Cap. VII: Lexicography of ἐφ᾽ ᾧ — in quo versus eo quod

I hear a learned man confirming this by another argument; let us attend to it. "The same," he says, "those little words ἐφ᾽ ᾧ, 'in which,' confirm. For those who, when they were not yet in the nature of things, are said to have sinned in another are counted without doubt, while he was committing the sin, to have committed it themselves also, which evidently belongs to imputation. And yet all men, when they were not yet, are said to have sinned in Adam. Therefore they are counted, while he was committing the sin, to have committed it themselves also, which manifestly belongs to the imputation of Adam's sin." First this argumentation rests on the hypothesis that the little words ἐφ᾽ ᾧ in this place signify "in which." That we do not grant. For it cannot be denied that they can be rendered "in that," "because," "inasmuch as," and so on. If they can be so rendered, it is not necessary that they be rendered "in which"; if it is not necessary that they be rendered "in which," there is no necessity of the argumentation which rests on that version. How then does D. Garissoles prove that in this place "in which" ought to be rendered rather than "in that," and so on? He brings an index of great men ancient and recent who rendered "in which," but their authority did not hinder others, themselves also great men, from preferring to the version "in which" the version "in that," "inasmuch as," and so on: Theodoret, the Syriac interpreter, Calvin, Martyr, Bucer, Aretius, Piscator, Paraeus, Erasmus, Leo Juda, Vatablus, the authors of the French version which our churches use, and likewise of the English, and so on — for it would be long to enumerate all. Did those greatest men therefore favor the Pelagian heresy? What is there why Placeus ought not to follow their example and rest, answering, on the received version? Does D. Garissoles add nothing besides? He also adds the force of those little words from the use of Scripture: for, he says, it is most frequent that ἐπί be taken for ἐν, which to prove he praises many examples. Namely, he proves what is not denied; but what is denied, that he does not prove. For nobody denied to him that ἐπί is sometimes taken for ἐν. But does it therefore follow that that preposition is used here by enallage, and ἐπί put for ἐν? Nay, if the Apostle had said ἐν ᾧ, nothing would hinder even those words from being rendered "in that" or "since," and so on, as was done by nearly all interpreters at Romans 8:3. And ἐφ᾽ ᾧ exists in that sense at 2 Corinthians 5:4, and is usually taken otherwise whenever there is no antecedent to which ᾧ can conveniently be referred. For the rest, what he says — that he makes Beza the author of the version "in which" for us — whence he has it I do not know. That certainly Placeus never said, nor wrote, nor ever thought. The reasons which he attributes to us are not Placeus's, nor are they needed by one answering according to the version approved by our churches. If you demand of me, Reader, that I prove it: First I will bring two reasons of Placeus, then those five which D. Garissoles objected to himself I will briefly vindicate from his exceptions. First therefore if you render "in which," the relative "which," because it will not be able to be referred to the nearest or neighboring masculine noun but to a remoter one, a trajection will have to be admitted, and that an insolent and very hard one. But now such a trajection ought not to be admitted without necessity, which here appears none, since the little words ἐφ᾽ ᾧ can no less both properly and conveniently be rendered "in that," or "since," or "inasmuch as." Next, the words "all sinned," since they contain the cause of that which immediately preceded, demand to be joined with it: for who can deny that death invaded all because all sinned (Romans 5:12)? Why then should we separate from each other those members of the Apostolic speech which are joined by the Apostle not only by situ and placement, but also by sense and by the indissoluble nexus of the things signified?