rome's testimony alone is most inevident — yet inevidence does not help them. It excludes only scientific knowledge (sense or evident reason from the thing's nature), not all knowledge. Certainty, faith's second condition, presupposes firm persuasion that what we assent to is God's word, not man's. That persuasion is opposed to Papist implicit faith; certainty cannot be found in it.
Latin · §32
ART. V. De fidei divisione in explicitam, & implicitam; & an inevidentia, quam fidei tribuimus, faciat pro caeca & implicita Pontificiorum fide. 1. Theologi dividunt fidem in explicitam et implicitam, vel ut loquitur Lombardus, lib. 3. Sent. Dist. 25. in distinctam, & velatam seu confusam: hujus distinctionis explicationem legere possumus apud clarissimum Tilenum, parte prima Syntagmatis, Disp. 38. Thes.23. & 24. item apud Durandum, lib. 3. Sent. dist. 25. quaest. 1. S. Thomam, 2.2. q. 2. Art. 7. Guilielmum Estium, lib. 3. Sent. Dist.25. ex quibus authoribus descriptiones istius divisionis bene colligi possunt: fides explicita, est qua aliquid creditur secundum se distincte, & in particulari. Implicita vero, est qua aliquid creditur non in se, sed in alio, tanquam in universali; Exempli gratia, Christiani rudes & simpliciores (ut loquuntur) qui ea sola intelligunt, quae ad salutem absolute necessaria sunt, ut articulos fidei, decalogum, & caetera, cum ex animo profitentur se credere S. Scripturam esse DEI verbum, & proinde fide dignam, habent suae fidei objectum; unum generale, quod formaliter, explicite, & per se credunt: alterum particulare, quod implicite & ex consequenti credunt: objectum generale, quod explicite credunt, est Scripturam esse DEI verbum; & proinde fidem ei adhibendam esse: objecta particularia, quae implicite in illo generali & ex consequenti credunt, sunt historiae & dogmata Scripturae, quorum cognitionem nondum assecuti sunt, ut Noachum habuisse tres filios, Abrahamum duos, non ablatum esse sceptrum a Juda ante adventum Messiae: qui enim credunt Scripturam totam esse veram, illi implicite & ex consequenti credunt omnia esse vera quae in Scriptura continentur, hoc est, habent fidem implicitam omnium historiarum, dogmatum, & praedictionum Propheticarum, quae sunt in sacrae Scripturae volumine, omnium (inquam) quorum particularem & distinctam notitiam non acquisiverunt. 2. Quaeritur hic potest, an haec divisio fidei in explicitam & implicitam, in Scholis Ecclesiarum reformatarum ferenda sit; Respond. Duabus assertionibus: prior est haec; praedicta distinctio fidei admitti potest, si sano modo concipiatur: certum enim est non solum Laicos & simpliciores, sed etiam clarissimos & doctissimos Theologos quaedam implicite credere in isto generali quod Scriptura sit DEI verbum & proinde fide dignissima; quaedam (inquam) quorum distinctam intelligentiam nondum assecuti sunt: hoc enim patet ex quotidiano nostro in cognitione Scripturae progressu, qui tamen non arguit Scripturae ipsius obscuritatem (ut nugantur Pontificii) sed ingenii nostri imbecillitatem, & mysteriorum coelestium, quae in Scriptura passim traduntur, immensam opulentiam, quae sensim angusto illi vasi mentis humanae infunditur, non autem tota simul infundi potest. 3. Secunda assertio est haec; praedicta divisio fidei Christianae, si ita accipiatur ut a Pontificiis accipi solet, rejicienda est tanquam crassa, absurda, & naturae fidei prorsus contraria: illi enim per fidem implicitam intelligunt eam fidem qua laici ignota & nondum intellecta fidei dogmata credunt implicite in illo generali, quod vera sunt omnia quae Romana Ecclesia credit & pro veris amplectitur; quae quidem fides non est divina, sed humana; id est, non nititur DEI, sed hominum testimonio: non est hypostasis aut elenchos, sed levis & fallax conjectura, quae non DEI verbo, sed hominum judicio per se infirmo, atque adeo fragili admodum & ruinoso fundamento nititur. 4. Quaeritur etiam potest; an inevidentia quam non solum Theologi Sententiarii, sed etiam Orthodoxi Doctores fidei attribuunt, faciat pro caeca illa & implicita Pontificiorum fide: maximus enim & confusus ille assensus, qui solo Ecclesiae Romanae testimonio nititur (ut id quod res est dicam) maxime est inevidens. Respond. Inevidentiam nihil pro eorum sententia facere: quia inevidentia illa non excludit omnem notitiam, sed eam solam quae nititur medio scientifico; id est, sensu aut evidente ratione a natura rei petita. Secundo, quia certitudo, quae est secunda fidei conditio, necessario praesupponit firmam notitiam & persuasionem de doctrina, cui assentimur, quod non sit hominis sed DEI verbum: talis autem notitia aut persuasio implicitae Pontificiorum fidei velut e regione adversatur, ac proinde in ea certitudo inveniri non potest.
On the threefold light: of nature, of faith or grace, and of glory§33
33Article VI. On the threefold light: of nature, of faith or grace, and of glory.
1. Scholastic theology draws several distinctions from nature, grace, and glory. First: God's kingdom — of nature (his empire over all creatures), of grace (reign in the Church militant), and of glory (reign in the Church triumphant).
2. Second: God's presence — natural or essential (everywhere), gracious (in the just, who are his temple), and glorious (in heaven, manifesting majesty to the blessed).
3. Third: works ad extra — of nature (creation, conservation, cooperation — in him we live and move and are); of grace (the Word's incarnation, humiliation, exaltation, threefold office; effectual calling, regeneration, justification, sanctification); of glory (the elect's glorification and the reprobate's damnation).
4. Fourth: human life — natural (animal and rational), of grace (spiritual life to God by faith and charity), and of glory (seeing God face to face in the homeland).
5. Fifth: God's decree as ordering things of nature, grace, and glory.
6. Sixth, and most to our purpose: the mind's light — of nature (fallen man's power to grasp self-evident principles and natural conclusions); of faith or grace (supernatural illumination believing what Scripture reveals above natural reason); of glory (the blessed's naked, intuitive vision of God).
7. Faith's light stands between nature and glory: above nature (loftier objects, surer foundation), below glory (not intuition but inevident assent on God's testimony).
