Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology · §19

Objections against native corruption's propagation through parental seed are answered

Article VII. Objections against native corruption's propagation through parental seed are answered.

1. First objection: a body cannot act on a spirit by impressing a vicious quality; so concupiscence is not derived from body to soul. Pareus (from Augustine) answers that the soul contracts vice from vitiated flesh not wholly by nature but by God's hidden judgment for the first parents' fault — the body cannot naturally act on spirit, yet by the hidden justice of the divine law it can happen. Others locate it not in flesh's action on soul but in natural concomitance between matter and form: as the soul communicates life and sense to the body, so the body's dispositions are communicated to the soul (a soul infused into a badly disposed body becomes dull, as in the naturally foolish — Esthius). Zanchi adds: infection comes from conjunction with the body not by physical action but by God's just ordinance — as Adam's justice would have flowed to children if he had not sinned, so when he sinned nature's corruption flows from him as head into all, through seed as the vehicle of the stain.

2. Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure: the soul is vitiated in an unclean body not by flesh truly acting on spirit, but because flesh stripped of original rectitude and rebellious to reason draws the mind down and warps it. Pareus: imagine the body prone to evils and unfit as an organ for good acts; the soul, robbed of original purity, follows that vicious temperament (Hommius likewise).

3. Second objection: if God thrusts a pure soul into so impure a prison he acts cruelly — which is blasphemous to say, so the premise is absurd. We concede the whole: we do not say God sends a just, pure soul into an impure body (that would make souls just before infusion — refuted in Art. VIII). Press: God infuses a soul that of itself has no sin into a contagious body, so he acts unjustly. Deny the consequence. Injustice is doing what equity binds one to do the contrary of. God is not bound to give Adam's children — who sinned in Adam and merited eternal death — pure bodies before infusion; by the threat In the day you eat you shall die he is bound not to purge them.

4. Third: the cause of a cause is cause of the caused; God causes union; union causes the soul's sin; so God causes sin. Zanchi: union is a cause of sin only per accidens — had Adam not sinned, God would have joined souls and bodies without sin following. Further: God creates souls in the body; parents by prolific virtue substantially unite them. Having souls in bodies is from God; having them created in impure bodies is from the fall. The rule applies to causes per se, not per accidens. God causes his law; the law causes sin per accidens (Rom 7:8–14); yet God is not the cause of sin.

5. Fourth: what the body lacks it cannot use to infect the soul; but soul-proper sin (ignorance, aversion from good) is not in the body. Answer: as leprous seed produces leprosy without having leprosy formally — only a hidden disposition — so flesh can infect the soul with only a virtual disposition toward sin. What the body has neither formally nor virtually cannot infect; what it has virtually can.

6. Fifth: in Adam sin was first in the soul and passed to flesh, not reverse; so in his children the soul is first-sufferer. Pareus: the order in vice from free choice differs from the order in vice generated from flesh. Or: the soul is still first-sufferer actually and formally, though the body has the disposition virtually first. Those who put original sin actually and formally in the seed before the soul are absurd: habit and privation concern the same subject; original justice cannot be in seed, so neither can its privation. If seed had sin formally, seed would have a law, face eternal damnation, and be able to be redeemed, repent, and believe — absurdities Keckermann says can scarcely be outdone.

