Whether the Ubiquitarians' arguments drawn from the personal union are valid

Article XI. Whether the Ubiquitarians' arguments drawn from the personal union are valid.

1. The first objection of those who invent a certain immensity of Christ's human nature is customarily put thus: Whatever is personally joined to the whole Logos exists wherever the Logos exists; but Christ's human nature is such: therefore. The answer is that the proposition is openly false; for from the personal union of the two natures in Christ it no more follows that the humanity is wherever the Deity is, than from the substantial union of our soul with the matter of the head it follows that the matter of the head is wherever the soul is — that is, that it is in the foot, because the soul is in the foot: I say that it is substantially joined to the whole soul, because the whole soul is in the whole body, and whole in each of its parts. If therefore the Ubiquists argue well and acutely when they construct such a syllogism, this argumentation will be good and effective: What is substantially joined to the whole soul exists wherever the soul exists; but the matter of the head is substantially joined to the whole soul: therefore it is wherever the soul is; but the soul is in the matter of the foot; therefore the matter of the head also is in the matter of the foot.

2. Second objection. The union of the two natures in Christ was made indivisibly and without interval: therefore one of them does not exist except where the other exists — that is, they coexist in all places. Answer: the adverbs 'inseparably' and 'indistantly', when used to explain the manner in which those natures are united in the person of the Logos, have a twofold use. First they are used to refute Nestorius's error, who not only distinguished these natures but divided and separated them, assigning to each nature its own proper hypostasis, and therefore did not join them into one hypostasis. Second, that we may know that that union is indissoluble, and that these natures, once they have been joined, can never be disjoined or separated. We therefore deny that consequence: the human and divine natures are indissolubly and inseparably joined in one person; therefore wherever one of them exists, there the other also exists. The reason is that by the distinction of the local presence of the two natures their union is not dissolved, but rather the truth of the natures is asserted and confusion is removed.

3. Someone will press first: If one of those natures exists there where the other does not exist, then one of them is separated from the other; but the former is true: therefore the latter also. Answer by denying the connection: for the human soul, which is whole in the matter of the head, is also whole in the other members in which the matter of the head does not exist; yet the union of the soul with the matter of the head is not by this means dissolved: for, as all know, the soul is torn away and separated from the head and the remaining members only by the death of the human being. Second instance: The soul, which exists whole in the matter of the head and whole outside it, is not united to the head by an adequate and complete union, but is united to it as to a partial and incomplete matter; whereas by an adequate and complete union it is united to the whole body, because the soul is so whole in the whole body that in no way is it outside it. Therefore, since on the Calvinists' view the whole Deity exists in the humanity and also whole outside it, the union of the Logos with the humanity will not be adequate and complete. Answer: the reason is unequal. For the union of the soul with the matter of the head is called incomplete because it is not a union of whole with whole — that is, of the whole form with the whole matter, but with a part of it; but the union of the Logos with the human nature is of whole with whole — that is, of the whole Deity of Christ with his whole humanity, in one hypostasis. The true reason, therefore, why the union of the soul with the matter of the head is inadequate is not that the soul exists outside the matter of the head, but that it is not a union of whole with whole — that is, of the integral form with the integral matter. Wherefore it is not that the Ubiquitarians should object against us that we dissolve the person of Christ, tear apart his natures, and invent an inadequate conjunction of natures for him; on the contrary, we grieve and marvel that such feeble arguments, such childish absurdities, could please and impose upon men distinguished for learning.

4. Third objection. The second person of the Trinity, after he assumed human nature, is always and everywhere GOD INCARNATE: therefore he is nowhere UN-INCARNATE, as Philip Nicolai insolently speaks. Answer: that argument concludes nothing against us, and therefore the whole of it can be admitted. For since the incarnation of God, once posited, consists in the assumption of human nature and its hypostatic conjunction with the divine, it is necessary that 'excarnation' (to speak with Philip Nicolai) signify the depositing, deserting, and dissolving of the union already made: but far be it from us to say that the most blessed Logos anywhere deposits, strips off, or expels from his hypostasis the flesh which he assumed in the Virgin's womb. Someone will press first: if the Logos exists outside the flesh, then he is somewhere un-incarnate; but the former is true on your view; therefore you are bound to admit the latter also. Answer by denying that connection; for just as the whole human soul exists outside the matter of the head with its union to the matter of the head preserved, so also the whole Logos exists both in the flesh and outside the flesh with his personal union to the human nature preserved; and therefore 'to be outside the flesh' does not necessarily infer excarnation, or the dissolution of that personal union. Matthias Martinius, a most acute theologian, answering an argument of this kind proposed by Balthasar Mentzer, says that the little word 'outside' is ambiguous; and that sometimes it is equivalent to 'beyond' — that is, it denies the inclusion of one thing in another; but sometimes it imports separation and denies union. In the former way he says the Logos exists outside the flesh assumed by him, but not in the latter way.

5. Someone will press second: If the Logos, in the former way, is outside the humanity, then somewhere he will not be man; but the Logos is nowhere not man: therefore he is nowhere outside the humanity. The assumption is proved: the Logos is always and everywhere man, for he is always and everywhere the God-man. Answer: Although Saint Thomas, and with him nearly all the scholastic theologians, think that proposition 'the Logos is everywhere man' simply false, yet I judge that a distinction is to be applied. For either this is its sense: the Logos everywhere is a person having human nature united to himself; or this is its sense: the Logos is a person having human nature united to himself everywhere, and therefore locally present to himself everywhere. In the former sense the proposition is true and is admitted by us, because it does not contradict our position; but in the latter it is plainly false, and therefore is never admitted by us. That there is a huge difference between these two senses of that proposition is clear from these examples: 'A husband everywhere, or wherever he exists, is a man having a wife' is a true proposition; but this, 'a husband is everywhere, or in all places, having a wife', is a false proposition. Likewise this, 'A master everywhere is a man having a servant', is a true proposition; but this, 'A master is a man, everywhere having a servant'.

6. Someone will press third: If the Logos does not have human nature united to himself everywhere and locally coexisting, then whole Christ is not everywhere, but only one of his natures, namely the Deity; but the latter is absurd: therefore the former also. Answer by denying the connection of the proposition; for from the antecedent of that connected proposition it follows well that the whole of Christ — that is, all the parts of Christ — is not everywhere; but it does not follow well that whole Christ is not everywhere. Why Doctor Jacob Andreae, and with him the remaining Ubiquitarians, should repudiate this distinction, I greatly wonder. For whole Christ is man, but not the whole of Christ; whole Christ suffered, died, and rose again; but not the whole of Christ — that is, both of his natures.

7. Someone will press fourth: Christ is not whole without the humanity: therefore if whole Christ is everywhere, the humanity of Christ is everywhere. Answer by denying the sequel; for the consequence of that argument is plainly ridiculous and unworthy of refutation, as is clear from these examples which contain a like consequence: Whole Christ is not without the Deity: therefore if whole Christ suffered and died, the Deity also suffered and died. Likewise, Christ is not whole without his foot: therefore if whole Christ is a man, the foot of Christ is a man.