Why philosophers attribute composition from essence and existence, and from essence and subsistence, to created substances but not to God
Article VII. What is the cause why philosophers attribute composition from essence and existence, and likewise from essence and subsistence, to created substances, but not to God.
1. Created singular substances can be considered in three ways, as was said above. First, insofar as they have such an essence. Second, insofar as they are beings actually existing in the world. Third, insofar as they have such a mode of existing, or insofar as they are supposita. If they are considered in the first way, they have composition from the physical parts of their essence, and from the metaphysical parts of the same: for example, if Socrates is considered insofar as he is a man, he is physically constituted from his matter and form; likewise metaphysically, or logically, from genus and difference — that is, from animal and rational. If singular substances are considered in the second way, they include two things, namely essence and existence, which according to our way of conceiving stand as potency and act, as I explained above: and therefore, since from potency and act there is always made some composite that is one through itself, we rightly say that singular substances so considered are composed from essence and existence — that is, from nature and the act of existing. Thus Peter, insofar as he is a man actually existing in the world, includes these two: human nature, and the act of existing; he includes them (I say) as two principles from which he is constituted.
2. If created singular substances are considered in the third way — that is, if they are considered insofar as they are supposita, not only having an essence actually existing in the world, but also such a mode of existing, namely through itself and not in another — if (I say) they are so considered, they include two things, namely an essence actually existing, and subsistence, or the mode of existing through itself, superadded to that existing essence: but the essence or singular nature of a created substance is potency with respect to subsistence, and subsistence is its act superadded to it and perfecting it; and therefore from an essence or nature actually existing, and from subsistence superadded to it, we rightly say that something one through itself comes to be — namely the suppositum itself. Thus Peter, insofar as he is such a person, includes a singular essence, through which he is a singular being, and a singular subsistence, through which he is a singular person.
3. Someone will ask what the cause is why these three compositions are not attributed to God: since essence, existence, and subsistence or personality are found in all the persons of the Trinity, no less than in human and angelic persons — for each person of the Trinity has its essence and existence, common to it with the remaining persons of the Trinity; it also has its own proper subsistence, or personality, through which it differs from the remaining persons. The answer is that none of their composition can be attributed to God, his simplicity being preserved, and likewise the infinite perfection and dignity of that most glorious nature. But this will become plain if we consider and weigh those compositions one by one and apart.
4. First, then, essential composition, both physical and metaphysical, is to be removed from God: the former indeed, because it overturns a spiritual nature; the latter, because God is contained under no univocal genus, as will afterwards be proved (God favoring) in the questions concerning God. Second, composition from essence and existence is removed from God for two reasons: first, because for every composition, whether it be real or of reason, it is required that one thing be superadded to another for the constitution of some third; but existence is neither in truth, nor according to our way of conceiving, something superadded to the essence of God, but rather is something included in God's essence itself, as I declared in Article II. Therefore the existence of God cannot concur with his essence to constitute some third thing. Second, composition from essence and existence is attributed to created substances because their being so stands as potency, and existence as an act superadded to it; but the essence of God cannot be called potency with respect to the divine existence, because it includes existence in itself, as was said in the place already cited: and no potency includes its act in itself, but is directed to its act as to something further and external.
5. Concerning the third composition, which is that of supposita from singular nature and subsistence, there is greater hesitation: for it seems that it ought to be attributed to God, because each person of the Trinity includes these two: the divine essence, which is common to all three persons; and its particular personality, through which it is distinguished from the remaining two persons; therefore it is composed from these two. If you reply that some person is not composed from nature and subsistence because subsistence is something included in God's essence itself, just as was already said of existence, you will easily be refuted: for if the subsistence or personality of the Father were of his essence, it would be common to the whole Trinity, just as his essence itself also is. But this is absurd: therefore that too. Concerning this controversy I will set out my mind in several assertions.
6. Assertion 1. The subsistence, or personality, of the Father (let the same be said of the hypostasis of the Son and of the Holy Spirit) does not differ from his essence by any kind of real diversity, neither as a thing from a thing, nor as a mode of a thing from a thing, but differs from it by a distinction of reason alone. This assertion is proved thus: first, whatever is in God is God. Therefore nothing is in God that in truth, and on the side of the thing (as they say), differs from his Godhead. Second, if the person of the Father is really composed from his essence and subsistence or personality, two absurdities will follow: First, that God the Father is not, absolutely speaking and in the highest degree, simple; for the highest simplicity takes away every composition, and above all a real one: second, that the Godhead is a part of some thing; but every part is something incomplete, and less perfect than that whole of which it is a part.
