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Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology · §5

Explanation of being, essence, existence, subsistence, suppositum, and person

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Article V. An explanation of these words: Being, Essence, Existence, Subsistence, Suppositum, and Person.

1. Essence is accustomed to be described by the philosophers in various ways. First, thus: the essence of a thing is that which is explained by the definition. Second, thus: essence is that through which a thing is constituted in a definite genus of being and is distinguished from all others. Third, thus: essence is the first, radical, and intimate principle of all the actions and properties of a thing. For example, the principles of many human operations are habits existing in the souls of men; the principles of the habits are natural potencies flowing from the essence; the principle of the potencies is human nature or essence; but human essence itself, consisting of soul and body, has no productive and effective principle of itself existing in the man — that is, nothing can be found in the man himself from which his essence flows or is caused. I said that it has no effective principle existing in the man, because it is certain that it has constitutive principles, both physical and metaphysical. Since therefore the natural potencies of things, and the operations of the potencies, draw their origin from the essence, while the essence has no efficient cause prior to itself in that thing whose essence it is, it is rightly called the first, radical, and intimate principle of all the properties and actions of the thing.

2. Finally, essence can not inconveniently be described thus: essence is that which belongs to a thing most necessarily and first of all. I say "most necessarily" to exclude common accidents, which are contingently present to that thing whose accidents they are. I say "first of all" to exclude proper accidents, which, although they belong necessarily to their subject, do not yet inhere in it first; rather the essence inheres first, from which they flow. This, then, is the general rule: whatever inheres in a thing most necessarily, first of all, and intimately, that is the essence of the thing; but whatever inheres either contingently, or on account of another from which it flows — and likewise whatever is adventitious and not intimate — that is something superadded to the essence, not the essence itself.

3. Existence differs from essence chiefly in office and function. For the office of essence is to constitute a thing in a definite genus of being and to distinguish it from all others. Thus a man through his essence, inasmuch as he is a rational animal, is distinguished from all other beings. But the office of existence is to bring it about that a thing having such an essence is outside its causes (as the metaphysicians speak), or rather, that it is outside the virtue and productive potency of causes. For when a thing does not exist, it is said to be in the potency of its causes, because it is producible by its causes and can exist through their effective potency; but when it has been produced in act and has received the act of existing, it is no longer in the effective potency of the causes, but has been led out from the state of potentiality into the state of actuality. While that state lasts, it is not producible through the potency of the causes; for it must perish, and lose the act of existing which it already has, before it can again be produced by its causes and receive existence.

4. This office of existence differs from the office of essence in that the office of essence in all things is stable and perpetual; whereas the office of existence in some things is subject to various changes, because existence itself is now present, now absent. For example, the existence of a rose, or of thunder, at certain times exercises its office, but at other times does not — as in winter, when the rose or thunder are in the potency of their causes, as they say. By contrast, the essence of these and similar things perpetually exercises its office: for whether a rose exists or not, a rose is a flower, by nature and essentially distinct from all other flowers; and the physicists have science of the rose even when it does not exist, because they know the rose to be a flower distinct from other flowers not only by nature or essence but also by properties, virtue, and efficacy. For it is not to be thought that when a rose does not exist it loses its essential distinction from other flowers, or is confused with them as to essence. From these things this definition of existence can be gathered: Existence is a mode superadded to essence, bringing it about that a thing having that essence is outside its causes in the world.

5. These words — essence and existence — having been explained, it is easy to know what Being is. For Being differs from essence and existence as a concrete from two abstracts; and likewise as that which has, from those things which are had from it. For Being is nothing other than that which has essence, or existence. It is to be noted here that Being is taken in two ways, participially and nominally, as they speak. Being, as it is the participle of the verb "to be," signifies that which is existing in act; but Being, inasmuch as it is a verbal noun, signifies that which has an essence capable of existence, whether it exists in act or not; and as Suarez speaks, it signifies being itself, not as exercised in act, but in potency or aptitude. Thus "living," as it is a participle, signifies the actual use of life; but as it is a noun, it signifies only that which has that essence which can be a principle of vital operation.