8. Papists invent a further "prophetic" light by which Church doctors — especially the Roman Pontiff — judge faith infallibly. Scripture does not support it; it shifts wayfarers' faith from God's word to men's judgments.
Latin · §33
ART. VI. De triplici lumine, videlicet naturae, fidei seu gratiae, & gloriae. 1. In Theologia Scholastica variae inveniuntur distinctiones petitae ab istis tribus terminis: natura, gratia, & gloria. Prima est, qua DEI Opt. Max. regnum distinguitur, in regnum naturae, regnum gratiae, & regnum gloriae. Regnum naturae, est naturale illud imperium, quod DEUS habet in omnes res creatas, quas pro arbitrio regit & gubernat. Regnum gratiae, est quo DEUS regnat in Ecclesia sua in terris militante. Regnum gloriae est, quo regnat in Ecclesia in coelis triumphante. 2. Secunda distinctio est qua DEI localis praesentia distinguitur in praesentiam naturalem, seu essentialem, gratiosam, & gloriosam. Secundum praesentiam naturalem DEUS est ubique: per praesentiam gratiosam DEUS dicitur esse in justis & sanctis hominibus, & vicissim illi habitaculum & Templum DEI dicuntur; & per praesentiam gloriosam Deus dicitur esse in coelis, ubi gloriam suam & majestatem beatis hominibus & Angelis manifestat. 3. Tertia divisio est qua opera DEI ad extra dividuntur in opera naturae, opera gratiae, & opera gloriae. Opera naturae, sunt rerum visibilium & invisibilium creatio, conservatio, & cum iisdem cooperatio in omnibus earum actionibus: nam in eo vivimus, movemur, & sumus. Opera gratiae, sunt Verbi incarnatio, humiliatio, exaltatio, triplex ejus officium, videlicet Regium, Propheticum, & Sacerdotale: item electorum per verbi praedicationem & Sacramentorum administrationem efficax vocatio, eorundemque regeneratio, justificatio, sanctificatio, & conservatio in statu gratiae. Opera gloriae, sunt electorum glorificatio, & reproborum aeterna damnatio. 4. Quarta distinctio, est qua vita humana dividitur in vitam naturae, vitam gratiae, & vitam gloriae. Vita naturae est, qua vivimus vitam animalem & rationalem. Vita gratiae, est vita spiritualis, qua vivimus DEO per fidem & charitatem. Vita gloriae, est vita beata, qua in patria DEUM facie ad faciem videbimus. 5. Quinta divisio, est qua consilium & decretum DEI distinguitur in decretum naturae, gratiae, & gloriae — seu quo DEUS ordinat res naturales, res gratiae, & res gloriae. 6. Sexta & ad propositum maxime spectans distinctio, est qua lumen seu cognitio mentis humanae distinguitur in lumen naturae, lumen fidei seu gratiae, & lumen gloriae. Lumen naturae, est naturalis illa vis intelligendi, qua homo, etiam lapsus, percipit principia per se nota, & ex iis conclusionibus ratiocinando assequitur notitiam rerum naturalium. Lumen fidei seu gratiae, est supernaturalis illuminatio, qua credimus ea quae DEUS in Scriptura revelavit, & quae supra captum rationis naturalis elevantur. Lumen gloriae, est illa perfecta cognitio DEI, qua beati in patria DEUM nude & intuitive vident. 7. Ex his patet, lumen fidei medium esse inter lumen naturae & lumen gloriae: perfectius est lumine naturae, quia versatur circa objecta sublimiora, & nititur certiore fundamento; imperfectius est lumine gloriae, quia non est intuitiva DEI visio, sed assensus inevidens nitens DEI testimonio. 8. Pontificii non contenti isto triplici lumine, fingunt lumen aliquod propheticum, seu speciale donum, quo Doctores Ecclesiae, & praesertim Pontifex Romanus, infallibiliter de rebus fidei judicent. Sed hoc commentum nullo Scripturae testimonio nititur, & fidem viatorum transfert a DEI verbo ad hominum judicia.
Whether there is given to wayfarers any light clearer than the light of faith§34
34Article VII. Whether there is given to wayfarers any light clearer than the light of faith.
1. Theology divides into wayfarers' and comprehensors' — of the way and of the homeland. The first rests on faith's light; the second on glory's. Is any clearer light given to wayfarers so that they know faith's mysteries evidently?
2. Papists and some Scholastics posit a prophetic light or gift of understanding by which Church doctors judge mysteries more clearly than ordinary believers. The Orthodox deny any light clearer than faith as to the thing's evidence — though faith's own light may admit degrees of extension and firmness.
3. Faith's notion involves inevidence. A clearer light that made faith's objects evident would turn them into objects of science or vision. In the way there is not vision of God but faith: we walk by faith, not by sight (2 Corinthians 5:7).
4. That learned theologians grasp and explain more credibles comes from greater learning, Scripture study, and ministerial gifts for edification — not from a light above faith. Those gifts do not remove inevidence or make mysteries seen.
5. No light clearer than faith as to the mode of knowing is given to wayfarers. Glory's light belongs only to comprehensors in the homeland.
Latin · §34
ART. VII. An detur in viatoribus lumen aliquod clarius fidei lumine. 1. Theologia dividi solet in Theologiam viatorum & Theologiam comprehensorum, seu in Theologiam viae & Theologiam patriae. Theologia viatorum nititur lumine fidei; Theologia patriae lumine gloriae. Quaeritur an praeter lumen fidei detur viatoribus aliquod lumen clarius, quo mysteria fidei evidenter cognoscant. 2. Pontificii & nonnulli Scholastici affirmant dari lumen aliquod propheticum, seu donum intellectus & sapientiae, quo Doctores Ecclesiae clarius & evidentius de mysteriis fidei judicent quam vulgares fideles. Sed Orthodoxi negant dari viatoribus lumen ullo modo clarius lumine fidei quoad evidentiam rei; quamvis admittere possimus gradus in ipso lumine fidei quoad extensionem & firmitatem. 3. Ratio est: fides in sui ratione involvit inevidentiam; si daretur lumen clarius quo res fidei evidenter perciperentur, desinerent esse objecta fidei & fierent objecta scientiae seu visionis. At in via non datur visio DEI, sed fides: 2 Cor.5.7. per fidem ambulamus, non per speciem. 4. Quod vero doctiores Theologi plura credibilia intelligunt & melius explicant, id non provenit ex lumine clariore quam sit lumen fidei, sed ex majore eruditione, majore assiduitate in Scripturis, & ex donis ministerialibus ad aedificationem Ecclesiae datis — quae tamen non tollunt inevidentiam fidei, nec efficiunt ut mysteria fiant evidenter visa. 5. Unde concludimus, nullum dari in viatoribus lumen clarius lumine fidei quoad modum cognoscendi; lumen gloriae solis comprehensoribus in patria competit.
