Tertullian — Against Marcion 1.9

I know indeed in what sense they toss about a new god—by recognition of course. But I wanted to strike back the very novelty of cognition striking rude souls and the very natural graciousness of novelty, and from here already to challenge about the unknown god. For of course whom they oppose as new by recognition, they show unknown before recognition. Come then, back to the lines and into step! Persuade that a god could have been unknown. I find plainly altars prostituted to unknown gods—but that is Attic idolatry. Likewise to uncertain gods—but that is Roman superstition. Further, uncertain gods are less known, as less certain, and accordingly unknown, inasmuch as less certain. What title shall we cut from the two for Marcion’s god? Both, I suppose—both now uncertain and formerly unknown. For just as the known God, the Creator, made him unknown, so also the certain God made him uncertain.

But I will not wander off so as to say: if a god was unknown and hid, a region of hiding overshadowed him—new of course itself too and unknown and likewise now also uncertain, certainly some immense and indubitably greater than him whom it hid. But I will briefly propose and most fully pursue, prescribing that a god could not have been unknown by the name of greatness nor ought to have been by the name of kindness—especially more outstanding in both than our Creator. But since I notice that in some things the proving of every new and formerly unknown god ought to be challenged to the Creator’s form, I ought first to commend that this itself is done by us with reason, so that I may more constantly use the patronage of the reason set forth.

Before all things indeed what sort of thing is it that you who recognize God the Creator and confess him prior from knowledge do not know that another is also to be examined for you by the same modes by which you already learned to know God in another? Every prior thing has furnished a norm to the later. Two gods are now proposed, unknown and known. About the known the question is vacant. That he is stands firm, because he would not have been known unless he were. About the unknown dispute presses. For he can also not be, because if he were, he would have been known. What therefore is sought, as long as it is unknown, is in uncertainty; as long as it is sought, and can not be, as long as it is in uncertainty. You have a certain god, inasmuch as known, and an uncertain, inasmuch as unknown. If so, does it not seem to you defended by just reason that uncertain things be proved to the norm and form and rule of certain things?

Otherwise if to this cause, itself still uncertain, arguments also from uncertain things are applied, a series of questions will be entangled from the rehandling also of the arguments themselves equally uncertain, risking about faith through uncertainty, and it will go into those already indeterminable questions which the apostle does not love; but if from certain and undoubted and absolute parts of the rule, they will prejudge uncertain and doubtful and unexpedited things. Plainly in things where diversity of status is found, perhaps uncertain things are not challenged to the form of certain, as freed from the remaining challenge of comparison through diversity of principal status. But when two gods are proposed, the principal status is common to them. For what God is, both are: unborn, unmade, eternal. This will be the principal status; let Marcion see to the rest, if he has arranged them in diversity. For later things are not in rehandling—nay will not even be admitted—if it stands about the principal status. Further it stands, because both are gods: and so of those about whose status it stands that it is common. When under it they are called to proof, if they are uncertain, they will have to be challenged to the form of those certain with whom they are counted concerning communion of principal status, so that accordingly they may also share concerning proof. From here therefore most constantly I will direct that he is not God who is today uncertain, because formerly unknown—when he whom it stands to be stands from this itself that he was never unknown, and therefore not uncertain.