6. Subsistence properly, and taken in the third signification, agrees with existence in this, that neither this nor that is Being itself, or the essence of Being, but a mode of Being. Yet it differs from it, first, in that existence extends more widely than subsistence: for the former belongs to all things, both substances and accidents; the latter belongs only to singular complete substances, inasmuch as they are signified by concrete names — to this man, this horse, this lion. For as I warned in the previous article, this singular humanity or this singular horseness do not subsist, but exist in their supposita and by their benefit.

7. From these things that have already been said we can gather that, in any singular substance signified by a concrete name, these three acts can be discerned: first, the act of the singular essence, through which that substance is such an individual, distinct from all others; second, the act of existence, through which the substance that has such a singular essence is outside its causes in the world; third, the act of subsistence, through which it is so outside its causes that it does not inexist, or lean upon another, but underlies those that inexist in it, and is supposed under them — whence, as was said above, it is called a suppositum.

8. The suppositum is easily known once the nature of subsistence is known; for a suppositum is nothing other than that which has subsistence, thus superadded to essence and existence — or that which, in the act of existing, leans upon no other, but is laid under and supposed by other things that lean upon it. It can also be explained thus: a suppositum is that which is in no way communicable to many, and likewise in no way can inhere in another, after the manner of a part or of a form. Therefore Peter's singular humanity is not a suppositum, because it is truly said to be in Peter; likewise the human nature of Christ is not a suppositum, for the same reason; but Peter himself is a suppositum, because he does not inhere in another as a part in a whole, an accident in a subject, or a nature in that which has a nature. In the same way Christ, and any other person of the Trinity, is a suppositum for the same reason. Accidents are not supposita, whether they are universal or singular, because they inhere in and lean upon their subjects. Universal substances also are not supposita, because they are communicated to singulars and inhere in them. Finally the glorious God, insofar as he is common, in an ineffable way, to the three persons of the Trinity, is not a suppositum — and that because it belongs to the account of a suppositum that it cannot be communicated, or inhere in another suppositum; but God, or the Godhead, is communicated and inheres in the three persons of the Trinity.

9. Person differs from suppositum in this, that every person is a suppositum, but not every suppositum is a person: for a person is nothing other than a suppositum endowed with reason — whence it is described by Boethius thus: It is an individual substance of a rational nature. Therefore suppositum in general is divided into rational and irrational. A rational suppositum is called a person; an irrational suppositum, as this horse, this stone, does not have a peculiar name imposed upon it. Person is divided into created and uncreated. The uncreated persons are three: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. A created person is either angelic, as Gabriel, Michael; or human, as Peter, John.