Three questions solved: whether faith is well divided into infused and acquired; whether faith is more certain than the sciences; what it is properly to believe in God§35
35Article VIII. Three questions solved: whether faith is well divided into infused and acquired; whether faith is more certain than the sciences; what it is properly to believe in God.
1. Infused vs acquired. Scholastics distinguish faith God creates by grace in the soul from faith gained by study and teaching. The Orthodox grant historical or acquired faith — even in demons and hypocrites — but deny that justifying, saving faith is acquired. It is God's gift, infused by the Spirit, not born of human industry.
2. Is faith more certain than the sciences? Divine faith is more certain than any created science — not as to evidence (science is evident; faith inevident), but as to the foundation's firmness. Faith rests on God's testimony, who can neither deceive nor be deceived; the sciences rest on created middles that, however certain, do not equal God's infallibility.
3. What is it properly to believe in God? Distinguish: believing that God is; believing God (what he says); and believing in God — resting trustingly on God as salvation's author. That last is proper to justifying faith and does not belong to demons, who believe and tremble.
Latin · §35
ART. VIII. In quo solvuntur tres quaestiones. Prima est, An fides bene distinguatur in infusam, & acquisitam. Secunda est, An fides sit certior ipsis scientiis. Tertia est, Quid sit proprie credere in Deum. 1. Prima quaestio: An fides bene distinguatur in infusam & acquisitam. Scholastici distinguunt fidem in infusam (quam DEUS per gratiam creat in anima) & acquisitam (quam homo studio & doctrina comparat). Orthodoxi fatentur dari fidem historicam seu acquisitam, quae etiam daemonibus & hypocritis inesse potest; sed fidem justificantem & salvificam negant esse acquisitam: ea enim est donum DEI, Spiritu Sancto infusum, non humana industria partum. 2. Secunda quaestio: An fides sit certior ipsis scientiis. Respondemus fidem divinam esse certiorem qualibet scientia creata, non quidem quoad evidentiam (nam scientia est evidens, fides inevidens), sed quoad firmitatem fundamenti: nititur enim DEI testimonio, qui nec fallere nec falli potest; scientiae vero nituntur mediis creatis, quae quamvis sint certa, non adaequant infallibilitatem DEI. 3. Tertia quaestio: Quid sit proprie credere in Deum. Distinguendum est inter credere DEUM, credere DEO, & credere in DEUM. Credere DEUM, est credere DEUM esse. Credere DEO, est credere eis quae DEUS dicit. Credere in DEUM, est fiducialiter in DEUM tanquam in salutis authorem recumbere — quod est proprium fidei justificantis, & non competit daemonibus, qui credunt & contremiscunt.
The opinion of Nicolaas Grevinchoven is refuted — that the habit of faith is not infused but acquired§36
36Article IX. The opinion of Nicolaas Grevinchoven is refuted — that the habit of faith is not infused but acquired.
1. Grevinchoven, a Remonstrant, holds that faith's habit is not infused by God but acquired by using the means and hearing the word diligently — as arts and sciences are acquired. The Orthodox reject this.
2. Scripture calls faith God's gift, not a human work (Ephesians 2:8; Philippians 1:29 — it has been granted to you to believe in Christ).
3. Justifying faith is supernatural; its objects surpass nature's grasp. It cannot be acquired by nature's powers; it needs God's infusion and the Spirit's operation.
4. If faith were merely acquired, it would differ only in degree from demons' and hypocrites' historical faith. Scripture and the Church teach that saving faith differs in kind — bringing charity and trust, produced by the regenerating Spirit.
5. Grevinchoven's view opens onto Pelagianism and Arminianism, giving man power to believe from himself without special prevenient and operating grace. It is to be rejected.
Latin · §36
ART. IX. Refellitur Sententia Nicolai Grevinchovii, dicentis habitum fidei non esse infusum, sed acquisitum. 1. Nicolaus Grevinchovius, Remonstrantium Theologus, asserit habitum fidei non infundi a DEO, sed ab homine acquiri per usum mediiorum & assiduam verbi auditionem — perinde ac habitus scientiarum & artium acquiruntur. Hanc sententiam Orthodoxi rejiciunt. 2. Primo, quia Scriptura fidem appellat donum DEI, non opus humanum: Ephes.2.8. gratia estis salvati per fidem; & hoc non ex vobis, DEI donum est. Philipp.1.29. vobis donatum est in CHRISTUM credere. 3. Secundo, quia fides justificans est supernaturalis, & objectum habet mysteria captum naturae superantia; ergo non potest acquiri viribus naturae, sed requirit specialem DEI infusionem & Spiritus Sancti operationem. 4. Tertio, quia si fides esset habitus acquisitus, differret solum gradu a fide historica daemonum & hypocriticorum; at Scriptura & Ecclesiae consensus docent fidem salvificam specie differre, utpote quae charitatem & fiduciam secum fert, & a Spiritu Sancto regenerante producitur. 5. Quarto, Grevinchovii sententia viam sternit Pelagianismo & Arminianismo, tribuendo homini vires credendi ex se, absque speciali gratiae praevenientis & operantis auxilio. Ideoque rejicienda est.
Whether actual or habitual faith is in infants, or can be in them§37
37Article X. Whether actual or habitual faith is in infants, or can be in them.
1. First: it is not absolutely impossible for infants to have both actual and habitual faith. Habitual faith is plain enough — in integrity infants would have been born with supernatural habits; in corruption God can create faith's habit in their souls by the Spirit, as in adults.
2. Actual faith is harder. Some deny infants any intellective acts. Others, with Augustine and many Orthodox, grant that God can elicit in them hidden, ineffable acts of faith in a manner known to himself — especially in baptism, where the Spirit works in covenanted infants.
3. Second: possibility does not bind us to assert that every baptized infant actually has faith. Covenanted infants' salvation rests on God's promise and Christ's merit, not on a demonstrable act of faith in them.
