Lactantius — Divine Institutes 6.17
But I have been carried farther by the zeal of refuting, though my plan is to show that what the philosophers thought vices are not only not vices but even great virtues. From these, for teaching's sake, I will take what I judge most belongs to the matter. They place fear or dread among the greatest vices and think it the highest weakness of mind, to which courage is contrary; if that is in a human, they say there is no place for fear. Does anyone then believe it can happen that the same fear is the highest courage? Not at all. For nature does not seem to allow something to fall back into its contrary. And yet I will not, by some clever wrap of argument as Socrates does in Plato, forcing those he disputes against to confess what they had denied, but will simply show that the highest fear is the highest virtue. No one doubts that it belongs to a timid and weak mind to fear pain or want or exile or prison or death: whoever has not shuddered at all these is judged most brave. But whoever fears God does not fear all those. To prove this, arguments are not needed: the punishments of God's worshipers have always been seen and are still seen through the world, in whose torturing new and unheard-of torments have been devised. For the mind shudders to recall the kinds of death, when the butchery of savage beasts has raged beyond death itself. Yet happy and unconquered patience has borne these execrable tearings of bodies without any groan. This virtue has given the greatest marvel to all peoples and provinces and to the torturers themselves, when cruelty was conquered by patience. And yet nothing else made this virtue than fear of God. And so, as I was saying, fear is not to be torn out, as the Stoics want, nor tempered, as the Peripatetics want, but directed onto the true road, and fears are to be removed — yet so that this alone is left: which, since it is lawful and true, alone makes it possible that all the rest not be feared.
Desire too is counted among the vices: but if it longs for what is earthly, it is a vice; a virtue, however, if for what is heavenly. For whoever desires to obtain justice, God, perpetual life, everlasting light, and all those things God promises the human will despise these riches and honors and powers and the kingdoms themselves. A Stoic may say perhaps that will is needed to obtain these, not desire. On the contrary, it is too little to will. For many will, but when pain has come upon the vitals, will yields, desire perseveres: which, if it makes all that others seek be held in contempt, is the highest virtue, since indeed it is the mother of continence. And therefore we ought rather to bring it about that the affections, which it is vice to use badly, we direct onto the right. For those stirrings of minds are like a yoked chariot, in whose right guiding the driver's highest office is that he know the road: if he holds it, however furiously he goes, he will not strike; but if he has wandered, though he go calmly and gently, he will either be shaken over broken ground or slip over cliffs or at least be carried where there is no need. So that chariot of life, which is led by affections as by swift horses, if it holds the right road, will do its office. Fear therefore and desire, if they are cast onto the earth, will become vices; virtues, however, if they are referred to the divine.
Frugality, on the contrary, they hold in the place of a virtue: which, if it is a zeal for having, cannot be a virtue, because it is wholly turned to increasing or guarding earthly goods. We however do not refer the highest good to the body, but measure every duty by the preservation of the soul alone. But if, as I taught above, the inheritance is by no means to be spared so that we may hold humanity and justice, it is not a virtue to be thrifty: which name deceives and tricks under the look of virtue. For frugality is indeed abstinence from pleasures, but in that a vice, because it descends from love of having, though one must both abstain from pleasures and by no means be sparing of money. For to use money sparingly — that is, moderately — is a kind of smallness of mind, either fearing beforehand that it may fail oneself, or despairing of being able to restore it, or not taking up contempt of earthly things. But they again call the one who does not spare his household goods a prodigal. For so they distinguish the liberal from the prodigal, that the liberal is the one who gives to those who have deserved well and when it is needed and as much as is enough, but the prodigal the one who pours out both to the undeserving and when there is no need and without regard for the household. What then? Shall we call prodigal the one who for mercy's sake grants food to the needy? And yet it matters much whether you give to whores for lust or to the wretched for humanity, whether pimps and gamblers and panders snatch your money or you present it to piety and God, whether you stuff it into belly and throat or lay it up in the treasury of justice. As therefore it is a vice to pour out toward the bad side, so toward the good it is a virtue. If it is a virtue not to spare wealth that can be restored so that you may sustain a human life that cannot be restored, frugality is therefore a vice. And so I would say nothing else than that those are mad who wish to orphan the human, a gentle and social animal, from that society and mutual help. For justice and humanity and mercy and kindness are nothing if you lock them inside and do not bring them forth into works. Whoever therefore fears God despises all these earthly goods and is ready for whatever must be borne for faith and justice: if the whole body must suffer torments or flame must be drawn into the mouth or hands stretched on the gibbet, he does not ask what he suffers, but how well. But whoever worships God suffers these and does not fear: therefore he is just. By these things it is brought about that whoever is a stranger to the religion of the one God can know or hold neither the virtues nor the virtues' most exact limits at all.
