Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology · §10

Whether Christ, as man, is a person; and whether Christ, as man, is everywhere

Click or tap any sentence to jump there. The side buttons skip a paragraph.

Article X. Whether Christ, insofar as he is man, is a person; and whether Christ, insofar as he is man, is everywhere.

1. These arguments seem to prove the affirmative part of the question. 1. Just as all singular oxen, horses, lions, and so on, are irrational supposita, so also all singular human beings are rational supposita, or persons: therefore Christ, insofar as he is a singular man, is a person. 2. Every complete singular substance, signified by a concrete name, is a suppositum, as all the metaphysicians teach; but Christ, insofar as he is a singular man, is such: therefore he is a suppositum; and every rational suppositum is a person. 3. A singular human being differs from his singular essence as a suppositum differs from the nature existing in the suppositum; therefore Christ, insofar as he is a singular man, is a suppositum, and consequently a person.

2. Next, if Christ, insofar as he is man, is a person, as has now been proved, he is either an immense person existing everywhere, or a finite person comprehended in a definite place. The latter cannot be admitted, because then there would be two persons in Christ, one finite and the other infinite; therefore the former must be said — namely, that Christ, insofar as he is man, is an immense person, existing in every place and beyond every place. And therefore it must be confessed not only that the proposition 'Christ the man is everywhere' is true, but also that 'Christ, insofar as he is man, is everywhere' is true.

3. That this question may be satisfied, I say first that the proposition 'Christ, insofar as he is this man, is a person' is ambiguous, and therefore to be distinguished. For as Suárez speaks on the third part of St Thomas, volume 1, question 16, article 11, that particle 'insofar as' either reduplicates the suppositum or reduplicates the nature — that is, either this is its sense: Christ, by reason of the human nature assumed by him, is a person; and so the proposition is openly false, for Christ neither has from his humanity that he is a person simply, nor has he from it any new subsistence or personality; for then there would be a double hypostasis in him; nor is it true to say that the humanity assumed by him has its own proper subsistence or personality, because it inexistes in another and does not subsist. Therefore it is to be denied that Christ is a person by reason of his human nature. Or this is its sense: Christ, insofar as he is a suppositum including human nature, is a person; and so the proposition is most true, as those three arguments placed at the threshold of the article prove; for that suppositum in which the humanity is, is a person.

4. Others answer more briefly that Christ, insofar as he is this man, includes two things — namely, the divine subsistence and the human nature — and they say that Christ, insofar as he is man, is a person with respect to the divine subsistence, which he includes materially, but not with respect to the assumed human nature, which that word 'this man' more formally and directly imports.

5. I say second that that manner of speaking — 'Christ, insofar as he is man, is a person' — is to be fled. 1. Because it seems to favor the Nestorian dogma by which two persons are attributed to Christ. 2. Because reduplication properly taken imports the proper reason or cause why the attribute is in the subject; but it is certain that the reason according to which personality belongs to Christ is not in the human nature, and therefore Christ is not sufficiently conveniently called a person insofar as he is this man. 3. Because when theologians discuss Christ and use those reduplications 'insofar as God', 'insofar as man', or 'insofar as this man', they do not look to Christ's personal subsistence, but to the nature: for they designate the nature according to which these or those attributes belong to Christ. But personality does not belong to Christ according to the human nature, and therefore that locution is unusual: 'Christ, insofar as he is this man, is a person'.

6. As for the other part of the argument, the answer is as above: Christ, insofar as he is this man, includes two things — namely, the divine subsistence and the human nature superadded to it. With respect to the divine subsistence, which he includes in a certain material way, it can be said that Christ, insofar as he is this man, is an immense person and defined by no place. With respect to the human nature, which that word 'this man' more formally and directly imports, it is rightly denied that Christ, insofar as he is this man, is an immense person existing everywhere; and that because his human nature has its particular ubi and is comprehended in a definite place.

7. For the rest, although that proposition is true in some sense, as has now been said, yet because it smells of the Ubiquitarians' error, and because the sense which the words of that proposition more evidently carry before them is absurd — namely, that Christ by reason of the human nature is immense, or that his humanity is immense — therefore it is to be rejected and carefully avoided.

