Cap. 4 Mem. 3: Abelard objection on eternal decree — Halensis/Aquinas/Scripture/Augustine

That also is objected which seems to cast a greater scruple: that God from eternity not only foreknew but predestined to whom he will infallibly give faith, remission, and eternal life, and to whom he will not: But God cannot in time act otherwise, or otherwise than he from eternity foreknew and decreed that he would do. On this argument Abelard once boldly asserted that God cannot do anything beyond those things which he has done or is going to do. If this holds, since it is certain that as to the greater part of human beings God neither foreknew faith to be produced in them nor decreed it, there is no ground for our saying that this condition of faith is in any way possible as to the non-elect still constituted in this life.

That God does or permits nothing without an antecedent eternal decree and eternal foreknowledge is most true. But if anyone thence concludes that God cannot do by ordinary power anything beyond those things which he foreknew and decreed to be done, that is most false. For as our Halensis rightly has it, Part 1, question 21, article 4, member 2: Divine power is limited neither by God’s will nor by his foreknowledge, although the egress of Divine power into act is always accompanied by his foreknowledge and will. Aquinas renders a reason of this matter fit enough, namely: Because the very doing is subject to the foreknowledge and ordination of the one doing; but not the very being-able, which is natural. For God therefore does something because he wills; yet he can not therefore because he wills, but because he is powerful by his nature (Part 1, question 25, article 5, to the first). The same Aquinas answers the aforesaid objection in form in the Disputed Questions On the Power of God, article 5, reply to 1, whose words I will set down: This locution, God CANNOT DO EXCEPT WHAT HE FOREKNOWS HE WILL DO, is twofold: because the exceptive particle EXCEPT is referred either to the power which is imported by the verb CAN, or to the act which is imported by the verb DO. If in the first way, then the locution is false: For God can do more things than he foreknows he will do. If in the second way, then the sense is that it cannot be that something is done by God and is not foreknown by God: so the locution is true; but this sense does nothing for the purpose. Thus far he. But because some so wholly lean on this contemplation of the eternal and secret will and foreknowledge that they admit almost nothing else into their minds, we will show briefly that neither the Scriptures, nor the Fathers, nor reason itself permit that according to these secret and eternal decrees of predestination it be established by us what is possible for God, or impossible, according to his ordinary power.

Let us begin from the Scriptures: which are accustomed not to restrict God’s power according to the secret decrees of his will, but to extend it according to God’s infinite strength, and according to the rule revealed in the word. (Matthew 3:9): God is able from these stones to raise up children of Abraham. (Matthew 19:26): All things are possible with God. And (Matthew 26:53): Can I not ask the Father, and he will exhibit to me more than twelve legions of angels? (Mark 14:36): All things are possible to you: transfer this cup from me. So also the Apostle speaks of the refractory Jews: God is able to graft them in again (Romans 11:23). And of any fallen human being: Who are you who judge another’s servant? To his own Lord he stands or falls. But he will stand: for God is able to make him stand (Romans 14:4). Finally of any wayfarer that is true: God is able to make all grace abound in him (2 Corinthians 9:8). I pass over more. From these it is plain enough that God’s power is least to be judged from his secret decrees: For he did not decree to raise children of Abraham from stones, nor to free Christ from the Jews’ hands, nor to raise and establish any fallen person, nor to pour the abundance of his grace into any and all: indeed he decreed and foreknew that he would least do all these things, which yet (if we are willing to hear the sacred Scriptures) are not therefore held for impossibles.

Augustine to this sense: Almighty God can do many things which he neither wills nor does. The same Father also presses the point in Judas himself, a reprobate beyond controversy: The Lord, he says, who raised Lazarus in the body — could he not raise Judas in the mind? He could indeed, but he was unwilling. What Augustine does not fear to affirm of Judas, let us intrepidly affirm of any wayfarer, the secret will or foreknowledge of God concerning the same notwithstanding: namely that God can raise anyone in the mind, that is, gift him with penitence and faith and saving grace; because of no particular human being has he revealed that he wills not this, and of each he has revealed that by ordinary power he can do this while he is still constituted on the way. On this will we ought to lean, and least to divine about the possibility or impossibility of things from a will utterly unknown to us.