Fathers

Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology · §13

On the diversity of material and immaterial forms

Second Exercise. On the origin of the soul and the propagation of sin.

Article I. On the diversity of material and immaterial forms.

So that we may settle the question of the soul's origin with a clear mind, I will first set down a few points about the kinds of forms, and about the different ways matter causes and receives the forms that enter it or are drawn out of it.

2. Hold first that effects made for a definite end — not at random or by chance — fall into three kinds, according as four causes, or three, or only two, concur in making them. Corporeal substances need all four: the two inward causes, matter and form, and the two outward ones, efficient cause and end, must join to give them the act of existing. Accidental forms or accidents, and every substantial form except the rational soul, are made by three — efficient, matter, and end. Angels and human souls are made by only two — efficient and end. Angels neither consist of matter and form nor exist in matter, so they can have no more than those two causes. Human souls, though they exist in matter, still do not consist of matter and form, and are not produced by the power of the matter they inhabit. Being spirits, they cannot be generated by any material power, as will be shown shortly; God creates them from nothing and introduces them into matter for the best end: his own glory and the eternal salvation of those persons.

3. Accidental forms such as whiteness or blackness need three causes if they are to have real being in the world. First, some end or purpose must stir and draw the efficient cause to act. Second, the efficient must apply its power — its active concurrence. Third, the matter-in-which, the subject of the whiteness, must concur passively and cooperate in giving that being to the accident: it does so by receiving the efficient's action that produces the whiteness, and by receiving and sustaining the whiteness itself. From these three the existence of whiteness and other accidents hangs — above all from the matter that receives them and, by passive concurrence, produces and sustains their being. Relative to efficient and end they depend only as to becoming; relative to matter or subject they depend both as to becoming and as to being. They cannot come to be without the concurrence of the matter in which they exist, nor keep the act of existing once that matter is gone. But if efficient and final cause are removed, an accident already produced can still persist in existence — as countless examples show.

4. Every substantial form except the human soul likewise needs three causes. For the form of a stone to exist in act, some end must move the efficient by what is called metaphorical motion; the efficient must, by its power in act, dispose the stone's matter to receive that substantial form; and matter, as a subjective cause, must concur in producing and sustaining the form. That form depends on matter for becoming, being, and operating: without the matter in which it exists it can neither come to be, nor be, nor operate. This dependence plainly shows that matter is a cause of the forms in it — not an active cause, but a passive, subjective one. Every dependence of one thing on another as on a prior in becoming and in being is a clear mark of causality. The human soul stands far otherwise. After a person's death it both exists and acts outside matter. Therefore it does not depend on matter for being or for operating, nor for becoming: matter cannot by any power or causal concurrence give being to a spiritual substance such as the rational soul, as will soon be proved, and so is in no way its cause. Hence the soul belongs with those things produced by only two causes — efficient and end. It is rightly called an immaterial form, independent of matter; every other form, substantial or accidental, is called material and dependent on matter. Fire's form cannot exist outside its matter, and without that matter it cannot heat or burn. A brute's form cannot exist without its matter — the body — and without that body it cannot sense or desire. The human soul not only exists outside matter after death; it also acts outside it, in understanding, willing, rejoicing, and grieving.

