Tertullian — On the Soul 4
ON THE UNBORN. After the definition of origin the question of status suffers. For it follows that, having professed the soul from God's breath, we should assign it a beginning. This Plato shuts out, wanting an unborn and unmade soul. But we teach both born and made from the constitution of the beginning.
Nor do we at once err in saying both, because of course born is one thing and made another — as this fits the lifeless, that the living. Yet differences, having their places and times, sometimes also have dealings of suffering in common. So even a making can be put for a being-born, since everything that in any way receives being is generated. For the maker himself can be called parent of what is made; so Plato also uses it. Therefore as far as our faith is concerned — of a made or born soul — the philosopher's opinion is driven off, by the authority of prophecy also.
Latin
DE INNATA. [1] Post definitionem census quaestionem status patitur. Consequens enim est, ut ex dei flatu animam professi initium ei deputaremus. Hoc Plato excludit innatam et infectam animam uolens. Et natam autem docemus et factam ex initii constitutione. Nec statim erra<b>imus utrumque dicentes, quia scilicet aliud sit natum, aliud factum utpote <istud inanimalibus>, illud animalibus competens.
Differentiae autem sua habendo loca et tempora habent aliquando et passiuitatis commercia. Capit itaque et facturam pro in esse poni, siquidem omne quod quoque modo accipit esse generatur. Nam et factor ipse parens facti potest dici; sic et Plato utitur. Igitur quantum ad fidem nostram factae nataeue animae, depulsa est philosophi opinio, auctoritate prophetiae quoque.