Latin

ART. X. An CHRISTUS, quatenus homo, sit persona: item an CHRISTUS, quatenus homo, sit ubique. 1. Affirmativam quaestionis partem probare videntur haec argumenta. 1. Sicut omnes singulares Boves, Equi, Leones, &c. sunt supposita irrationalia; ita etiam, omnes singulares homines sunt supposita rationalia, seu personae: Ergo CHRISTUS, qua est singularis homo, est persona. 2. Omnis singularis substantia completa, & concreto nomine significata, est suppositum, ut docent omnes Metaphysici; at CHRISTUS, quatenus est singularis homo, est talis: ergo est suppositum: omne autem suppositum rationale est persona. 3. Homo singularis differt a singulari sua essentia, ut suppositum a natura in supposito existente; ergo CHRISTUS, quatenus est homo singularis, est suppositum, & proinde persona. 2. Deinde si CHRISTUS quatenus est homo, sit persona, ut jam probatum est, vel est persona immensa, & ubique existens, vel est persona finita, & certo loco comprehensa: posterius admitti non potest, quia sic in CHRISTO duae essent personae, una finita, altera infinita; ergo dicendum est prius, videlicet CHRISTUM quatenus est homo, esse personam immensam, in omni loco, & extra omnem locum existentem: & proinde non solum fatendum est, illam propositionem, CHRISTUS homo est ubique, esse veram; sed etiam illam, CHRISTUS quatenus homo, est ubique. 3. Ut huic quaestioni satisfiat, dico primo, ambiguam, & proinde distinguendam esse illam propositionem, CHRISTUS, quatenus est hic homo, est persona; nam ut loquitur Suarez in tertiam partem D. Thomae Tom. 1. quaest. 16. art. 11. illa particula quatenus, vel reduplicat suppositum, vel reduplicat naturam: h. e. vel hic est ejus sensus; CHRISTUS ratione naturae humanae ab eo assumptae est persona; & sic propositio est aperte falsa, nam CHRISTUS neque habet a sua humanitate quod sit persona simpliciter, neque ab ea habet novam aliquam subsistentiam, aut personalitatem; sic enim in eo duplex esset Hypostasis; neque verum est dicere humanitatem ab eo assumptam, suam propriam subsistentiam, aut personalitatem habere, quia ea alteri inexistit, & non subsistit: Idcirco negandum est CHRISTUM ratione naturae suae humanae esse personam: vel hic est ejus sensus: CHRISTUS quatenus est suppositum humanam naturam includens, est persona; et sic propositio est verissima, ut probant tria illa argumenta in limine articuli posita; illud enim suppositum, in quo est humanitas, est persona. 4. Alii brevius respondent, CHRISTUM, quatenus est hic homo, duo includere, videlicet subsistentiam divinam, & naturam humanam; et dicunt CHRISTUM quatenus est homo, esse personam respectu subsistentiae divinae, quam materialiter includit, non vero respectu naturae humanae assumptae, quam magis formaliter & directe importat illa vox, hic homo. 5. Dico secundo, illum modum loquendi, CHRISTUS quatenus homo est, est persona, fugiendum esse: 1. Quia Nestoriano dogmati, quo duae personae CHRISTO tribuuntur, favere videtur. 2. Quia reduplicatio proprie accepta importat propriam rationem, vel causam cur attributum insit subjecto: certum autem est rationem, secundum quam personalitas CHRISTO competit, non esse in natura humana, & proinde CHRISTUM non satis commode dici personam, quatenus est hic homo. 3. Quia Theologi, dum disserunt de CHRISTO, & utuntur illis reduplicationibus, quatenus DEUS, quatenus homo, aut quatenus hic homo, non respiciunt CHRISTI subsistentiam personalem, sed naturam: designant enim naturam, secundum quam haec vel illa attributa CHRISTO conveniunt: at personalitas non competit CHRISTO, secundum naturam humanam, ideoque insolens est illa locutio, CHRISTUS, quatenus est hic homo, est persona. 6. Quod ad alteram partem argumenti attinet, respondendum est ut supra, CHRISTUM, quatenus est hic homo, duo includere, videlicet subsistentiam divinam, & naturam humanam ei superadditam; respectu subsistentiae divinae, quam materialiter quadam ratione includit, dici potest CHRISTUS, quatenus est hic homo, esse persona immensa, & nullo loco definita: respectu naturae humanae quam magis formaliter, & directe importat illa vox, hic homo, recte negatur CHRISTUM, quatenus est hic homo, esse personam immensam, & ubique existentem; idque quia ejus natura humana habet suum particulare ubi, & certo loco comprehenditur. 7. Caeterum licet illa propositio aliquo sensu vera sit, ut jam dictum est; quia tamen Ubiquitariorum errorem redolet, quia item sensus quem verba istius propositionis evidentius prae se ferunt, est absurdus, videlicet quod CHRISTUS ratione naturae humanae sit immensus; seu quod ejus humanitas immensa sit; ideo rejicienda est, & sedulo cavenda.