7. Assertion 2. God is not composed from nature and subsistence by such a composition as is seen in created substances. This assertion plainly follows and is inferred from the preceding: for if God is not really composed from nature and subsistence, he does not have such a composition from nature and subsistence as created substances have; for these are composed from nature and subsistence as from two principles distinct in the thing itself, and therefore their composition is real.
8. Assertion 3. Although the subsistence of the Father is not of his essence, but according to our way of conceiving is something superadded to his essence, it is nevertheless not lawful to say that the Father's person is composed from those two by a composition of reason; indeed we ought not to conceive those two in the Father as two parts composing him: for when we conceive the Godhead as a part of some thing, we form an enormous concept of God, and we invent for God an imperfection that is not small. Wherefore the modesty of those seems praiseworthy and to be imitated, who piously think and profess that essence and personality are included in the person of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, not by way of composition, but by way of an ineffable conjunction or union.
Latin
ART. VII. Quae sit causa cur compositionem ex essentia et existentia, item ex essentia et subsistentia, creatis substantiis, non autem DEO tribuant Philosophi. 1. Substantiae creatae singulares tribus modis possunt considerari, ut supra dictum est. Primo, quatenus habent talem essentiam. Secundo, quatenus sunt entia actu existentia in mundo. Tertio, quatenus habent talem existendi modum, seu quatenus sunt supposita. Si primo modo considerentur, habent compositionem ex suae essentiae partibus Physicis, et ejusdem partibus Metaphysicis: e.g. si Socrates consideretur quatenus est homo, Physice constituitur ex materia et forma sua; item Metaphysice, aut Logice, ex genere et differentia; h.e. ex animali et rationali. Si singulares substantiae secundo modo considerentur, duo includunt, videlicet essentiam et existentiam, quae secundum nostrum concipiendi modum se habent ut potentia et actus, ut supra explicavi: ideoque cum ex potentia et actu semper fiat compositum aliquod unum per se, merito dicimus singulares substantias sic consideratas, esse compositas ex essentia et existentia; h.e. ex natura et existendi actu. Sic Petrus quatenus est homo actu existens in mundo, haec duo includit: naturam humanam, et existendi actum; includit (inquam) tanquam duo principia ex quibus constituitur. 2. Si singulares substantiae creatae tertio modo considerentur, i.e. si considerentur quatenus sunt supposita, non solum habentia essentiam actu existentem in mundo, sed etiam talem modum existendi, nimirum per se et non in alio; si (inquam) sic considerentur, duo includunt, videlicet essentiam actu existentem, et subsistentiam, seu modum per se existendi, illi essentiae existenti superadditum: essentia autem seu natura singularis substantiae creatae est potentia respectu subsistentiae, et subsistentia est ejus actus ei superadditus, eamque perficiens; ideoque ex essentia seu natura actu existente, et subsistentia ei superaddita, merito dicimus fieri aliquod unum per se; videlicet ipsum suppositum. Sic Petrus, quatenus est talis persona, includit singularem essentiam, per quam est singulare Ens; et singularem subsistentiam, per quam est persona singularis. 3. Quaeret aliquis, quae sit causa, cur istae tres compositiones DEO non attribuantur: cum essentia, existentia, et subsistentia seu personalitas, in omnibus personis Trinitatis inveniantur, non minus quam in personis humanis et Angelicis: quaelibet enim persona Trinitatis suam habet essentiam et existentiam, sibi cum reliquis personis Trinitatis communem; habet etiam suam propriam subsistentiam, aut personalitatem, per quam a reliquis personis differt. Respondetur, earum compositionem nullam posse DEO attribui, salva ejus simplicitate, salva item infinita perfectione et dignitate gloriosissimae illius naturae. Hoc autem manifestum evadet, si istas compositiones sigillatim et seorsim consideremus et perpendamus. 