To Florus 5.38

But lest, seeing yourself exposed, you try to break out by replying that you did not say, ‘Evil arose in God’s work because it was made from nothing,’ but rather, ‘Evil could arise because it was made from nothing,’ we must show how much more tightly the snares bind you. If you say that you attributed evil’s possibility, not its necessity, to the powers of that eternal nothing, we reply: the fact that an evil will could arise in a human being is certainly nothing other than free will. An evil will could arise precisely so that a good will could arise too. This is the freedom in which reason exercises itself, on account of which the human being is declared made in God’s image, and by which he excels other creatures (Genesis 1:26–27). If, then, the possibility of an evil will’s arising in a human being is nothing other than freedom of will, and this is so great a thing that its distinction makes him surpass the other living creatures, you who profess that this possibility existed in him not because he was made by God but because he was made from nothing declare, by a new monstrosity of doctrine, that nothing—ancient emptiness—is the cause of so great a good as free will.

To make the matter clear with a brief question: you said, ‘The evil will could arise not because the human being was made by God, but because he was made from nothing.’ This very possibility of the will’s arising, I ask, do you believe it good or evil? That is, do you judge the capacity for a will to arise, which you attributed to nothing, good or utterly evil? If you call it good, then God is not the cause of the good: nothing is. But if, seeing this to be completely insane, you declare it evil—since you say it should be attributed not to God but to nothing—you will testify that we reached no deceitful conclusion against you, but with honest debate overthrew your doctrine’s evil faith. Our result therefore stands unshaken: you and Mani have attributed even the first man’s evil will to the necessity of an eternal origin.