Novatian — On the Trinity 4

Novatian · On the Trinity · c. 250

Moreover, He is Good, Always the Same, Immutable, One and Only, Infinite; And His Own Name Can Never Be Declared, and He is Incorruptible and Immortal.

Him alone the Lord rightly declares good, of whose goodness the whole world is witness; which world He would not have ordained if He had not been good. For if everything was very good, Genesis 1:31 consequently, and reasonably, both those things which were ordained have proved that He that ordained them is good, and those things which are the work of a good Ordainer cannot be other than good; wherefore every evil is a departure from God. For it cannot happen that He should be the originator or architect of any evil work, who claims to Himself the name of the Perfect, both Parent and Judge, especially when He is the avenger and judge of every evil work; because, moreover, evil does not occur to man from any other cause than by his departure from the good God. Moreover, this very thing is specified in man, not because it was necessary, but because he himself so willed it. Whence it manifestly appeared also what was evil; and lest there should seem to be envy in God, it was evident whence evil had arisen. He, then, is always like to Himself; nor does He ever turn or change Himself into any forms, lest by change He should appear to be mortal. For the change implied in turning from one thing to another is comprehended as a portion of a certain death. Thus there is never in Him any accession or increase of any part or honour, lest anything should appear to have ever been wanting to His perfection, nor is any loss sustained in Him, lest a degree of mortality should appear to have been suffered by Him. But what He is, He always is; and who He is, He is always Himself; and what character He has, He always has. For increasing argues beginning, as well as losses prove death and perishing. And therefore He says, I am God, I change not; Malachi 3:6 in that, what is not born cannot suffer change, holding His condition always. For whatever it be in Him which constitutes Divinity, must necessarily exist always, maintaining itself by its own powers, so that He should always be God. And thus He says, I am that I am. For what He is has this name, because it always maintains the same quality of Himself. For change takes away the force of that name That I Am; for whatever, at any time, is changed, is shown to be mortal in that very particular which is changed. For it ceases to be that which it had been, and consequently begins to be what it was not; and therefore, reasonably, there remains always in God His position, in that without any loss arising from change, He is always like and equal to Himself. And what is not born cannot be changed: for only those things undergo change which are made, or which are begotten; in that those things which bad not been at one time, learn to be by coming into being, and therefore to suffer change by being born. Moreover, those things which neither have nativity nor maker, have excluded from themselves the capacity of change, not having a beginning wherein is cause of change. And thus He is declared to be one, having no equal. For whatever can be God, must as God be of necessity the Highest. But whatever is the Highest, must certainly be the Highest in such sense as to be without any equal. And thus that must needs be alone and one on which nothing can be conferred, having no peer; because there cannot be two infinites, as the very nature of things dictates. And that is infinite which neither has any sort of beginning nor end. For whatever has occupied the whole excludes the beginning of another. Because if He does not contain all which is, whatever it is — seeing that what is found in that whereby it is contained is found to be less than that whereby it is contained — He will cease to be God; being reduced into the power of another, in whose greatness He, being smaller, shall have been included. And therefore what contained Him would then rather claim to be God. Whence it results that God's own name also cannot be declared, because He cannot be conceived. For that is contained in a name which is, in any way, comprehended from the condition of His nature. For the name is the signification of that thing which could be comprehended from a name. But when that which is treated of is such that it cannot be worthily gathered into one form by the very understanding itself, how shall it be set forth fittingly in the one word of an appellation, seeing that as it is beyond the intellect, it must also of necessity be above the significancy of the appellation? As with reason when He applies and prefers from certain reasons and occasions His name of God, we know that it is not so much the legitimate propriety of the appellation that is set forth, as a certain significancy determined for it, to which, while men betake themselves, they seem to be able thereby to obtain God's mercy. He is therefore also both immortal and incorruptible, neither conscious of any kind of loss nor ending. For because He is incorruptible, He is therefore immortal; and because He is immortal, He is certainly also incorruptible — each being involved by turns in the other, with itself and in itself, by a mutual connection, and prolonged by a vicarious concatenation to the condition of eternity; immortality arising from incorruption, as well as incorruption coming from immortality.