Latin
Sed euectus sum coarguendi studio longius, cum sit mihi propositum ostendere ea quae uitia philosophi putauerunt non tantum uitia non esse, uerum etiam magnas esse uirtutes. ex his iis docendi gratia sumam quae pertinere ad rem maxime puto. metum seu timorem in maximo uitio ponunt summamque inbecillitatem esse animi putant, cui sit contraria fortitudo; quae si sit in homine, locum timori esse nullum. creditne ergo aliquis fieri posse ut idem metus summa sit fortitudo ? minime. neque enim uidetur capere natura ut aliquid in contrarium reccidat. atquin ego non arguta aliqua conclusione, ut aput Platonem Socrates facit, qui eos quos contra disputat cogit ea quae negauerant confiteri, sed simpliciter ostendam summum metum summam esse uirtutem. nemo dubitat quin timidi et inbecilli sit animi aut dolorem metuere aut egestatem aut exilium aut carcerem aut mortem: quae omnia quisquis non exhorruerit, fortissimus iudicatur. qui autem deum metuit, illa uniuersa non metuit. ad quod probandum argumentis opus non est: spectatae sunt enim semper spectanturque adhuc per orbem poenae cultorum dei, in quibus excruciandis noua et inusitata tormenta excogitata sunt. nam de mortis generibus horret animus recordari, cum inmanium bestiarum ultra ipsam mortem carnificina saeuierit. has tamen exsecrabiles corporum lacerationes felix atque inuicta patientia sine ullo gemitu pertulit. haec uirtus omnibus populis atque prouinciis et ipsis tortoribus miraculum maximum praebuit, cum patientia crudelitas uinceretur. atquin hanc uirtutem nihil aliut quam metus dei fecit. itaque, ut dicebam, non euellendus, ut Stoici, neque temperandus timor, ut Peripatetici uolunt, sed in ueram uiam dirigendus est auferendique sunt metus, sed ita ut hic solus relinquatur: qui quoniam legitimus ac uerus est, solus efficit ut possint cetera omnia non timeri.
cupiditas quoque inter uitia numeratur: sed si haec quae terrena sunt concupiscat, uitium est, uirtus autem, si caelestia. qui enim iustitiam, qui deum, qui uitam perpetuam, qui lucem sempiternam eaque omnia quae deus homini pollicetur consequi cupit, opes istas et honores et potentatus et regna ipsa contemnet. dicet fortasse Stoicus uoluntate opus esse ad haec consequenda, non cupiditate. immo uero parum est uelle. multi enim uolunt, sed cum dolor uisceribus accesserit, uoluntas cedit, cupiditas perseuerat: quae si efficit ut contemptui sint omnia quae a ceteris adpetuntur, summa uirtus est, siquidem continentiae mater est. ideoque illut potius efficere debemus, ut adfectus, quibus praue uti uitium est, derigamus in rectum. nam istae concitationes animorum iuncto currui similes sunt, in quo recte moderando summum rectoris officium est ut uiam nouerit: quam si tenebit, quamlibet concitate ierit, non offendet, si autem aberrauerit, licet placide ac leniter eat, aut per confragosa uexabitur aut per praecipitia labetur aut certe quo non est opus deferetur. sic currus ille uitae, qui adfectibus uelut equis pernicibus ducitur, si uiam rectam teneat, fungetur officio. metus igitur et cupiditas si proiciantur in terram, uitia fient, uirtutes autem, si ad diuina referantur.
