Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology · §9

Whether God, as common to the three persons, is a singular substance; and whether the three persons of the Trinity are three singular substances

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Article IX. Whether God, insofar as he is common to the three persons, is a singular substance; and whether the three persons of the Trinity are three singular substances.

1. Among the Latins, substance is so called from subsisting (as some will have it) and from standing under accidents (as others will have it). According to the latter etymology, God Most High is not a substance, but the principle and cause of all substances; but according to the former, he is most truly and most properly a substance — not indeed a universal substance, but a singular and individual one. For second substances stand in need of first substances, that they may exist in them; but God, even insofar as he is common to the three persons, stands in need of no thing in which to exist. But someone will object: God, insofar as he is common to the three persons of the Trinity, is predicable of several; therefore he is a universal, and a second substance. I answer that the definition of the universal is to be conceived thus: a universal is that which can be predicated of those things that are several according to the very name of the universal. Thus man is predicated of those that are several according to the name of man — that is, of several men. But God is indeed predicated of several persons; yet he cannot be said to be predicated of several according to the name of God — that is, of several gods. Others say that that is universal which can be predicated of several, in which it is divided and multiplied: but it comes to the same thing.

2. Second objection: no first or singular substance contains under itself other first or singular substances; but God contains under himself three persons; and each person is a singular substance. Reply: no singular substance contains under itself other singular substances numerically — that is, distinct by individual differences; yet one singular substance can contain under itself several persons that have one essence numerically, and are distinct only by modes of existing.

3. The other question proposed in the title is this: whether the three persons of the Trinity are three singular substances. The difficulty of this question is set here: that the orthodox Fathers hold the Son to be ὁμοούσιον with the Father — that is, as the Latin Church translates it, consubstantial, or of one and the same substance; so that Jerome rightly said in his Letter to Damasus, Who would dare with a sacrilegious mouth to grant three substances in God? On the contrary, since a person is a singular substance, there seem to be as many singular substances in the Godhead as there are persons in it.

4. The determination of this question can be comprised in two assertions. First: new and unused locutions are not to be employed in the mysteries of the faith; for all manners of speaking that seem to favor heretics, even in appearance, are to be avoided. Those therefore who speak of the three persons of the adorable Trinity ought not to use the aforesaid manner of speaking, saying that they are three substances — lest they seem to favor the Arians, the Macedonians, Valentinus Gentilis, and his followers. Second: that locution can in no way be admitted, but is to be rejected as openly false and tritheistic. For if the three persons are three substances, they are either three finite substances, or three infinite substances. They are not three finite or created substances, as is plain; nor yet are they three infinite substances, because there are not three gods.

5. The consequence is not valid of the argument brought on the other side. For I will give a like consequence which is plainly vicious and inept in the judgment of all: as if someone should argue in this way — Peter standing, Peter sitting, and every other aggregate of that sort, is a singular substance clothed with a certain accident; therefore as many as there are such aggregates, so many are there singular substances clothed with accidents. If (I say) someone should argue thus, the inference will be vicious: because Peter standing and Peter sitting are two such aggregates; yet they are not two singular substances, but one substance numerically and individually. Someone will ask what can rightly and legitimately be gathered from this antecedent — a person is a singular substance. It is answered that this is a just and lawful consequence: a person is a singular substance; therefore as many as there are persons, so many are there those things to each of which it belongs to be a singular substance.