Latin

1. Quem solum merito bonum pronuntiat Dominus, cuius bonitatis totus testis est mundus, quem non instituisset, nisi bonus fuisset. Nam si omnia bona ualde, consequenter ac merito et quae instituta sunt bona bonum institutorem probauerunt et quae a bono institutore sunt aliud quam bona esse non possunt, ex quo omne malum facessat a Deo. 2. Nec enim potest fieri ut sit initiator aut artifex ullius mali operis, qui nomen sibi perfecti uindicat et parentis et iudicis, maxime cum omnis mali operis uindex sit et iudex, quoniam et non aliunde occurrit homini malum, nisi a bono Deo recessisset. 3. Hoc autem ipsum in homine denotatur, non quia necesse fuit, sed quia ipse sic uoluit. Vnde manifeste et quid malum esset apparuit et, ne inuidia in Deo esse uideretur, a quo malum ortum esset, eluxit.

4. Hic ergo semper sui est similis nec se umquam in aliquas formas uertit aut mutat, ne per immutationem etiam mortalis esse uideatur. Immutatio enim conuersionis portio cuiusdam comprehenditur mortis. Ideo nec adiectio in illo umquam ullius aut partis aut honoris accedit, ne quid umquam perfecto defuisse uideatur, nec detrimentum in eo aliquod agitur, ne gradus mortalitatis receptus esse uideatur, sed quod est, id semper est, et qui est, semper ipse est, et qualis est, semper talis est. 5. Nam et incrementa originem monstrant et detrimenta mortem atque interitum probant. Et ideo Ego, ait, sum Deus et non sum mutatus, statum suum tenens semper, dum id quod natum non est conuerti non potest. 6.

Hoc enim in ipso, quicquid illud potest quod est Deus, semper sit necesse est, ut semper sit Deus, seruans sese uirtutibus suis. Et ideo dicit: Ego sum qui sum. Quod enim est, ideo hoc habet nomen, quoniam eandem semper sui obtinet qualitatem. Immutatio enim tollit illud nomen 'quod est'; quicquid enim aliquando uertitur, mortale ostenditur hoc ipso quod conuertitur. Desinit enim esse quod fuerat et incipit consequenter esse quod non erat. 7. Idcirco et merito in Deo manet semper status suus, dum sine detrimento commutationis semper sui et similis et aequalis est. Quod enim natum non est, nec mutari potest; ea enim sola in conuersionem ueniunt, quaecumque fiunt uel quaecumque gignuntur, dum quae aliquando non fuerant discunt esse nascendo atque ideo nascendo conuerti.

At enim illa quae nec natiuitatem habent nec artificem, excluserunt a se demutationem, dum in qua conuersionis causa est non habent originem. 8. Ideo et unus pronuntiatus est, dum parem non habet. Deus enim, quicquid esse potest quod Deus est, summum sit necesse est. Summum autem quicquid est, ita demum summum esse oportet, dum extra comparem est. Et ideo solum et unum sit necesse est, cui conferri nihil potest, dum parem non habet. 9. Quoniam nec duo infinita esse possunt, ut rerum dictat ipsa natura. Infinitum est autem quicquid nec originem habet omnino nec finem. Excludit enim alterius initium, quicquid occupauerit totum. Quoniam si non omne id quod est quicquid est continet, dum intra id inuenitur quo continetur, minus inuentum eo quo continetur, Deus esse desierit, in alterius potestatem redactus, cuius magnitudine, qua minor, fuerit inclusus, et ideo quod continuit Deus potius esse iam coeperit.

10. Ex quo effectum est ut nec nomen Dei proprium possit edici, quoniam non possit nec concipi. Id enim nomine continetur, quicquid etiam ex naturae suae condicione comprehenditur. Nomen enim significantia est eius rei quae comprehendi potuit ex nomine. At quando id de quo agitur tale est, ut condigne nec ipsis intellectibus colligatur, quomodo appellationis digne uocabulo pronuntiabitur, quod dum extra intellectum est etiam supra appellationis significantiam sit necesse est? 11. Vt merito quando nomen suum Deus ex quibusdam rationibus et occasionibus adicit et praefert, non tam legitimam proprietatem appellationis sciamus esse depromptam quam significantiam quandam constitutam, ad quam dum homines decurrunt Dei misericordiam per ipsam impetrare posse uideantur.

12. Est ergo et immortalis et incorruptibilis nec detrimenta sentiens omnino nec finem. Nam et quia incorruptibilis, ideo et immortalis, et quia immortalis, utique et incorruptibilis, utroque inuicem sibi et in se connexione mutua perplexo et ad statum aeternitatis uicaria concatenatione producto et immortalitate de incorruptione descendente et incorruptione de immortalitate ueniente.

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