parsimoniam contra uirtutis loco habent: quae si studium est habendi, non potest esse uirtus, quia in augendis uel tuendis terrestribus bonis tota uersatur. nos autem summum bonum non referimus ad corpus, sed omne officium solius animae conseruatione metimur. quodsi, ut supra docui, patrimonio minime parcendum est, ut humanitatem iustitiamque teneamus, non est uirtus frugi esse: quod nomen specie uirtutis fallit ac decipit. est enim frugalitas abstinentia quidem uoluptatum, sed eo uitium, quia ex habendi amore descendit, cum sit et uoluptatibus abstinendum et pecuniae minime temperandum. nam parce id est mediocriter uti pecunia quasi quaedam pusillitas animi est aut praetimentis ne sibi desit aut desperantis posse se illam reparare aut contemptum terrestrium non capientis. sed illi rursus eum qui rei familiari suae non parcat prodigum uocant. nam ita liberalem distinguunt a prodigo, quod is liberalis sit qui et bene meritis et cum oportet et quantum satis est largiatur, prodigus uero, qui et non meritis et cum opus non est et sine respectu rei familiaris effundat. quid ergo? prodigumne dicemus eum qui misericordiae causa tribuat egentibus uictum ? atquin multum refert utrumne scortis propter libidinem largiare an miseris propter humanitatem, utrum pecuniam tuam perductores aleatores lenonesque diripiant an illam pietati ac deo praestes, utrumne illam uentri et gulae ingeras an in thesauro iustitiae reponas. ut ergo uitium est effundere m malam partem, sic in bonam uirtus. si uirtus est non parcere opibus quae possunt reparari, ut hominis uitam sustentes quae reparari non potest, uitium igitur parsimonia est. quare nihil aliut dixerim quam insanos qui hominem, mite ac sociale animal, orbant suo nomine, qui euulsis adfectibus quibus omnis constat humanitas, ad immobilem stuporem mentis perducere uolunt, dum student animum perturbationibus liberare et, ut ipsi dicunt, quietum tranquillumque reddere. quod fieri non tantum non potest, quia uis et ratio eius in motu est, sed ne oportet quidem, quia sicut aqua semper iacens et quieta insalubris et magis turbida est, sic animus inmotus ac torpens inutilis est etiam sibi, nec uitam ipsam tueri poterit, quia nec faciet quicquam nec cogitabit, cum cogitatio ipsa nihil aliut sit quam mentis agitatio. denique qui hanc immobilitatem animi adsernnt, priuare animum uita uolunt, quia uita actuosa est, mors quieta. quaedam etiam recte pro uirtutibus habent, sed earum modum non tenent. uirtus est constantia, non ut inferentibus iniuriam resistamus — his enim cedendum est; quod . cur fieri debeat mox docebo —, sed ut iubentibus facere nos contra legem dei contraque iustitiam nullis minis aut suppliciis terreamur, quominus dei iussionem iussioni hominis praeferamus. item uirtus est mortem contemnere, non ut adpetamus eamque nobis ultro inferamus, sicut philosophorum plurimi et maximi saepe fecerunt, quod est sceleratum ac nefarium, sed ut coacti deum relinquere ac fidem prodere mortem suscipere malimus libertatemque defendamus aduersus inpotentium stultam uecordemque uiolentiam et omnes saeculi minas atque terrores fortitudine animi prouocemus. sic ea quae alii timent, excelsa et insuperabili mente dolorem mortemque calcabimus. haec est uirtus, haec uera constantia, in hoc tuenda et conseruanda solo, ut nullus nos terror, nulla uis a deo possit auertere. uera igitur Ciceronis illa sententia est: nemo inquit iustus potest esse qui mortem, qui dolorem, qui exsilium, qui egestatem timet; item Senecae m libus moralis philosophiae dicentis: hic est ille homo honestus, non apice purpuraue, non lictorum insignis ministerio, sed nulla re minor, qui cum mortem in uicinia uidit, non sic perturbatur tamquam rem nonam uiderit, qui siue toto corpore tormenta patienda sunt siue flamma ore rapienda est siue extendendae per patibulum manus, non quaerit quid patiatur, sed quam bene. qui autem deum colit, haec patitur nec timet: ergo iustus est. his rebus efficitur ut neque uirtutes neque uirtutum exactissimos limites nosse ant tenere possit omnino quisquis est a religione dei singularis alienus.