Tertullian — Against Marcion 1.25
As far as concerns the question of goodness, by these lines we have drawn it as least matching God—as neither innate nor rational nor perfect, but also wicked and unjust and already unworthy of the very name of goodness—because of course insofar as it suits God, so far it fits that he not be God who is even preferred from such goodness, and not from such as true and alone.
For already this too is fair to discuss: whether God is to be rated from goodness alone, with the other appendant senses and affections denied—which Marcionites indeed drive from their god onto the Creator. We however recognize them in the Creator as worthy of God, and from this too we will deny God in whom not all that are worthy of God stand.
If he aimed to title some god from Epicurus’s school with Christ’s name—so that what is blessed and incorruptible furnish troubles neither to itself nor to another (for Marcion, chewing this sentence, removed from him severities and judicial forces)—he ought either to have conceived a wholly immobile and numb god (and what to him with Christ, troublesome to the Jews by teaching and to himself through Jesus?) or also to have recognized him from the other motions (and what to him with Epicurus, needed neither by himself nor by Christians?).
For see: by this itself—that formerly quiet, who for a time had not cared for notice of himself by any work, after so great an age he felt for human salvation, of course by will—was he not then shakable to a new will, so as to seem liable also to other motions? For what will is without the goad of desire? But care also will accede to will. Who will will and desire something and not care?
Therefore when he both willed and desired unto human salvation, he already made business for himself and others—Epicurus unwilling, Marcion’s counselor. For he also set an adversary for himself: that very thing against which he willed and desired and cared—whether delict or death; first of all their arbiter and human’s lord, the Creator. Further nothing will run without rivalry that will not be without an adversary. Finally willing and desiring and caring to free the human, by this itself he already rivals both him from whom he frees—about to free for himself against him—and those things from which he frees. So rivalry’s officials must meet it in what it rivals: anger, discord, hate, disdain, indignation, bile, unwillingness, offense. If all these assist rivalry, and rivalry procures freeing the human, and freeing the human is goodness’s operation, that goodness will not be able without its dowries—that is without senses and affections through which it is administered against the Creator—lest thus too it be prescribed as irrational if it lack even due senses and affections. These we will defend much fuller in the Creator’s cause, in which they are also cast up.
Latin
Quod adtinet ad bonitatis quaestionem, his lineis deduximus eam minime deo adaequare, ut neque ingenitam neque rationalem neque perfectam, sed et improbam et iniustam et ipso iam bonitatis nomine indignam, quod scilicet in quantum deo congruat, in tantum deum non esse conueniat qui de tali bonitate etiam praeferatur, nec de tali modo uerum et sola. iam enim et hoc discuti par est, an deus de sola bonitate censendus sit, negatis ceteris adpendicibus sensibus et adfectibus. quos Marcionitae quidem a deo suo abigunt in creatorem. nos uero [et] agnoscimus in creatore ut deo dignos, et ex hoc quoque negabimus deum in quo non omnia, quae deo digna sint, constent. si aliquem de Epicuri schola deum adfectauit Christi nomine titulare, ut quod beatum et incorruptibile sit neque sibi neque alii molestias praestet — hanc enim sententiam ruminans Marcion remouit ab illo seueritates et iudiciarias uires —: aut in totum inmobilem et stupentem deum concepisse debuerat — et quid illi cum Christo, molesto et Iudaeis per doctrinam et sibi per Iesum? — aut et de ceteris motibus eum agnouisse. — et quid illi cum Epicuro, nec sibi nec Christianis necessario? ecce enim hoc ipso, quod retro quietus, qui nec notitiam sui aliquo interim opere curauerit, post tantum aeui senserit in hominis salutem, utique per uoluntatem, nonne concussibilis tunc fuit nouae uoluntati, ut et ceteris motibus uideatur obnoxius? quae enim uoluntas sine concupiscentiae stimulo est? [quis uolet quod non concupiscet?] sed et cura accedet uoluntati. quis enim uolet quid et concupiscet, et non curabit? igitur cum et uoluit et concupiit in hominis salutem, iam et sibi et aliis negotium fecit, Epicuro nolente, consiliario Marcionis. nam et aduersarium sibi constituit: ipsum illud, aduersus quod et uoluit et concupiit et curauit, siue delictum siue mortem. inprimis ipsum arbitrum eorum et dominum hominis, creatorem. porro nihil sine aemulatione decurret, quod sine aduersario non erit. denique uolens et concupiscens et curans hominem liberare, hoc ipso iam aemulatur et eum, a quo liberat, aduersus eum scilicet sibi liberaturus, et ea, de quibus liberat, in alia liberaturus. proinde autem aemulationi occurrant necesse est officiales suae in ea, quae aemulatur: ira discordia odium dedignatio indignatio bilis nolentia offensa. haec omnia si aemulationi adsistunt, aemulatio autem liberando homini procurat, liberatio autem hominis operatio bonitatis est, non poterit ea bonitas sine suis dotibus, id est sine sensibus et adfectibus, per quos administratur aduersus creatorem, ne sic quoque inrationalis praescribatur, si careat et sensibus et adfectibus debitis. haec multo plenius defendemus in causa creatoris, in qua et exprobrantur.