4. Primo igitur, compositio essentialis, tum Physica, tum Metaphysica, a DEO removenda est: illa quidem, quia spiritualem naturam evertit; haec vero, quia DEUS sub nullo genere univoco continetur, ut postea probabitur (DEO favente) in quaestionibus de DEO. Secundo, compositio ex essentia et existentia a DEO removetur, ob duas rationes: primo, quia ad omnem compositionem, sive sit realis, sive rationis, requiritur ut unum superaddatur alteri, propter constitutionem alicujus tertii: at existentia, neque re vera, neque secundum nostrum concipiendi modum, est aliquid superadditum essentiae DEI, sed potius est aliquid in ipsa DEI essentia inclusum, ut declaravi Art. II. Ergo existentia DEI non potest cum ejus essentia concurrere ad constituendum aliquod tertium. Secundo, compositio ex essentia et existentia tribuitur substantiis creatis, quia earum esse ita se habet ut potentia, et existentia ut actus illi superadditus: at essentia DEI non potest appellari potentia, respectu existentiae divinae, quia in se includit existentiam, ut dictum est loco jam citato: nulla autem potentia in se includit actum suum, sed ad actum suum, tanquam ad aliquid ulterius et externum, dirigitur. 5. De tertia compositione, quae est suppositorum ex natura singulari et subsistentia, major est dubitatio: ea enim videtur DEO tribuenda, quia quaelibet persona Trinitatis haec duo includit: essentiam divinam, quae communis est omnibus tribus personis; et particularem suam personalitatem, per quam a reliquis duabus personis distinguitur; Ergo ex his duabus composita est. Si respondeas, personam aliquam ideo non esse compositam ex natura et subsistentia, quia subsistentia est aliquid in ipsa Dei essentia inclusum, sicuti jam dictum est de existentia; facile confutaberis: si enim subsistentia aut personalitas Patris esset de essentia ejus, esset toti Trinitati communis, sicut et ipsa ejus essentia est. At hoc est absurdum: Ergo et illud. De hac controversia meam mentem aliquot assertionibus proponam. 6. Assert. 1. Subsistentia, aut personalitas Patris (idem de Filii et Sp. Sancti hypostasi dicatur) non differt ab ejus essentia ullo genere realis diversitatis, neque tanquam res a re, neque tanquam modus rei a re, sed ab ea differt sola distinctione rationis. Probatur haec assert. sic: primo, quicquid est in Deo, est Deus. Ergo nihil est in Deo, quod revera, et a parte rei (ut loquuntur) ab ejus Deitate differt. Secundo, si persona Patris realiter componatur ex ejus essentia et subsistentia seu personalitate, duo sequentur absurda: Primo, Deum Patrem non esse absolute loquendo et summe simplicem; summa enim simplicitas omnem compositionem tollit, imprimis autem realem: secundo, Deitatem esse alicujus rei partem; omnis autem pars est incompletum aliquid, et minus perfectum quam totum illud cujus est pars. 7. Assert. 2. Deus non componitur ex natura et subsistentia, tali compositione, qualis cernitur in creatis substantiis. Haec assert. manifeste sequitur, et infertur ex precedente: si enim Deus non componitur realiter ex natura et subsistentia, non habet talem compositionem ex natura et subsistentia, qualem habent substantiae creatae; nam hae componuntur ex natura et subsistentia, tanquam ex duobus principiis re ipsa distinctis, et ideo earum compositio realis est. 8. Assert. 3. Quamvis subsistentia Patris de ejus essentia non sit, sed secundum nostrum concipiendi modum sit aliquid ejus essentiae superadditum, non tamen licet dicere, Patris personam esse ex iis duabus compositam compositione rationis; imo non concipere debemus ista duo in Patre, tanquam duas partes eum componentes: cum enim concipimus Deitatem tanquam alicujus rei partem, formamus de Deo enormem conceptum, et imperfectionem non exiguam Deo affingimus. Quare laudanda et imitanda videtur eorum modestia, qui pie sentiunt et profitentur, essentiam et personalitatem includi in persona Patris, Filii, et Sp. Sancti, non per modum compositionis, sed per modum ineffabilis conjunctionis aut unionis.
About this text
Robert Baron — Philosophia theologiae ancillans from the 1658 Oxford Latin. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII On Being and Essence; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV On the origin of the soul and the propagation of sin. Later Exercitationes / remainder of 213 pp remain.
English follows locked 1658 Oxford Latin. Prima Art. I-XII from IA PDF leaves ~15-53. Secunda Art. I-XV from PDF leaves 56-107 / printed pp.54-105 (tess+pdftotext+DjVu). No modern English copied. Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.
Catalogue & scope
Wing B887. IA bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_philosophia-theologi-an_baron-robert_1658. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV (De origine animae & propagatione peccati). Not whole Philosophia (213 pp). Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.
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