Latin

ART. VII. Solvuntur argumenta quae afferri solent contra praecedentem doctrinam de propagatione nativae corruptionis per semen parentum. 1. Objicitur primo sic: corpus non potest agere in spiritum, vitiosam aliquam qualitatem ei imprimendo: Ergo concupiscentia seu propensio ad malum a corpore ad animam non derivatur. Respondet ex Augustino Pareus, lib. 4. de amissione gratiae, cap. 12., non omnino fieri naturaliter, sed occulto DEI judicio, quod anima a carne vitiata, ob culpam primorum parentum, vitium contrahat; i.e. licet corpus in spiritum naturaliter agere nequeat, per occultam tamen justitiam divinae legis illud fieri posse. 2. Alii respondent, id non fieri per actionem carnis in animam, sed per quandam naturalem concomitantiam & communicationem quae est inter materiam & formam; sicut enim anima corpori communicat suas affectiones, ut vitam, sensum, & alia hujusmodi, ita etiam dispositiones corporis communicantur animae; nam anima infusa corpori male disposito fit stolida, ut videre est in naturaliter fatuis; ita sentit Esthius Theol. Pontif. lib. 2. sent. 35. art. 1. 3. Tertio, Hieron. Zanchius, de operibus DEI parte 3. lib. 2. cap. 5., respondet animam ex conjunctione cum corpore peccato infici, non per Physicam actionem corporis in animam, sed ex justissima DEI ordinatione, qui sic initio constituerat, ut sicut si Adam non peccasset, tota illius justitia in liberos propagaretur, sic illo peccante tota naturae corruptio, quae ejus inobedientiam est consecuta, ab illo tanquam a capite in omnes homines flueret & derivaretur, idque per semen tanquam vehiculum quo ista labes a parente ad prolem transfertur. 2. Quarto, Alensis & Bonaventura in 2 Sent. dicunt animam in corpore immundo vitiari, non quod caro spiritum inficiat vera & reali actione, sed quod caro destituta originali rectitudine ac rebellis rationi effecta animum deorsum trahat, ac per hoc obliquam & distortam efficiat. Hanc sententiam explicans Pareus dicit nos posse imaginari corpus, licet brutum sit, ad mala pronum esse, & non aptum animae ad bonas actiones organum: animam vero rectitudine & puritate originali orbatam sequi inclinationem & vitiosum temperamentum corporis: idem etiam innuit clariss. Hommius in suo Antibellarmino, disput. 58. Thes. 5. 3. Secundo objicitur: Si DEUS animam puram in carcerem tam impurum detrudit, crudeliter ac injuste agit: at impium & blasphemum est posterius; Ergo & prius est absurdum. Resp. concedendo totum; nos enim non dicimus DEUM immittere animam justam & puram in corpus impurum; inde enim sequitur animas nostras esse justas ante earum infusionem & conjunctionem cum corporibus, quod postea refutabitur art. 8. Instabit aliquis: DEUS infundit animam, ex se peccatum non habentem, corpori impuro & contagioso: Ergo injuste agit. Resp. negando consequentiam; is enim agit injuste qui illud agit cujus contrarium agere tenetur ex aequo & bono; sed DEUS non tenetur animas filiorum Adae, qui in Adamo peccaverunt & sic aeternam mortem meriti sunt, puris corporibus infundere; h.e. non tenetur corpora nostra, labe peccati foedata, ante infusionem animarum purgare; sed contra, tenetur ea non purgare, idque vi illius comminationis, Quo die comederis, moriendo morieris. 4. Tertio obj.: causa causae est etiam causa causati: at DEUS est causa unionis animae cum corpore; anima ex conjunctione cum corpore contrahit peccatum; nam unio est causa illius peccati in anima: Ergo DEUS est causa peccati. Respondet Zanchius, unionem animae cum corpore non per se, sed per accidens esse causam peccati, idque quia si Adam non peccasset, DEUS copulasset animas cum corporibus sine ulla peccati consecutione: quare ex accidente est quod nunc animae labes eam conjunctionem consequatur. 2. Respond. DEUM tantum creare animas in corpore, parentes vero per virtutem prolificam animas substantialiter cum corporibus conjungere: quare quod animas habeamus in corporibus nostris, est a DEO; quod vero animas habeamus in corporibus impuris & contagiosis creatas, est a lapsu primorum parentum. In summa, illa regula, causa causae est causa causati, intelligenda est de causis per se, non per accidens. DEUS enim est causa suae legis, & lex divina est causa peccati per accidens, ut patet ex cap. 7. ad Rom. a vers. 8. ad 14.; nemo tamen inde concludere potest DEUM esse peccati causam. 5. Quarto obj.: quod corpus non habet, eo non potest animam inficere; at peccatum, quod animae est proprium, nimirum ignorantia mentis & aversio voluntatis a bono, non inest corpori: Ergo corpus peccato animam inficere non potest. Resp. sicut semen parentis leprosi producit lepram in corporibus filiorum, licet actu & formaliter in se non habeat lepram, sed occultam quandam dispositionem ad lepram, ita etiam caro potest inficere animam peccato, licet actu & formaliter in se non habeat peccatum, sed tantum dispositionem virtualem ad peccatum. Respondetur igitur ad propositionem: quod corpus in se habet nullo modo, h.e. neque formaliter neque virtualiter, eo non potest inficere animam; potest tamen virtualiter habere quod formaliter non habet. 6. Quinto obj.: in Adamo peccatum primo fuit in anima, quam in carne, & ab anima in carnem, non a carne ad animam transit: Ergo eodem ordine in filiis Adae vitium existit; anima enim, non corpus, est πρωτοπαθὲς peccati. Respondet Pareus, alium fuisse ordinem in vitii operatione quae a libero arbitrio cepit; alium esse in vitii generatione quae a carne procedit. Responderi etiam potest eundem ordinem adhuc servari, & animam etiam nunc esse πρωτοπαθὲς peccati, idque quia ignorantia, contumacia, & aversio a bono actu & formaliter primo inest animae, deinde corpori; licet dispositive & virtualiter insint corpori prius quam animae. Hic nobis se offert occasio reprehendendi crassam & absurdam eorum sententiam, qui dicunt peccatum originis actu & formaliter in semine inesse ante adventum animae. Primo enim habitus & privatio versantur circa idem: Ergo privatio non potest esse in subjecto in quo habitus inesse non potest; atqui in semine non potest esse justitia originalis, quae est habitus: ergo neque in eo existere potest peccatum originale, quod est ejus privatio. Secundo, si semen actu & formaliter in se peccatum habet, varia sequentur absurda. Primo, semini datam esse legem, lex enim, inquit Paulus, data est peccatoribus; secundo, semen esse obnoxium aeternae damnationi, quod enim proprie peccatum in se habet, id damnari in aeternum potest; tertio, semen posse a CHRISTO redimi, salvari, poenitentiam agere, & credere, quae omnia tam absurda sunt, inquit Keckermannus, ut cogitari vix absurdus possit.

About this text

Robert Baron — Philosophia theologiae ancillans from the 1658 Oxford Latin. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII On Being and Essence; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV On the origin of the soul and the propagation of sin. Later Exercitationes / remainder of 213 pp remain.

English follows locked 1658 Oxford Latin. Prima Art. I-XII from IA PDF leaves ~15-53. Secunda Art. I-XV from PDF leaves 56-107 / printed pp.54-105 (tess+pdftotext+DjVu). No modern English copied. Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.

Catalogue & scope

Wing B887. IA bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_philosophia-theologi-an_baron-robert_1658. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV (De origine animae & propagatione peccati). Not whole Philosophia (213 pp). Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.

Witnesses

This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.