Fathers

Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology · §28

On the firmness, certainty, and evidence of the mind's acts of assent

Third Exercise. On Faith, Science, and Opinion.

Article I. On the firmness, certainty, and evidence of the mind's acts of assent.

1. Every intellective habit has knowledge — or assent — as its proximate end: the mind assents to those propositions whose truth it perceives and cognizes. It is therefore worthwhile to premise something about the mind's assent, its affections, and its species, so that the diversity of our mind's acts may be understood.

2. Assent of the mind is the judgment by which the intellect judges some proposition true. The mind assents to "man is an animal" by embracing and approving it — that is, by judging it true.

3. Philosophers have marked three degrees of perfection in assent: firmness, certainty, and evidence. Opposed to them are three degrees of imperfection: infirmity or vacillation, uncertainty, and inevidence.

4. Firm assent is without hesitation, doubt, or fear of the opposite side. Infirm or vacillating assent is when the mind so assents that it doubts the proposition's truth, or at least somehow fears that by assenting it may err.

5. Certain assent rests on some certain or solid foundation, not on a light or fallacious reason. Uncertain assent is the contrary. Note carefully: for certainty it is required that the foundation on which the mind rests while assenting not only be certain in itself, but also appear such to the one who assents. Unless he knows that the reason on which he rests is certain, his assent will in no way be certain and stable.

6. Evident assent is when someone, by the force of his own sense or reason and apart from another's information or testimony, perceives that the proposition to which he assents is true. When I see Socrates standing near me and assent to "Socrates stands," my assent is evident — not by another's report, but by my own sense. Likewise when I assent to "man is an animal," the assent is evident because by my own intellect I perceive that a sensitive nature is in man. Even if no one asserted it — even if all asserted the contrary — I would still judge that proposition true.

7. Assent is inevident when someone assents not because sense or solid reason demonstrates the proposition true, but either because a light reason persuades it (a light reason does not drive away the mind's darkness, and so leaves the assent obscure and inevident) or because another testifies that it is true. He who has seen Peter slain and assents to "Peter is slain" has evident assent; he who assents only because of that man's narration has inevident assent, because neither sense nor reason shows him that it is true.

8. These three degrees so stand that the second includes the first and adds something; the third includes both and adds something further. For firmness it is enough that the foundation appear certain and solid to the one assenting. Even if in reality it is not such, if it appears such he will assent firmly and without hesitation. So heretics firmly assent to their errors: though their foundations are neither certain nor solid, to them — such is their blindness — they seem most efficacious and valid.

9. For certainty, and freedom from error, more is required: the foundation must not only appear certain and solid to the one assenting, but really and in itself be such. Otherwise the assent is erroneous and false. We may grant heretics firmness in judging; we do not grant them certainty of judging. Certainty and error cannot stand together.

10. For evidence still more is required: the foundation must appear certain and solid, and be such in itself — and it must not be another's testimony or narration, but either sense or some solid reason that clearly demonstrates that the matter so holds.

11. Assent can therefore be firm without being certain — as in heretics who without fear assent to dogmas that conflict with the Catholic faith or with good morals. Assent can also be certain without being evident. He who assents to a proposition because of God's testimony in Sacred Scripture has assent that is without doubt very certain, resting on the most certain foundation — God's own testimony — yet it is not evident. The theologian does not assent because sense or reason shows him that the matter so holds, but because God asserts or says that it so holds.

12. These three degrees of perfection in the mind's assent therefore stand so that the first extends more widely than the second, and the second than the third — just as among the degrees of necessity the "in a respect" sense extends more widely than the "in itself" sense, and that more widely than the "in itself primarily."

