Lactantius — Divine Institutes 6.15

For that these are natural, not voluntary, the account of all living things shows, which is shaken by the same affections in all. The Peripatetics therefore more rightly deny that all these can be taken away, because they were born together with us, and they try to show how providently and how necessarily God or nature — for so they say — armed us with these affections: which nevertheless, because they often become vicious if they are excessive, can be temperately moderated by a human with measure applied, so that only so much is left to the human as is enough for nature. Not a foolish dispute, if, as I said, they did not refer everything to this life. The Stoics therefore are mad, who do not temper these things but cut them off and wish somehow to castrate the human of things planted by nature. Which is such as if they wished either to take fear from deer or venom from snakes or anger from wild beasts or mildness from cattle. For what were given one by one to mute animals were truly given all at once to the human. But if, as physicians affirm, the affection of joy is in the spleen, of anger in the gall, of lust in the liver, of fear in the heart, it is easier to kill the animal itself than to tear something out of the body: which is to wish to change the nature of a living thing.

But prudent humans do not understand that when they take vices from the human they also take virtue, for which alone they make a place. For if virtue is to restrain and check oneself in the midst of anger's rush — which they cannot deny — then whoever lacks anger lacks virtue. If virtue is to contain the body's lust, he must lack virtue who does not have lust to temper. If virtue is to bridle desire from seeking another's goods, he can certainly have no virtue who lacks that toward whose restraining the use of virtue is applied. Where therefore there are no vices, there is not even a place for virtue, just as not even for victory where there is no adversary. So it happens that good cannot be without evil in this life. Affections therefore are as it were the natural richness of minds. For as a field which is fertile by nature overflows in old age, so an uncultivated mind is covered with vices growing strong of their own accord as with thorns. But when the true cultivator has come, at once with vices yielding the crops of virtue arise. God therefore, when he first formed the human, by marvelous providence first planted in him those motions of mind so that he could take virtue as the earth takes tillage, and he placed the matter of vices in the affections, of virtue in the vices. Which will surely either be nothing or will not be able to be in use if those things are lacking through which its force either appears or stands.

Let us now see what those same ones who cut vices out by the root have achieved. Those four affections which they think arise from the opinion of goods and evils, by whose uprooting they judge the wise person's mind must be healed — since they understand both that they are planted by nature and that without them nothing can be moved, nothing done — they put certain others in their place and turn. For desire they substitute will, as if it were not much better to desire the good than to will the evil; likewise for joy, gladness; for fear, caution. But in that fourth the account of changing the name fails them. And so they have taken away grief entirely — that is, sadness and pain of mind: which can by no means happen. For who can not grieve if pestilence has drained the homeland or an enemy overturned it or a tyrant oppressed it? Can anyone not grieve if he has seen liberty taken away, if neighbors, if friends, if good men have been either banished or most cruelly slaughtered? Unless his mind has grown so numb that every sense has been snatched from him. Wherefore they ought either to have taken away all or this short and weak dispute ought to have been filled out — that is, something also put back for grief, since with the earlier ones so arranged this followed. For as we rejoice in present goods, so we are distressed and grieve at evils. If therefore they gave joy, because they thought it vicious, another name, so it was fitting that another word be assigned to grief, because they think it too vicious. From which it appears they lacked not the thing but the word: by whose lack they wished to take away that whole affection which is even the greatest, against what nature would allow. For I could refute those changes of names at more length and show either that many names were set on the same things for the sake of adorning speech and increasing vocabulary, or at least that those do not differ much among themselves. For desire begins from will and caution arises from fear and joy is nothing else than gladness made public. But let us suppose, as they themselves wish, that they are different. Surely therefore they will say desire is a persevering and perpetual will, but joy gladness lifting itself insolently, and fear excessive caution exceeding measure. So it happens that they do not take away the things they judge must be taken away, but temper them, since indeed they only change the names, the things themselves remain. Therefore they roll back unawares to where the Peripatetics arrive by reason, that since vices cannot be taken away they must be tempered in the middle. They err therefore, because they do not achieve what they want, and by a long and rough circuit return to the same road.