Latin

ART. IX. An DEUS, ut est communis tribus personis, sit singularis substantia: & an tres personae Trinitatis, sint tres singulares substantiae. 1. Substantia apud Latinos a subsistendo (ut volunt nonnulli,) & a substando accidentibus (ut volunt alii) dicta est: juxta posteriorem Etymologiam, DEUS Opt. Max. non est substantia, sed substantiarum omnium principium, & causa: at juxta priorem, verissime & propriissime est substantia; non quidem universalis, sed singularis & individua: substantiae enim secundae indigent primis, ut in iis existant; at DEUS etiam qua communis est tribus personis, nulla re indiget, in qua existat. Sed objiciet aliquis: DEUS, ut est communis tribus personis Trinitatis, est praedicabilis de pluribus, Ergo est universalis, & secunda substantia. Respond. definitionem universalis, sic concipiendam esse; universale est id quod praedicari potest de iis quae sunt plura secundum ipsum nomen universalis: sic homo praedicatur de iis quae sunt plura secundum nomen hominis, i. e. de pluribus hominibus: at DEUS praedicatur quidem de pluribus personis, non tamen dici potest praedicari de pluribus secundum nomen DEI, i. e. de pluribus DIIS. Alii dicunt illud esse universale, quod praedicari potest de pluribus, in quibus dividitur, & multiplicatur: sed eodem res redit. 2. Secundo obj. nulla prima seu singularis substantia sub se continet alias primas, seu singulares substantias: at DEUS sub se continet tres personas; quaelibet autem persona est singularis substantia. Resp: nulla singularis substantia, sub se continet alias singulares substantias numero, h. e. differentiis individualibus distinctas, potest tamen una singularis substantia sub se continere plures personas unam numero essentiam habentes, & solis existendi modis distinctas. 3. Altera quaestio, in titulo proposita, est; an tres personae Trinitatis sint tres singulares substantiae? hujus quaestionis difficultas in hoc est posita; quod Orthodoxi Patres statuant filium esse Patri ὁμοούσιον, h. e. ut Ecclesia latina vertit, consubstantialem, sive unius & ejusdem substantiae; ut merito Hieronymus in Epistola ad Damasum dixerit, quis audeat ore sacrilego tres substantias in DEO concedere? Contra vero, cum persona sit substantia singularis, tot videntur esse singulares substantiae in Deitate, quot sunt in ea personae. 4. Hujus quaestionis determinatio duabus assertionibus comprehendi potest. Primo, novae & insolitae locutiones in mysteriis fidei non sunt usurpandae: vitandi enim sunt omnes modi loquendi qui Haereticis vel in speciem favere videntur. Qui igitur de tribus personis adorandae Trinitatis loquuntur, ii uti non debent supradicto loquendi modo, dicentes eas esse tres substantias; ne favere videantur Arianis, Macedonianis, Valentino Gentili, & ejus sectatoribus. Secundo, nullo modo admitti potest illa locutio, sed rejicienda est tanquam aperte falsa, & Tritheitica: si enim tres personae sint tres substantiae; vel sunt tres substantiae finitae, vel sunt tres substantiae infinitae: non sunt tres substantiae finitae, seu creatae, ut patet: at neque sunt tres substantiae infinitae, quia non sunt tres DII. 5. Consequentia non est valida argumenti allati in contrarium; dabo enim similem consequentiam, quae plane vitiosa & inepta est, omnium judicio: ut si hoc modo argumentetur aliquis; Petrus stans, Petrus sedens, & omne aliud ejusmodi aggregatum, est substantia singularis accidente quodam vestita; Ergo quot sunt talia aggregata, tot sunt singulares substantiae accidentibus vestitae. Si (inquam) aliquis sic argumentetur, vitiosa erit illatio: quia Petrus stans, & Petrus sedens sunt duo talia aggregata; at non sunt duae singulares substantiae, sed una numero & individua substantia. Quaeret aliquis, quid ex antecedente isto, persona est singularis substantia, recte & legitime possit colligi. Respondetur hanc esse justam, & licitam consequentiam; persona est singularis substantia, Ergo quot sunt personae, tot sunt ea quibus singulis competit esse singularem substantiam.

About this text

Robert Baron — Philosophia theologiae ancillans from the 1658 Oxford Latin. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII On Being and Essence; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV On the origin of the soul and the propagation of sin. Later Exercitationes / remainder of 213 pp remain.

English follows locked 1658 Oxford Latin. Prima Art. I-XII from IA PDF leaves ~15-53. Secunda Art. I-XV from PDF leaves 56-107 / printed pp.54-105 (tess+pdftotext+DjVu). No modern English copied. Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.

Catalogue & scope

Wing B887. IA bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_philosophia-theologi-an_baron-robert_1658. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV (De origine animae & propagatione peccati). Not whole Philosophia (213 pp). Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.

Witnesses

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This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.