4. Third: parents' or the Church's faith is not formally the infants' faith. The Papist fiction of alien faith imputed to infants is rejected. Covenanted infants are saved by God's grace in Christ — baptism its sign and seal — not by alien faith as a formal principle in them.
5. In adults both habitual and actual faith are required for justification: habit as principle, act as the exercise that apprehends Christ.
Latin · §37
ART. X. An fides actualis aut habitualis infantibus insit, aut inesse possit. 1. Assertio prima: Non est impossibile, absolute loquendo, fidem tum actualem, tum habitualem infantibus inesse. De fide habituali res est manifesta: nam infantes, in statu integritatis, nati fuissent cum habitibus supernaturalibus; & in statu corruptionis, DEUS potest per Spiritum Sanctum habitum fidei in infantium animis creare, sicut in adultis. 2. De fide actuali difficilior est quaestio. Nonnulli negant infantes ullos actus intellectus exercere posse. Alii, cum Augustino & multis Orthodoxis, fatentur DEUM posse in infantibus elicere actus fidei occultos & ineffabiles, modo sibi noto — praesertim in baptismo, ubi Spiritus Sanctus in foederatis infantibus operatur. 3. Assertio secunda: Etsi possibile sit fidem infantibus inesse, non tamen tenemur asserere omnes infantes baptizatos actu fidem habere; salus infantium foederatorum nititur DEI promissione & CHRISTI merito, non demonstrabili praesentia actus fidei in iis. 4. Assertio tertia: Fides parentum, seu fides Ecclesiae, non est formaliter fides infantium; nec Papistarum fictio de fide aliena (fide Ecclesiae infantibus imputata) admittenda est. Infantes foederati salvantur non aliena fide tanquam formali principio in se, sed DEI gratia in CHRISTO, cujus signum & sigillum baptismus est. 5. Quod ad adultos attinet, fides actualis & habitualis utraque requiritur ad justificationem: habitus ut principium, actus ut exercitium quo CHRISTUS apprehenditur.
Whether there is faith in demons§38
38Article XI. Whether there is faith in demons.
1. Do demons have faith? James 2:19 — the demons believe and tremble — shows some faith is in them.
2. Distinguish: theirs is historical or dogmatic faith — intellective assent to what God revealed — not justifying or fiducial faith. They believe that God is and that much about Christ is true; they do not rest on Christ as Savior or love God.
3. So Augustine and the Scholastics: demons' faith is without love and trust — dead, and of no avail for salvation. Saving faith in adults is inseparable from charity and trust.
4. Is demons' faith an infused habit? Rather it is knowledge from experience and revelations, not a habit of grace — sanctifying grace is not in them.
Latin · §38
ART. XI. An in Daemonibus sit fides. 1. Quaeritur an daemones fidem habeant. Scriptura dicit, Jacob.2.19. daemones credunt & contremiscunt. Unde colligitur iis inesse aliquam fidem. 2. Distinguendum tamen est: fides quae daemonibus inest, est fides historica seu dogmatica — assensus intellectus de veritate eorum quae DEUS revelavit — non fides justificans seu fiducialis. Credunt DEUM esse, & multa de CHRISTO vera esse; sed non recumbunt in CHRISTUM ut Salvatorem, nec amant DEUM. 3. Unde Augustinus & Scholastici: fides daemonum est sine dilectione & sine fiducia; ideoque mortua est, & ad salutem non confert. Fides salvifica formatur charitate (ut loquuntur), seu potius a charitate & fiducia inseparabilis est in adultis. 4. Bonaventura & alii quaerunt an fides daemonum sit fidei habitus infusus. Respondemus eam potius esse notitiam acquisitam ex experientia & revelationibus, non habitum gratiae; nam gratia sanctificans daemonibus non inest.
Whether there was faith in Christ's soul; and whether the saints already translated to heaven have face-to-face knowledge of God§39
39Article XII. Whether there was faith in Christ's soul; and whether the saints already translated to heaven have face-to-face knowledge of God.
1. Orthodox theologians commonly deny that faith was in Christ's soul as in ours. From conception he had clear beatific vision of God; faith and vision do not coexist in the same subject about the same object.
2. Some say Christ as wayfarer knew some things by faith in his outward humiliation. Safer: his knowledge of divine things was always above faith, because he was personally united to the Logos.
3. Saints in heaven have not faith but vision. Faith is evacuated in the homeland (1 Corinthians 13). Seeing face to face, they no longer walk by faith. They have facial knowledge of God — not infinite comprehension, but intuitive beatific vision according to creaturely capacity.
Latin · §39
ART. XII. An fides fuerit in anima CHRISTI? & an sit in Sanctis, qui jam in coelum translati, habeant DEI cognitionem facialem, ut loquuntur. 1. De fide in anima CHRISTI: Theologi Orthododoxi communiter negant fidem fuisse in anima CHRISTI viatoris eodem modo quo in nobis, quia CHRISTUS a primo conceptionis momento visionem DEI claram & beatificam habuit; fides autem & visio simul in eodem subjecto quoad idem objectum non consistunt. 2. Aliqui tamen distinguunt: CHRISTUS ut viator quaedam per fidem cognovit quoad statum externaе humiliationis; sed tutius est dicere cognitionem ejus de rebus divinis semper fuisse superiorem fide, quia personaliter unitus erat Λόγῳ. 3. De Sanctis in coelo: illi non habent fidem, sed visionem. Fides evacuatur in patria, 1 Cor.13. Cum enim videbimus facie ad faciem, non amplius per fidem ambulamus. Habent cognitionem facialem DEI — non quidem comprehensionem infinitam, sed visionem intuitivam & beatificam secundum capacitam creaturae.
Whether the Remonstrants rightly deny that Adam before the fall had the power of believing in Christ§40
40Article XIII. Whether the Remonstrants rightly deny that Adam before the fall had the power of believing in Christ.
1. Remonstrants deny that Adam in integrity had power or habit to believe in Christ the mediator — the woman's-seed promise came only after the fall, they say, and justifying faith's object was not yet revealed.
2. Orthodox answer: Adam had power of obedience and trust in God as Creator and Lord; and virtually, in the root, power to believe in the Mediator if God had revealed him — his intellect and will were right and able for every supernatural good God might reveal.
3. That he did not actually believe in Christ before the fall we grant — incarnation and redemption were not yet revealed. Remote power is not to be denied.