Latin

ART. V. Explicatio istarum vocum, Ens, Essentia, Existentia, Subsistentia, Suppositum, & Persona. 1. ESSENTIA variis modis a Philosophis describi solet. 1. sic; Essentia rei est id quod definitione explicatur. 2. sic; Essentia est id, per quod res constituitur in certo genere Entis, &.ab omnibus aliis distinguitur. 3. sic; Essentia est primum ac radicale &.intimum principium omnium rei actionum, &.proprietatum: e g. multarum operationum humanarum principia sunt habitus in animis hominum existentes: habituum principia sunt potentiae naturales ab essentia fluentes: potentiarum principium est natura seu essentia humana: ipsa vero essentia humana, ex anima &.corpore constans, nullum habet principium sui productivum &.effectivum, in homine existens: h. e. nihil in ipso homine inveniri potest, a quo profluat, aut causetur ejus essentia. Dixi eam nullum habere principium effectivum, in homine existens, quia certum est, eam habere principia constitutiva, tum Physica, tum Metaphysica. Cum igitur rerum potentiae naturales, potentiarumque operationes, ab essentia originem suam trahant; essentia vero nullam habeat causam efficientem se priorem, in ea re, cujus est essentia, merito ea dicitur primum, ac radicale, &.intimum principium omnium rei proprietatum, &.actionum. 2. Denique essentia sic non incommode describi potest; Essentia est id, quod summe necessario, omnium primo, rei convenit. Dico summe necessario, ad excludenda accidentia communia, quae contingenter adsunt illi rei cujus accidentia sunt. Dico omnium primo, ad excludenda propria accidentia, quae licet necessario conveniant suo subjecto, non tamen primo ei insunt, sed prius inest essentia, a qua dimanant. Haec igitur est generalis regula: Quicquid summe necessario, omnium primo, &.intime rei inest, illud est rei essentia: quicquid vero aut contingenter inest, aut propter aliud a quo profluit; quicquid item est adventitium, &.non intimum, illud est aliquid essentiae superadditum, non vero ipsa essentia. 3. Existentia praecipue ab essentia differt munere, &.officio: essentiae enim munus est, rem in certo genere entis constituere, eamque ab aliis omnibus distinguere. Sic homo per essentiam suam, quatenus nimirum est animal rationale, ab omnibus aliis entibus distinguitur. At existentiae munus est, efficere ut res, talem essentiam habens, sit extra causas suas, (ut loquuntur Metaphysici) aut potius, ut sit extra causarum virtutem, &.potentiam productivam: res enim cum non existit, dicitur esse in potentia causarum suarum, quia est producibilis a causis suis, &.per earum potentiam effectivam existere potest: at ubi actu producta est, &.existendi actum accepit, non amplius est in causarum potentia effectiva, sed educta est ex statu potentialitatis in statum actualitatis; durante eo statu, non est per causarum potentiam producibilis; oportet enim eam perire, &.existendi actum, quem jam habet, amittere, priusquam a causis suis, denuo produci, &.existentiam accipere queat. 4. Differt hoc officium existentiae ab officio essentiae, quod essentiae munus in omnibus rebus sit stabile &.perpetuum: contra vero, existentiae munus in quibusdam sit variis mutationibus obnoxium, quia ipsa nunc adest, nunc abest: e. gr. existentia rosae, aut tonitrus, quibusdam temporibus exercet suum munus, aliis vero temporibus non exercet; ut hyeme, cum rosa, aut tonitrus sunt in causarum suarum potentia, ut loquuntur. Contra vero, harum &.similium rerum essentia suum munus perpetuo exercet: sive enim rosa existat, sive non, rosa est flos, natura &.essentialiter ab omnibus aliis floribus distinctus: &.Physici habent scientiam de rosa, etiam cum non existit: quia norunt rosam esse florem ab aliis floribus distinctum, non solum natura seu essentia, sed etiam proprietatibus, virtute, &.efficacia: non enim putandum est, rosam cum non existit, amittere essentiale suum discrimen ab aliis floribus, aut cum iis quoad essentiam confundi. Ex his colligi potest haec definitio existentiae: Existentia est modus essentiae superadditus, efficiens ut res eam essentiam habens, sit extra suas causas in mundo. 5. Explicatis his vocibus, Essentia, &.existentia, facile est scire quid sit Ens: differt enim Ens ab essentia, &.existentia, ut concretum a duobus abstractis: item ut id quod habet, ab iis quae ab eo habentur: nihil enim aliud est Ens, quam id quod habet essentiam, aut existentiam. Notandum hic est, Ens duobus modis accipi, participialiter &.nominaliter, ut loquuntur. Ens, ut est participium verbi sum, significat id, quod est actu existens: Ens vero, quatenus est nomen verbale, significat id, quod habet essentiam, existentiae capacem, sive actu existat, sive non: &.ut loquitur Suarez, significat ipsum esse, non ut exercitum actu, sed in potentia, vel aptitudine. Sic vivens, ut est participium, significat actualem usum vitae: ut vero est nomen, significat id solum, quod habet eam essentiam, quae potest esse vitalis operationis principium. 