Lactantius — Divine Institutes 6.16
But I do not think even the Peripatetics have reached the truth, who grant that there are vices but temper them moderately. For one must abstain even from middling vices. Rather it ought first to have been brought about that vices not exist: for nothing vicious can be born, but vices come to be if we use affections badly, virtues if well; then it ought to be shown that not the affections themselves but their causes are to be moderated. 'One must not,' they say, 'exult with excessive joy, but moderately and temperately.' But this is such as if they said one must not run hard, but walk quietly. And yet both one who walks can err and one who runs can hold the straight road. What? If I show there is something where not only moderate but even a point of rejoicing is vicious, and another on the contrary where even to exult with joy is not at all criminal, what then will that middleness profit us? I ask whether they think the wise person should rejoice if he sees some evil befall his enemy, or whether he ought to rein joy if, with enemies conquered or a tyrant crushed, liberty and safety have been won for the citizens. No one doubts that both to rejoice a little in the former and to rejoice too little in the latter is the greatest crime.
The same may be said of the other affections. But, as I said, the account of wisdom is not turned to moderating these, but to their causes, since they are moved from outside, and bridles ought not especially to have been put on them themselves, since both the small can be in the greatest crime and the greatest can be without crime, but they ought to have been assigned to certain times and things and places, so that those things we may rightly use not be vices. For as to walk rightly is good, but to wander is evil, so to be moved by affections toward the right is good, toward the crooked, evil.
For lust, if it does not wander outside the lawful bed, though it be fierce, nevertheless lacks blame; but if it seeks another's, though it be middling, it is nevertheless the greatest vice. It is therefore not a disease to be angry nor to desire nor to be moved by lust, but it is a disease to be irascible, greedy, lustful. For whoever is irascible is angry even at whom he ought not or when he ought not; whoever is greedy desires even what is not needed; whoever is lustful seeks even what is forbidden by laws. The whole account therefore ought to have turned on this, that since the rush of those things can neither be checked nor ought to be, because it is necessarily planted for guarding life's duties, it be rather directed onto the straight road, where even a run is without stumble and danger.
Latin
At ego ne Peripateticos quidem accessisse ad ueritatem puto, qui uitia esse concedunt, sed ea mediocriter temperant. carendum est enim uitiis etiam mediocribus. quin potius efficiendum fuit primum, ne uitia essent: nec enim quicquam uitiosum nasci potest, sed uitia fieri, si male utamur adfectibus, uirtutes, si bene; deinde monstrandum, non ipsos adrectus, sed eorum causas esse moderandas. \'non est\' inquiunt \'nimia laetitia gestiendum, sed modice ac temperate.\' hoc uero tale est, quale si dicerent non esse currendum concitate, sed gradiendum quiete. at potest et qui graditur errare et qui currit rectam uiam tenere. quid? si ostendo esse aliquid ubi non tantum modicum, sed uel punctum gaudere uitiosum sit, et aliut contra in quo uel exultare laetitia minime criminosum, quid tandem nobis ista mediocritas proderit? quaero utrumne sapienti laetandum putent, si quid inimico suo mali uideat accidere, aut utrumne laetitiam frenare debeat, si uictis hostibus aut obpresso tyranno libertas et salus ciuibus parta sit. nemo dubitat quin et in illo exiguum laetari et in hoc parum laetari sit maximum crimen.
eadem de ceteris adfectibus licet dicere. sed, ut dixi, non in his moderandis sapientiae ratio uersatur, sed in causis eorum, quoniam extrinsecus commouentur, nec ipsis potissimum frenos inponi oportuit, quoniam et exigui possunt esse in maximo crimine, et maximi possunt esse sine crimine, sed adsignandi fuerunt certis temporibus et rebus et locis, ne uitia sint quibus uti recte licet. sicut enim recte ambulare bonum est, errare autem malum, sic moueri adfectibus in rectum bonum est, in prauum, malum. nam libido si extra legitimum torum non euagetur, licet sit uehemens, tamen culpa caret, sin uero adpetit alienum, licet sit mediocris, uitium tamen maximum est.
non est itaque morbus irasci nec cupere nec libidine commoueri, sed iracundum esse morbus est, cupidum, libidinosum. qui enim iracundus est, etiam cui non debet aut cum non oportet irascitur, qui cupidus, etiam quod non opus est concupiscit, qui libidinosus, etiam quod legibus uetatur adfectat. omnis igitur ratio in eo uersari debuit, ut quoniam earum rerum inpetus inhiberi nec potest nec debet, quia necessario est insitus ad tuenda officia uitae, derigeretur potius in uiam rectam, ubi etiam cursus offensione ac periculo careat.