About this text

Robert Baron — Philosophia theologiae ancillans from the 1658 Oxford Latin. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII On Being and Essence; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV On the origin of the soul and the propagation of sin. Later Exercitationes / remainder of 213 pp remain.

English follows locked 1658 Oxford Latin. Prima Art. I-XII from IA PDF leaves ~15-53. Secunda Art. I-XV from PDF leaves 56-107 / printed pp.54-105 (tess+pdftotext+DjVu). No modern English copied. Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.

Catalogue & scope

Wing B887. IA bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_philosophia-theologi-an_baron-robert_1658. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV (De origine animae & propagatione peccati). Not whole Philosophia (213 pp). Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.

Witnesses

Copy-text Locked Latin, Exercitatio Prima Art. I-II tip (Oxford 1658) (Latin)
Checked print IA Text PDF tip-page extract of Art. I-II (Latin)
Checked print IA DjVu OCR of the 1658 volume (Latin)
Copy-text Locked Latin, Exercitatio Prima Art. III (Oxford 1658) (Latin)
Checked print IA Text PDF page extract of Art. III (Latin)
Copy-text Locked Latin, Exercitatio Prima Art. IV (Oxford 1658) (Latin)
Copy-text Locked Latin, Exercitatio Prima Art. V (Oxford 1658) (Latin)
Checked print Tesseract OCR of Art. IV PDF pages (Latin)
Checked print Tesseract OCR of Art. V PDF pages (Latin)
Copy-text Locked Latin, Exercitatio Prima Art. VI (Oxford 1658) (Latin)
Checked print Tesseract OCR of Art. VI PDF pages (Latin)
Checked print IA Text PDF page extract of Art. VI (Latin)
Copy-text Locked Latin, Exercitatio Prima Art. VII (Oxford 1658) (Latin)
Checked print Tesseract OCR of Art. VII PDF pages (Latin)
Checked print IA Text PDF page extract of Art. VII (Latin)
Copy-text Locked Latin, Exercitatio Prima Art. VIII (Oxford 1658) (Latin)
Checked print Tesseract OCR of Art. VIII PDF pages (Latin)
Checked print IA Text PDF page extract of Art. VIII (Latin)
Copy-text Locked Latin, Exercitatio Prima Art. IX (Oxford 1658) (Latin)
Checked print Tesseract OCR of Art. IX PDF pages (Latin)
Checked print IA Text PDF page extract of Art. IX (Latin)
Copy-text Locked Latin, Exercitatio Prima Art. X (Oxford 1658) (Latin)
Checked print Tesseract OCR of Art. X PDF pages (Latin)
Checked print IA Text PDF page extract of Art. X (Latin)
Copy-text Locked Latin, Exercitatio Prima Art. XI (Oxford 1658) (Latin)
Checked print Tesseract OCR of Art. XI PDF pages (Latin)
Checked print IA Text PDF page extract of Art. XI (Latin)
Copy-text Locked Latin, Exercitatio Prima Art. XII (Oxford 1658) (Latin)
Checked print Tesseract OCR of Art. XII PDF pages (Latin)
Checked print IA Text PDF page extract of Art. XII (Latin)
Copy-text Locked Latin, Exercitatio Secunda Art. I (Oxford 1658) (Latin)
Checked print Tesseract OCR of Secunda Art. I PDF pages (Latin)
Checked print IA Text PDF page extract of Secunda Art. I (Latin)

This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.