6. Subsistentia proprie, &.in tertio significatu accepta, in hoc convenit cum existentia, quod neque haec, neque illa, sit ipsum Ens, aut essentia Entis, sed modus Entis: differt tamen ab ea, primo, quod existentia latius pateat, quam subsistentia: illa enim competit omnibus, tum substantiis, tum accidentibus; haec vero convenit solis substantiis singularibus completis, quatenus concretis nominibus significantur — huic homini, huic equo, huic leoni: nam ut superiori articulo monui, haec humanitas singularis aut haec equinitas singularis, non subsistunt, sed in suis suppositis &.earum beneficio existunt. Secundo, differunt existentia et subsistentia ratione muneris, seu officii sui; munus enim existentiae est efficere, ut res aliqua actu sit in mundo, extra causarum virtutem, aut potentiam: munus vero subsistentiae est, efficere, ut res nullo modo possit esse in alio, vel ut pars in toto, vel tanquam accidens in subjecto, vel tanquam natura seu essentia, in eo quod habet essentiam. Tertio, differunt ut determinans et determinatum; sicut enim essentia est ex se indifferens ad existere et non existere, ita existentia est ex se indifferens ad esse in alio, et esse per se, seu subsistere: h.e. existentia est indifferens ad modum existendi innitendo alteri ut sustentanti, et ad modum existendi per se, sine dependentia ab alio recipiente et sustentante. Subsistentia igitur sic describi potest: Subsistentia est modus existentiae superadditus, a quo res habet, quod non in alio, sed per se existere possit. Unde a quibusdam dicitur omnimoda perseitas existendi. 7. Ex his, quae jam dicta sunt, colligere possumus, in qualibet singulari substantia, concreto nomine significata, tres hos actus cerni posse: primo, actum essentiae singularis, per quem substantia ea est tale individuum, ab omnibus aliis distinctum; secundo, actum existentiae, per quem substantia talem singularem essentiam habens, est extra causas suas in mundo; tertio, actum subsistentiae, per quem ea ita est extra causas suas, ut non inexistat, aut innitatur alteri, sed aliis ei inexistentibus substet, et supponatur; unde, ut supra dictum est, suppositum appellatur. 8. Suppositum facile jam cognita natura subsistentiae; nihil enim aliud est suppositum, quam id quod subsistentiam habet, sic essentiae et existentiae superadditam: seu id, quod in existendi actu nulli alteri innititur, sed aliis rebus ei innitentibus substernitur, et supponitur. Potest etiam sic explicari: suppositum est id, quod nullo modo est communicabile pluribus, nullo item modo alteri inesse potest, ad modum partis, aut formae. Singularis igitur humanitas Petri non est suppositum, quia vere dicitur esse in Petro: item natura humana CHRISTI non est suppositum, ob eandem rationem: at ipse Petrus est suppositum, quia non inest alteri, tanquam pars in toto, accidens in subjecto, aut natura in eo quod naturam habet. Similiter CHRISTUS, et quaelibet alia persona Trinitatis, est suppositum ob eandem rationem. Accidentia non sunt supposita, sive sint universalia, sive singularia, quia subjectis suis insunt et innituntur. Substantiae etiam universales non sunt supposita, quia singularibus communicantur, et iis insunt. Denique DEUS gloriosus, quatenus est communis, ineffabili modo, tribus personis Trinitatis, non est suppositum; idque quia est de ratione suppositi, quod non possit communicari, aut inesse alteri supposito: at DEUS, aut Deitas, communicatur, et inest tribus personis Trinitatis. 9. Persona in hoc differt a supposito, quod omnis persona sit suppositum, sed non omne suppositum sit persona: persona enim nihil est aliud, quam suppositum ratione praeditum: unde a Boetio sic describitur; Est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Quare suppositum in genere dividitur in rationale et irrationale. Suppositum rationale appellatur persona: suppositum irrationale, ut hic equus, hic lapis, non habet peculiare nomen sibi impositum. Persona dividitur in creatam et increatam. Personae increatae sunt tres, Pater, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus. Persona creata, vel est Angelica, ut Gabriel, Michael; vel humana, ut Petrus, Johannes.

About this text

Robert Baron — Philosophia theologiae ancillans from the 1658 Oxford Latin. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII On Being and Essence; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV On the origin of the soul and the propagation of sin. Later Exercitationes / remainder of 213 pp remain.

English follows locked 1658 Oxford Latin. Prima Art. I-XII from IA PDF leaves ~15-53. Secunda Art. I-XV from PDF leaves 56-107 / printed pp.54-105 (tess+pdftotext+DjVu). No modern English copied. Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.

Catalogue & scope

Wing B887. IA bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_philosophia-theologi-an_baron-robert_1658. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV (De origine animae & propagatione peccati). Not whole Philosophia (213 pp). Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.

Witnesses

This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.