4. Their denial tends to make justifying faith merely historical and tied to post-fall revelation, and to lessen prevenient grace's necessity in the fallen. Rejected.
Latin · §40
ART. XIII. An recte negent Remonstrantes, Adamum ante lapsum habuisse potentiam credendi in Christum. 1. Remonstrantes negant Adamum in statu integritatis habuisse potentiam seu habitum credendi in CHRISTUM mediatorem — quia (inquiunt) promissio de semine mulieris post lapsum demum data est, & objectum fidei justificantis tunc nondum erat revelatum. 2. Orthodoxi respondent: Adamum ante lapsum habuisse potentiam obedientiае & fiduciae in DEUM Creatorem & Dominum; & virtualiter seu in radice habuisse potentiam credendi in Mediatorem, si DEUS eum revelasset — quia intellectus & voluntas ejus recta erant, & ad omne bonum supernaturale a DEO revelandum potens. 3. Quod vero actu non crediderit in CHRISTUM ante lapsum, concedimus: quia mysterium incarnationis & redemptionis nondum erat revelatum. Sed potentia remota non est neganda. 4. Remonstrantium negatio eo tendit, ut fidem justificantem faciant mere historicam & contingentem revelationi post lapsum, & ut gratiae praevenientis necessitatem in lapso minuant. Ideo rejicienda.
Whether the object of faith can be false§41
41Article XIV. Whether the object of faith can be false.
1. Some say faith's object can be false — if God (per impossibile) revealed a falsehood, or if someone believes what is in fact false, taking it as revealed.
2. Formally, divine faith's object cannot be false. It rests on God's testimony; he is truth itself and can neither deceive nor be deceived. Believing a falsehood is error or fallacious human faith, not divine faith.
3. Faith about conditionals or future contingents does not make the object false: God reveals what is true, even about contingents, according to his decree.
Latin · §41
ART. XIV. An objectum fidei possit esse falsum. 1. Non desunt qui asserant objectum fidei posse esse falsum — si DEUS (per impossibile) falsum revelaret, vel si aliquis credat id quod de facto falsum est, putans a DEO revelatum. 2. Respondemus: Objectum fidei divinae, formaliter spectatum, non potest esse falsum; quia fides divina nititur DEI testimonio, qui est ipsa veritas & nec fallere nec falli potest. Si quid falsum creditur, non est fides divina, sed error vel fides humana fallax. 3. Quod aliqui dicunt de fide quae versatur circa propositiones conditionales vel de futuris contingentibus, non facit objectum fidei esse falsum: DEUS enim vera revelat, etiam de contingentibus, secundum decretum suum.
How that Remonstrant argument is to be solved: that whatever each is bound to believe is true§42
42Article XV. How that Remonstrant argument is to be solved: that whatever each is bound to believe is true.
1. Remonstrants argue: each is bound to believe Christ died for him; whatever one is bound to believe is true; therefore Christ died for all and each — even the reprobate.
2. Orthodox answers: deny the major, distinguish the minor, or deny the minor. Denying the major is unsafe — as if God commanded the reprobate to believe falsehoods.
3. Safer: the precept to believe Christ died for you does not bind absolutely without condition, but under conversion and repentance. Those who own their sins and sorrow for them are commanded to believe Christ died for them.
4. The reprobate are not bound to believe they are elect, or that Christ died for them as they remain in malice; they are bound to convert and believe the Gospel. The unbelief that damns is refractory impenitence, not mere denial of historical assent.
5. So the sophism falls, and particular satisfaction for the elect stands with the Gospel's universal proclamation.
Latin · §42
ART. XV. Quomodo solvendum sit illud argumentum Remonstrantium: Quod unusquisque tenetur credere, illud est verum, &c. 1. Remonstrantes argumentantur: Unusquisque tenetur credere CHRISTUM pro se mortuum esse; At quod unusquisque tenetur credere, est verum; Ergo CHRISTUS pro omnibus & singulis mortuus est — etiam pro reprobis. 2. Orthodoxi tribus modis respondere solent: negando majorem; distinguendo minorem; vel negando minorem. Primus modus (negare majorem) non satis tutus videtur; ne sequatur DEUM praecipere reprobis credenda quae falsa sunt. 3. Tutior responsio: praeceptum credendi CHRISTUM pro se mortuum esse non obligat absolute omnes & singulos absque conditione, sed sub conditione conversionis & resipiscentiae — h.e. eos qui agnoscunt peccata & dolorem de iis concipiunt, vox Evangelii jubet ut credant CHRISTUM pro ipsis mortuum esse. 4. Reprobi non tenentur credere se esse electos, nec CHRISTUM pro ipsis quatenus in malitia permanentibus mortuum esse; tenentur converti & credere secundum Evangelii doctrinam. Infidelitas qua damnantur non est mera negatio assensus historici, sed refractaria impoenitentia. 5. Ita tollitur sophisma Remonstrantium, & doctrina satisfactionis particularis (pro electis) cum universali Evangelii proclamatione conciliatur.
Whether faith is a discursive assent; and whether the Papists use a circular discourse in establishing faith§43
43Article XVI. Whether faith is a discursive assent; and whether the Papists use a circular discourse in establishing faith.
1. Assent is simple (noetic) — to propositions clear by their own light — or discursive (dianoetic) — to a conclusion because of premises.
2. Divine faith is discursive: we assent to the articles because God has spoken, or Scripture testifies. It is not simple noetic assent; faith's mysteries are not self-evident to nature's light.
3. Papists establish faith by a vicious circle: Scripture is God's word because the Church says so; the Church is infallible because Scripture says so. That tends to destroy divine faith.
4. Orthodox deny the circle. Faith's principle is God's word authenticating itself by intrinsic marks and the Spirit's internal testimony — not Rome's authority as first foundation.
Latin · §43
ART. XVI. An fides sit assensus discursivus? Et an Pontificii utantur circulari discursu in stabilienda fide. 1. Assensus dividi solet in simplicem (noeticum) & dianoeticum seu discursivum. Simplex assensus est, quo intellectus assentitur propositionibus sua luce claris & manifestis. Discursivus, quo assentitur conclusioni propter praemissas. 2. Fides divina est assensus discursivus: assentimur articulis fidei propter hoc medium — DEUS dixit, seu Scriptura testatur. Non est assensus simplex noeticus, quia mysteria fidei non sunt per se nota lumine naturae. 3. Pontificii in stabilienda fide utuntur discursu circulari: Scripturam esse DEI verbum probant ex Ecclesiae testimonio; Ecclesiam esse infallibilem probant ex Scriptura. Hic circulus vitiosus est, & fidem divinam destruere tendit. 4. Orthodoxi negant circulum: principium fidei est ipsum DEI verbum seipsum authenticans per notas intrinsecas & testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum — non Ecclesiae Romanае authoritas tanquam fundamentum primum.