Latin

EXERCITATIO TERTIA De Fide, Scientia, & Opinione. ART. I. De firmitate, certitudine, & evidentia assensuum mentis nostrae. 1. Cum omnis habitus intellectivus, pro fine proximo habeat notitiam, sive assensum, quo mens assentitur iis propositionibus, quarum veritatem percipit & cognoscit; operae pretium erit, nonnihil praefari de assensu mentis, deque eius affectionibus, & speciebus, ideo ut intelligatur diversitas actuum mentis nostrae. 2. Assensus mentis, est judicium quo intellectus judicat propositionem aliquam esse veram: mens enim assentitur huic propositioni, homo est animal, eam amplectendo & approbando, hoc est, judicando eam esse veram. 3. Tres sunt gradus perfectionis, quos in assensu mentis observarunt Philosophi, videlicet firmitas, certitudo, & evidentia: quibus opponuntur totidem gradus imperfectionis, videlicet infirmitas seu vacillatio, incertitudo, & inevidentia. 4. Assensus firmus, est is qui est sine haesitatione, dubitatione, formidine partis oppositae. Infirmus vero, seu vacillans assensus, est cum mens ita assentitur huic vel illi propositioni, ut de eius veritate dubitet, aut saltem aliquo modo metuat ne isti propositioni assentendo erret. 5. Assensus certus, est qui nititur certo aliquo aut solido fundamento, non vero levi aut fallaci ratione. Assensus incertus, est qui contrario modo se habet. Hic diligenter notandum est, ad certitudinem assensus requiri, ut fundamentum quo mens nititur, dum assensum praebet, non solum sit in se certum, sed etiam assentienti tale videatur: nisi enim ille sciat rationem, qua nititur, esse certam, eius assensus nullo modo erit certus & stabilis. 6. Denique assensus evidens, est cum quis per se hoc est, vi sui sensus aut rationis, absque alterius informatione & testificatione percipit eam propositionem cui assentitur, esse veram: exempli gratia, cum video Socratem apud me stantem, assentior huic propositioni, Socrates stat: & assensus meus est evidens, idque quia non per alterius informationem aut testimonium, sed vi mei sensus, rem ita se habere percipio: item cum assentior huic propositioni, homo est animal, assensus est evidens, idque quia vi proprii intellectus, seu rationis, percipio homini inesse naturam sensitivam: adeoque quamvis nemo illud assereret, imo quamvis omnes contrarium assererent, istam propositionem veram esse judicarem. 7. Contra vero, inevidens est assensus, cum quis assentitur propositioni, non quod sensus aut solida ratio eam veram esse demonstret: sed vel quod levis aliqua ratio illud suadeat (levis enim ratio non pellit mentis tenebras, atque adeo facit assensum obscurum & inevidentem) vel quod alius testetur eam esse veram: sic qui vidit Petrum interfectum, & assensum praebet huic propositioni, Petrus est interfectus, eius assensus est evidens: qui vero propter hujus narrationem & testimonium, assensum praebet isti propositioni, eius assensus est inevidens, idque quia neque sensu, neque ratione percipit eam esse veram. 8. Hi tres gradus perfectionis, qui in assensu cernuntur, ita se habent, ut secundus includat primum, eique aliquid superaddat; tertius vero includat et primum et secundum, illisque aliquid superaddat: nam ut assensus sit firmus, satis est quod fundamentum, quo nititur ille assensus, assentienti certum et solidum videatur: quamvis enim revera non sit tale, si tamen assentienti tale esse videatur, is proculdubio firmiter et absque haesitatione assentietur: sic haeretici firmiter assentiuntur suis erroribus; quamvis enim fundamenta quibus nituntur, non sint certa & solida, iis tamen (quae eorum est caecitas) efficacissima et validissima videntur. 9. At vero ut assensus sit certus, et plane ab errore alienus, non tantum requiritur, ut fundamentum quo nititur, videatur assentienti certum, & solidum, sed etiam ut revera & in se tale sit; alioqui assensus noster erit erroneus, & falsus: quare quamvis haereticis attribui patiamur firmitatem in judicando, non tamen putamus iis competere certitudinem judicandi: certitudo enim & error simul consistere nequeunt. 10. Tandem vero, ut assensus sit evidens, non tantum requiritur, ut ejus fundamentum assentienti videatur certum et solidum, & etiam in se sit tale; sed etiam requiritur, ut illud fundamentum non sit alterius testimonium, vel narratio; sed vel sit sensus, vel solida aliqua ratio perspicue demonstrans rem ita se habere. 11. Quemadmodum igitur assensus potest esse firmus, quamvis non sit certus, ut videre est in Haereticis, absque ullo timore aut formidine assensum praebentibus iis dogmatis, quae Catholicae Fidei aut bonis moribus repugnant, ita etiam assensus potest esse certus, quamvis non sit evidens: qui enim assentitur propositioni alicui propter DEI testimonium in Sacra Scriptura propositum, ejus assensus proculdubio est valde certus, quia nititur certissimo fundamento, videlicet DEI testimonio, non tamen est evidens, non enim ideo assentitur Theologus, quod aut sensu aut ratione percipiat rem ita se habere, sed quod DEUS asserat, aut dicat rem ita se habere. 12. Ex his patet, hos tres gradus perfectionis, qui in assensu mentis cernuntur, ita se habere, ut primus latius pateat secundo, & secundus tertio; quemadmodum etiam in gradibus necessitatis kata meros latius patet quam kath hauto, & kath hauto quam kath hauto proton.

About this text

Robert Baron — Philosophia theologiae ancillans from the 1658 Oxford Latin. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII On Being and Essence; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV On the origin of the soul and the propagation of sin. Later Exercitationes / remainder of 213 pp remain.

English follows locked 1658 Oxford Latin. Prima Art. I-XII from IA PDF leaves ~15-53. Secunda Art. I-XV from PDF leaves 56-107 / printed pp.54-105 (tess+pdftotext+DjVu). No modern English copied. Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.

Catalogue & scope

Wing B887. IA bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_philosophia-theologi-an_baron-robert_1658. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV (De origine animae & propagatione peccati). Not whole Philosophia (213 pp). Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.

Witnesses

This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.