Whether in creatures the suppositum and its singular nature really differ

Article VI. Whether, in creatures, the suppositum and its singular nature really differ.

1. I have not resolved here to air that celebrated controversy concerning the distinction and diversity of essence from existence — whether namely it is real, or of reason alone. For that question has no usefulness in theology, and is more thorny and more difficult than can be grasped by those who are raw and beginners in metaphysics. Yet concerning the distinction of subsistence and of nature or essence I will say a few things: for the determination of that question has a notable use in theology.

2. This question is accustomed to be proposed in two ways. First, thus: whether, in created supposita, subsistence is something positive and really distinct from the singular essence to which it is superadded — or whether it is not. Second, thus: whether the suppositum and its singular nature really differ — for example, whether Peter and his singular human nature are in truth the same, or whether Peter, as Peter, includes something real and really diverse from his singular nature. Whether the question is proposed in this way or in that, it is the same controversy; and therefore I briefly answer that Peter and his singular nature really differ, as the including and the included, or as the composite and its constitutive principle. For every created suppositum, as Peter, includes the singular nature and something superadded to it — namely subsistence; or (to speak more plainly) every created suppositum is really composed of the singular essence and the subsistence superadded to it, which some call suppositality, others personality. If therefore we compare the suppositum to the singular nature, they are distinguished as whole and part; but if we institute the comparison between the singular nature itself and subsistence — as between Peter's singular human nature and Peter's subsistence or personality — then they are contradistinguished from each other as two extremes composing that created suppositum, namely Peter. But that this sentence may be established, first it must be proved that subsistence, or suppositality, is not a mere negation, as Scotus opines, but is something positive constituting Peter together with the singular nature, insofar as he is a suppositum. Second, that that positive thing differs not by reason alone but really from the singular nature with which it constitutes Peter. From this I will then manifestly infer that Peter really differs from his singular human nature, and that his human nature is truly and properly said to be in him. For if Peter, insofar as he is Peter, or insofar as he is a certain particular human person, includes these two — namely his singular humanity and his personality — as two constitutive principles really distinct, it is necessary that his singular humanity really differ from him, and be in him as truly as either his matter or his form is said to be in him.

3. Scotus, in book 3 of the Sentences, distinction 1, question 1, says that every suppositum, besides the singular nature, also includes subsistence, but he asserts that subsistence is a mere negation of the aptitude or potency of being in another suppositum. For singular natures have a potency of existing in a suppositum; but the suppositum itself, as Peter, cannot be in any other suppositum; and therefore on his view the suppositum, as such, is constituted by the negation of this potency of existing in a suppositum. This sentence is rightly rejected by Francisco Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations 34, section 2. First, because the subsistence which the suppositum adds to the singular nature is a certain substantial perfection; but a mere negation cannot be a substantial perfection; therefore a mere negation is not subsistence. Second, if subsistence, or personality, were a mere negation, the three persons of the Trinity would be constituted in their personal being, and would be distinguished from one another, by negation alone — for they are distinguished by their subsistences or personalities; but this is absurd, and plainly destroys the mystery of the Trinity. Therefore subsistence is not a mere negation, but something positive superadded to the singular essence for constituting the suppositum.

4. It must now be proved against Durandus, in book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 34, that subsistence is something really diverse from the essence or singular nature of created substances (for concerning God one must think far otherwise). And that is clearly shown by this reason: the Word assumed a singular human nature, but did not assume a human suppositum or human person — for thus he would not be one simple person, but twin. Therefore the human suppositum and its singular nature are really diverse; and therefore something is in truth included in the human suppositum besides its singular nature; and this can be nothing other than subsistence, or personality.

5. This reason is also accustomed to be proposed thus: those things which can be really separated are not really the same; but subsistence can be separated from the singular nature; therefore they are not really the same. The assumption is proved: the Word assumed a singular human nature; but he did not assume human personality or human subsistence, as all theologians confess; therefore they can be separated. This reason not only proves that subsistence really differs from the specific nature, which is common to all individuals, but also from the individual or singular nature; and therefore that their sentence is openly false who say that Peter's subsistence or personality is his individual difference. For Christ did not assume human nature in common, but a singular humanity; and he did not assume a singular person. In truth, therefore, the singular person differs from the singular nature, and includes something that is not included in the singular nature — namely subsistence and personality.

6. By these two reasons it is clearly proved that every suppositum, besides its singular nature, includes something positive really distinct from that nature — namely subsistence; and on that account that every created suppositum is really composed of its singular nature and subsistence, which others call suppositality. Someone will say: if subsistence is something real, really distinct from essence, it is either matter, or form, or the composite itself, or some accident of it. I answer: that which in the constitution of the suppositum is superadded to the singular nature is not some being properly so called, but a mode of being; and therefore it is neither matter, nor form, nor the composite, nor an accident of it.