Latin

EXERCITATIO SECUNDA De Origine animae, & propagatione peccati. ART. I. De formarum materialium, & immaterialium diversitate. 1. Ut decisio hujus quaestionis De origine animae, facilis intelligatur, quaedam premittam de formarum diversitate, deque varia causalitate, & potentia materiae, respectu formarum, quae in eam introducuntur, aut ex ea educuntur. 2. Primo igitur tenendum est, tria esse genera effectorium, quae propter certum aliquem finem, non vero temere aut fortuito producuntur: nam eorum alia omnium quatuor causarum, alia trium, alia duarum tantum concursu producuntur. Omnium quatuor causarum concursu producuntur substantiae corporeae, quae non possunt habere esse aliquod reale in mundo, nisi duae causae internae, viz. materia & forma, duae item externae, i.e. efficiens & finis concurrant, ad tribuendum iis existendi actum. Trium causarum concursu, videlicet efficientis, materiae, & finis, producuntur omnes formae accidentales seu accidentia, omnes item formae substantiales, sola anima rationali excepta: duarum causarum concursu, videlicet efficientis, & finis, producuntur angeli & animae humanae: Angeli enim neque ex materia & forma constant, neque in materia existunt; ideoque duas tantum habere possunt causas, videlicet efficientem & finem. Animae vero humanae, licet in materia existant, non tamen ex materia & forma constant, neque producuntur vi materiae, in qua existunt: cum enim sint spiritus, nullius materiae vi produci possunt, ut mox probabitur, sed a DEO ex nihilo creantur, & in materiam inducuntur, propter optimum finem, videlicet DEI gloriam, & ipsorum hominum salutem aeternam. 3. Dixi formas accidentales, ut albedinem, nigredinem, &c. trium causarum concursu produci, quia ut albedo habeat esse reale in mundo, 1. Oportet finem aliquem, seu propositum, excitare, & allicere efficientem ad agendum: 2. Oportet efficientem adhibere suam vim, seu concursum activum: 3. Oportet materiam in qua, seu subjectum albedinis, concurrere, & cooperari concursu passivo, ad tribuendum illud esse albedini: hoc autem praestat, recipiendo actionem causae efficientis & producentis albedinem, item recipiendo ipsam albedinem, eamque sustentando. Ex trium harum causarum concursu, pendet albedinis aliorumque accidentium existentia, praecipue vero a materia, in qua recipiuntur, quaeque concursu passivo producit & sustentat ipsorum esse: idque quia ex efficiente, & fine, pendent tantum quoad fieri, ex materia autem seu subjecto pendent, & quoad fieri, & quoad esse: nam neque possunt fieri sine concursu materiae in qua existunt, neque possunt in existendi actu perseverare, illa materia sublata: at efficiente & finali causa sublatis, potest accidens jam productum, in existendi actu perseverare, ut liquet ex infinitis pene exemplis. 4. Dixi omnes formas substantiales, anima humana excepta, etiam trium causarum concursu produci: quia ut forma lapidis v.g. actu existat, 1. Oportet finem aliquem motione metaphorica movere efficientem. 2. Necesse est efficientem actu sua virtute disponere materiam lapidis, ad recipiendam illam formam substantialem. 3. Oportet materiam, in genere causae subjectivae concurrere ad producendam, & sustentandam illam formam: idque quia illa forma pendet a materia, quoad fieri, esse, & operari; h.e. neque potest fieri, neque esse, neque operari, sine materia in qua existit: ista autem dependentia formarum substantialium a materia, manifeste arguit materiam esse formarum in ea existentium causam, non quidem activam, sed passivam, & subjectivam, ut vocant: omnis enim dependentia alicujus ab aliquo, tanquam a priori, in fieri, & esse, est evidens causalitatis indicium: at longe aliter se habet anima humana; ea enim post mortem hominis & existit, & operatur extra materiam: Ergo a materia non pendet quoad esse & operari; at neque ab ea pendet quoad fieri: idque quia materia non potest vi aliqua, aut concursu causali tribuere esse spirituali substantiae, qualis est anima rationalis, ut mox probabitur, & proinde nullo modo est ejus causa. Hinc consequitur, animam esse ex earum rerum numero, quae duarum tantum causarum concursu producuntur, efficientis videlicet & finis: patet item animam recte appellari formam immaterialem, seu independentem a materia, cum e contrario omnes aliae formae, tum substantiales, tum accidentales, vocentur formae materiales, & a materia pendentes: v.g. Forma ignis, sicut existere nequit extra suam materiam, ita etiam sine ea non potest calefacere, & comburere. Forma bruti, sicut existere nequit sine materia sua, i.e. corpore, ita sine eadem sentire, aut appetere non potest. At anima humana, non solum existit extra materiam post mortem hominis; sed etiam extra eam operatur, exercendo actus intelligendi, volendi, gaudendi, aut dolendi.

About this text

Robert Baron — Philosophia theologiae ancillans from the 1658 Oxford Latin. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII On Being and Essence; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV On the origin of the soul and the propagation of sin. Later Exercitationes / remainder of 213 pp remain.

English follows locked 1658 Oxford Latin. Prima Art. I-XII from IA PDF leaves ~15-53. Secunda Art. I-XV from PDF leaves 56-107 / printed pp.54-105 (tess+pdftotext+DjVu). No modern English copied. Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.

Catalogue & scope

Wing B887. IA bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_philosophia-theologi-an_baron-robert_1658. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV (De origine animae & propagatione peccati). Not whole Philosophia (213 pp). Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.

Witnesses

This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.