Whether knowledge is an act elicited from the habit of faith§44
44Article XVII. Whether knowledge is an act elicited from the habit of faith.
1. Bellarmine says faith is assent, not knowledge — knowledge only a prerequisite, not faith's own act.
2. Distinguish: knowledge of terms; of the proposition as proposed; and the judgment by which we assent. The first two precede faith's assent; the third is assent itself or joined to it.
3. Justifying faith is not bare historical knowledge but fiducial assent. If Bellarmine severs faith from knowledge entirely, reject that. Orthodox: faith includes knowledge, assent, and trust.
Latin · §44
ART. XVII. An notitia sit actus ab habitu fidei elicitus. 1. Robertus Bellarminus lib.1. de justificatione cap.7. dicit, fidem non esse notitiam, sed assensum; & notitiam esse praerequisitam ad fidem, non ipsum fidei actum. 2. Distinguendum est inter notitias: (1) notitia terminorum; (2) notitia propositionis ut proponitur; (3) notitia seu judicium quo assentimur. Primae duae praerequiruntur ad assensum fidei; tertia est vel ipse assensus, vel ei intimius conjuncta. 3. Fides justificans non est nuda notitia historica, sed assensus fiducialis; ideoque Bellarmini distinctio, si eo tendat ut fidem a notitia prorsus sejungat, rejicienda est. Orthodoxi docent in fide inesse notitiam & assensum, imo & fiduciam.
Whether trust is an act of faith§45
45Article XVIII. Whether trust is an act of faith.
1. Orthodox theologians differ on trust: some identify it with faith's justifying act; some call it distinct but inseparable; some take trust in several senses.
2. Trust may mean: firm persuasion of God's mercy in Christ; resting on his promises; courageous stance against dangers and miseries; or joy and peace of conscience over remission already obtained.
3. With most Orthodox: justifying trust is an act of faith — or justifying faith essentially includes the trust by which Christ and grace's promises are applied to us. Not mere historical knowledge or bare dogmatic assent.
4. Bellarmine's claim that certainty of particular remission needs special revelation in this life is rejected. Scripture urges trust and gives the regenerate signs of their share in Christ.
Latin · §45
ART. XVIII. An fiducia sit actus fidei. 1. Theologi Orthodoxi non eodem modo loquuntur de fiducia. Alii fiduciam esse ipsum fidei actum justificantem; alii eam esse actum a fide distinctum, etsi inseparabilem; alii fiduciam pluribus modis accipi. 2. Fiducia accipi potest: (1) ut firma persuasio de DEI misericordia in CHRISTO; (2) ut recumbentia in DEI promissis; (3) ut animosa oppositio contra pericula & miserias; (4) ut gaudium & pax conscientiae de remissione jam impetrata. 3. Nos cum plerisque Orthodoxis: fiducia justificans est actus fidei — seu potius fides justificans essentialiter includit fiduciam, qua CHRISTUS & promissiones gratiae nobis applicantur. Non est mere notitia historica, nec nuda assensio dogmatica. 4. Bellarmini sententia, fiduciam certitudinis de remissione particulari non posse haberi in hac vita absque revelatione speciali, rejicitur: Scriptura fideles hortatur ad fiduciam, & signa regeneratis dat quibus de sua in CHRISTO participatione certi reddantur.
Whether trust is an act of the intellect, and how it differs from assent§46
46Article XIX. Whether trust is an act of the intellect, and how it differs from assent.
1. Is trust in the intellect or the will? Papists commonly put it in the will. Orthodox distinguish.
2. As firm persuasion about God's promise, trust is an intellective act — not really distinct from faith's assent, but in reason: assent regards the testimony's truth; trust regards the promised good as applicable to me.
3. As loving motion and the will's resting on God, trust is a will-act — inseparable from faith in the justified, formally distinct.
4. Middle Orthodox view: justifying faith as assent and persuasion is in the intellect as proper subject; it belongs to the will by origin (will-commanded), concomitance (charity), and fruits.
Latin · §46
ART. XIX. An fiducia sit actus intellectus, & quomodo differat ab assensu. 1. Quaeritur an fiducia sit in intellectu an in voluntate. Pontificii plerumque fiduciam ad voluntatem referunt. Orthodoxi distinguunt. 2. Fiducia, quatenus est firma persuasio & judicium mentis de DEI promissione, est actus intellectus, & non differt realiter ab assensu fidei, sed ratione: assensus respicit veritatem testimonii; fiducia respicit bonitatem rei promissae ut mihi applicabilis. 3. Fiducia, quatenus est amorosus in DEUM motus & recumbentia voluntatis, est actus voluntatis, a fide inseparabilis in justificato, sed formaliter distinctus. 4. Sententia Orthodоxa mediа: tota fides justificans est in intellectu tanquam in subjecto proprio quoad assensum & persuasionem; sed ad voluntatem pertinet ratione originis (a voluntate imperata), ratione concomitantiae (charitas), & ratione fructuum.
Whether the object of saving faith is remission of sins already obtained, or remission to be obtained§47
47Article XX. Whether the object of saving faith is remission of sins already obtained, or remission to be obtained.
1. Is justifying faith's object remission already had, or Christ and the promise of remission through faith?
2. With the Orthodox: the primary object is Christ the Mediator and God's promise in him. Faith justifies not by believing remission already formally inheres, but by apprehending Christ, in whom remission is offered and by faith applied.
3. Bellarmine: if faith were trust of particular remission already had, it would presuppose the justification it causes. Solved: faith does not presuppose remission as inhering before faith; it follows and applies it. The object is the promise and Christ — not remission as prior possession.
Latin · §47
ART. XX. Utrum objectum fidei salvificae sit remissio peccatorum jam impetrata? An vero sit remissio peccatorum impetranda & obtinenda: Ubi obiter solvitur praecipuum argumentum Bellarmini, contra objectum & naturam fidei justificantis. 1. Quaeritur an objectum fidei justificantis sit remissio jam habita, an potius CHRISTUS & promissio remissionis obtinendae per fidem. 2. Nos cum Orthodoxis: objectum fidei justificantis primarium est CHRISTUS Mediator, & DEI promissio in ipso; fides justificat non quia credit remissionem jam formaliter inesse, sed quia CHRISTUM apprehendit, in quo remissio offertur & per fidem applicatur. 3. Bellarmini argumentum — si fides esset fiducia remissionis particularis jam habitae, praesupponeret justificationem quam dicitur causare — solvitur: fides non praesupponit remissionem tanquam jam inhaerentem ante fidem, sed eam consequitur & applicat; objectum est promissio & CHRISTUS, non remissio tanquam praevia possessio.
Whether and how far faith belongs to the will§48
48Article XXI. Whether and how far faith belongs to the will.
1. Estius puts faith with the will; others put it wholly in the intellect. We distinguish.
2. As assent and judgment, faith is in the intellect as proper subject. It still belongs to the will: by origin (the will commands the intellect to attend and assent); by state (faith directs the will); by fruits (love, trust, obedience born from faith in the will).
3. Unlike Estius, we do not seat faith in the will by origin alone, but relate it to the will by command, concomitance, and fruits.
Latin · §48
ART. XXI. An & quatenus fides ad voluntatem pertineat. 1. Guilielmus Estius dicit fidem ad voluntatem pertinere. Alii fidem totam in intellectu collocant. Nos distinguimus. 2. Fides quoad assensum & judicium est in intellectu tanquam in subjecto proprio. Ad voluntatem tamen pertinet: (1) ratione originis — quia voluntas imperat intellectui ut attendat & assentiatur; (2) ratione status — quia fides dirigit voluntatem; (3) ratione fructuum — quia ex fide nascuntur in voluntate amor, fiducia, obedientia. 3. Haec sententia differt ab Estii, quia non refert fidem ad voluntatem ratione suae originis solius tanquam in voluntate subjectatae, sed ratione imperii, concomitantiае, & fructuum.
Whether charity is the form of faith§49
49Article XXII. Whether charity is the form of faith.
1. Papists, after some Scholastics, make charity faith's form — faith without charity unformed and dead, formed by charity unto justification.
2. Orthodox reject this. Justifying faith is not shaped by charity as an extrinsic accidental form. Living fiducial faith justifies before charity formally considered — though charity inseparably accompanies living faith.
3. Dead (merely historical) faith is not the same kind as justifying faith. It needs not charity to "form" it, but the regenerating Spirit to make it living.
Latin · §49
ART. XXII. Utrum Charitas sit forma fidei. 1. Pontificii, sequentes Scholasticos quosdam, docent charitatem esse formam fidei — ita ut fides sine charitate sit informis & mortua, & per charitatem formetur ad justificandum. 2. Orthodoxi rejiciunt: fides justificans non formatur a charitate tanquam a forma accidentali extrinseca; sed ipsa fides, quatenus est viva & fiducialis, justificat ante charitatem formaliter consideratam — quamvis charitas fidei vivae inseparabiliter concomitatur. 3. Fides mortua (historica sine fiducia) non est eadem specie cum fide justificante; non indiget charitate ut formetur, sed regenerante Spiritus operatione ut fiat viva.
Whether religion is a theological virtue distinct from faith§50
50Article XXIII. Whether religion is a theological virtue distinct from faith.
1. Aquinas makes religion a moral virtue (not theological) rendering due worship to God. Others call it a theological virtue distinct from faith.
2. Broadly, religion is whole worship of God — not really distinct from faith, hope, and charity, but their exercise toward God. Strictly, as directing worship, it can be told apart from faith, yet is not theological in the same sense as faith, hope, and charity: its formal object is due worship, not God as supernatural end by revelation.
Latin · §50
ART. XXIII. An Religio sit virtus Theologica a Fide distincta. 1. Thomas Aquinas 2.2. q.81 docet religionem esse virtutem moralem (non theologicam), qua DEO cultus debitus redditur. Alii eam virtutem theologicam a fide distinctam faciunt. 2. Nos: Religio late sumpta includit totum DEI cultum, & sic non est virtus a fide, spe, charitate realiter distincta, sed earum exercitium erga DEUM. Stricte, ut virtus specialis dirigendi cultus actus, potest a fide distingui, non tamen est virtus theologica eodem modo quo fides, spes, charitas — quia objectum ejus formale non est DEUS ut finis supernaturalis per revelationem, sed cultus debitus.
That the theology of wayfarers is taken in three ways; and that theology in the first sense is not a habit really distinct from faith§51
51Article XXIV. That the theology of wayfarers is taken in three ways; and that theology in the first sense is not a habit really distinct from faith.
1. Wayfarers' theology three ways: (1) divine faith itself believing revealed mysteries; (2) a "scientific" habit deducing theological conclusions from faith's principles (some Scholastics); (3) an aggregate from faith and philosophy — scholastic theology.
2. In the first sense theology is not really distinct from faith — it is faith itself. Other distinctions multiply habits without need.
Latin · §51
ART. XXIV. Ostenditur Theologiam Viatorum tribus modis accipi: & probatur Theologiam primo modo acceptam, non esse habitum a Fide re distinctum. 1. Theologia viatorum tribus modis accipitur: (1) pro ipsa fide divina, qua mysteria revelata credimus; (2) pro habitu scientifico quo ex principiis fidei conclusiones theologicae deducuntur — ut quidam Scholastici volunt; (3) pro habitu aggregato ex fide & disciplinis philosophicis, quo Scholastica Theologia constat. 2. Theologia primo modo accepta non est habitus a fide realiter distinctus: est ipsa fides, seu notitia fidei. Qui aliter distinguunt, multiplicant habitus sine necessitate.
Against Antonio Rubio: that theology in the second sense is not science but divine faith§52
52Article XXV. Against Antonio Rubio: that theology in the second sense is not science but divine faith.
1. Rubio calls theology (deducing from faith's principles) true science. We deny it.
2. Aristotelian science rests on self-evident, evidently seen principles. Theology's principles (articles of faith) are believed, not seen. Discourse from them yields discursive faith — a faithful conclusion — not science properly so called.
3. Theology may be called science broadly, or wisdom — not Aristotelian science strictly.
Latin · §52
ART. XXV. Probatur, contra Antonium Ruvium, Theologiam secundo modo acceptam, non esse scientiam, sed fidem divinam. 1. Antonius Ruvius asserit Theologiam (ut conclusiones ex principiis fidei deducit) esse veram scientiam. Nos negamus. 2. Scientia propria Aristotelis nititur principiis per se notis & evidenter visis. At principia Theologiae (articuli fidei) non sunt evidenter visa, sed credita. Ergo discursus theologicus ex illis non gignit scientiam proprie dictam, sed fidem discursivam seu conclusionem fidelem. 3. Dici potest Theologia esse scientia lato modo, seu sapientia; sed non scientia Aristotelica stricte.
That theology in the third sense — scholastic theology — is an aggregate habit from faith and the philosophical disciplines§53
53Article XXVI. That theology in the third sense — scholastic theology — is an aggregate habit from faith and the philosophical disciplines.
1. Scholastic theology uses faith's principles together with philosophical middles — logic, metaphysics, ethics — to explain and defend conclusions.
2. So it is not a simple habit but an aggregate of faith and philosophical habits: logic for arguments, metaphysics for being and causes, ethics for the Decalogue's virtues and vices.
Latin · §53
ART. XXVI. Probatur Theologiam tertio modo acceptam, hoc est, Theologiam Scholasticam esse habitum aggregatum ex Fide, & Philosophicis disciplinis. 1. Theologia Scholastica utitur principiis fidei & simul mediis philosophicis (logica, metaphysica, ethica) ad conclusiones explicandas & defendendas. 2. Ideo non est habitus simplex, sed aggregatum ex fide & habitibus philosophicis. Beneficio Logicae disponit argumenta; Metaphysicae explicat terminos entis & causarum; Ethicae virtutes & vitia decalogi.
That theology is like all the Aristotelian habits, and especially like prudence§54
54Article XXVII. That theology resembles every Aristotelian intellectual habit — and prudence most of all.
1. Taken broadly, theology is compared to Aristotle's five intellectual habits (understanding, science, wisdom, art, prudence). The point is analogy of office in theology's own order, not identity with those habits.
2. The closest likeness is prudence. Prudence steers human action toward an end; theology steers mind and life toward the supernatural end — God's glory and eternal salvation — by the norms God has revealed.
Latin · §54
ART. XXVII. Theologiam esse similem omnibus habitibus Aristotelicis; praecipue vero prudentiae. 1. Theologia (lato modo) assimilatur habitibus intellectualibus Aristotelis: intelligentiae, scientiae, sapientiae, arti, prudentiae — non quod sit eadem cum illis, sed quod analogice eorum munera in suo ordine impleat. 2. Praecipue assimilatur prudentiae: quia sicut prudentia dirigit actiones humanas ad finem, ita Theologia dirigit intellectum & vitam ad finem supernaturalem — DEI gloriam & salutem aeternam — secundum normas a DEO revelatas.
Whether theology is a speculative or a practical discipline§55
55Article XXVIII. Whether theology is a speculative or a practical discipline.
1. Opinions vary: merely speculative, merely practical, or mixed.
2. Wayfarers' theology is principally practical — its ultimate end is not bare contemplation but enjoyment of God through faith, hope, charity, and obedience — though it contains much that is speculative.
3. Homeland theology is more speculative or contemplative, ending in God's vision. Even in the way, theology does not shut out speculation; it orders it to the practice of piety.
Latin · §55
ART. XXVIII. Utrum Theologia sit disciplina speculativa, an practica. 1. In hac controversia variae sunt Philosophorum & Theologorum sententiae. Alii Theologiam mere speculativam; alii mere practicam; alii mixtam faciunt. 2. Nos: Theologia viatorum est principaliter practica, quia finis ejus ultimus non est nuda contemplatio, sed fruitio DEI per fidem, spem, charitatem, & obedientiam — etsi multa in ea speculativa continentur. 3. Theologia patriae est magis speculativa seu contemplativa, quia in visione DEI terminatur. Attamen etiam in via Theologia non excludit speculationem; sed ordinat eam ad praxim pietatis.
Whether the theology of wayfarers can be called speculative from the speculation or vision that will be in the homeland§56
56Article XXIX. Whether the theology of wayfarers can be called speculative from the speculation or vision that will be in the homeland.
1. Some call way-theology speculative from its end — God's vision in the homeland. That confuses way-theology with homeland theology.
2. Wayfarers' theology is not speculative from future vision as its present form — the present form is faith, not vision. It is ordered to homeland speculation as end; it is not merely speculative in the way.
Latin · §56
ART. XXIX. An Theologia Viatorum dici possit speculativa a speculatione, seu visione, qua futura est in patria. 1. Quidam Theologiam viae speculativam dicunt a fine — visione DEI in patria. Sed hoc confundit Theologiam viae cum Theologia patriae. 2. Respondemus: Theologia viatorum non est speculativa a visione futura tanquam a forma sua praesenti; nam forma praesens est fides, non visio. Dici potest ordinari ad speculationem patriae ut ad finem; sed non inde mere speculativa in via.
Whether true and properly so-called theology can be in an ungodly human being§57
57Article XXX. Whether true and properly so-called theology can be in an ungodly human being.
1. Can an ungodly person — hypocrite, heretic, or merely learned — have true theology?
2. As bare historical knowledge of articles and scholastic conclusions: yes. Demons and hypocrites know many true things about God.
3. As saving wisdom — living faith with fear of God and obedience: no. That theology is the Spirit's gift, inseparable from charity and saving faith.
4. Conclusion: theology properly so called is not in the ungodly; acquired theological knowledge and faith's history may be. End of the Third Exercise.
Latin · §57
ART. XXX. An vera & proprie dicta Theologia possit esse in homine impio, seu non regenerato. 1. Quaeritur an homo impius — hypocrita, haereticus, aut mere literatus — veram Theologiam habere possit. 2. Si Theologia sumatur pro nuda notitia historica articulorum & conclusionum Scholasticarum, potest inesse impio: daemones & hypocritaе multa vera de DEO sciunt. 3. Si Theologia sumatur proprie pro sapientia salvifica, seu fide viva conjuncta cum timore DEI & obedientia, non potest inesse impio non regenerato: quia talis Theologia est donum Spiritus Sancti, a charitate & fide salvifica inseparabilis. 4. Ideo concludimus: Theologiam proprie dictam non esse in impiis; quamvis notitiam theologicam acquisitam & historiam fidei in iis dari concedamus. FINIS Exercitationis Tertiae.